{UAH} HOW DID THE NRA INITIALLY MANAGE TO ESTABLISH BASES IN LUWERO?
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After the elections Museveni remained a free person. He organised the launching of the guerrilla war unhindered. He put in place a network of contacts in the government and security organs. He established a line of supply that was to play a vital role in connecting new entrants to the bush, delivery of essential commodies and medice, and hosting those who would leave the bush to vist Kampala or other areas even outside the country. After the attack on Kabamba on 6th Feb. 1981, the NRA withdrew to Kiboga. The UPC government and the UNLA - the national army was ill prepared for the challenge. President Obote down played the NRA threat as mere bandits. During the first few months, the NRA could even drive vehicles in the area. Museveni used to ride a Vespa motocycle, donned a moslem cap and was refered to as Hajji. It took long before the government deployed troops to track the NRA. During that time, the NRA had ample time to link with simpathisers, local contacts and the external wing. He systematically decided who among his former FRONASAs was to remain in the National army to work from within and those that were to join him in the bush. He got all those Rwandese Tutsi refugees whom he had earlier set aside after they were eliminated from the new post Amin army. He despatched a strong team to estalish an external wing based in Nairobi.
At the time, the country's security was partly manned by the Tanzanian army. The bigger number had been withdrawn back to their country but a significant number manned vital and strategic installations. Museveni would make desparate appeals to Tanzania's Nyerere to withdraw the remaining troops so that he would further disorganise the disorganised UNLA. He use to make these appeals from Sam Njuba's office on Nkuruma Road by calling Nyerere's close confidant, a one Joseph Butiku who is now the Chairman of Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation. Earlier, the first casuality of Museveni's guerrilla war was the Tanzanian Corporal who was manning security at the Quarter Guard during the attack on Kabamba barracks. He was shot by Elly Tumwiine - the lead attacker. Later on, during an attack on Kakiri detachement, Tanzanian soldiers were killed. Museveni always boasts of having watched Paul Kagame blow up a sturbon machine gunner. In another incident, a Tanzanian Major was killed in anNRA ambush. This speeded up the total withdraw of Tanzanian troops from Uganda leaving the NRA to have a free day against the infant UNLA. Museveni very well knew that the UNLA without the backing of Tanzania was easy to infiltrate and disorganise. His innitial estimate had been that most westerners, Baganda and other Bantus would defect and join him so that within a few months he would have overwhelm the UNLA and taken over government. That is why during the early days the NRA was even using vehicles.
When a quick victory proved furtile, he switched to the protracted method including among others allying with other groups to win the support of Baganda. The so called Luwero Triangle was a vast savanaland with thickets. Much of the areas where the NRA established hideouts were forest reserves and innactive huge chunks of land owned by absentee landlords and used by pastrolists commonly known as Lukoola. The area was originally sparsely populated. The inhabitants were mainly Hima and Rwandese pastrolists (Balaalo). These are the people who were later to benefit from the Kanyaryeru resetllement scheme after Museveni took power. These Balalos had mastered the area very well and would act as guides to the NRA. The areas inhabited by Baganda peasants were used as sources of food and hit and run battles with the UNLA. The UNLA on the other hand operated from a strange terrain coupled by a manipulated hostile local population. The hostility arose from UNLA's internal weaknesses coupled by NRA's deceptive methods of operation. If the UPC government and the UNLA had taken on the with the seriousness it deserved, it would not have survived the first two months. Museveni's NRA, yes, Bandits indeed they were and they still are.
At the time, the country's security was partly manned by the Tanzanian army. The bigger number had been withdrawn back to their country but a significant number manned vital and strategic installations. Museveni would make desparate appeals to Tanzania's Nyerere to withdraw the remaining troops so that he would further disorganise the disorganised UNLA. He use to make these appeals from Sam Njuba's office on Nkuruma Road by calling Nyerere's close confidant, a one Joseph Butiku who is now the Chairman of Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation. Earlier, the first casuality of Museveni's guerrilla war was the Tanzanian Corporal who was manning security at the Quarter Guard during the attack on Kabamba barracks. He was shot by Elly Tumwiine - the lead attacker. Later on, during an attack on Kakiri detachement, Tanzanian soldiers were killed. Museveni always boasts of having watched Paul Kagame blow up a sturbon machine gunner. In another incident, a Tanzanian Major was killed in anNRA ambush. This speeded up the total withdraw of Tanzanian troops from Uganda leaving the NRA to have a free day against the infant UNLA. Museveni very well knew that the UNLA without the backing of Tanzania was easy to infiltrate and disorganise. His innitial estimate had been that most westerners, Baganda and other Bantus would defect and join him so that within a few months he would have overwhelm the UNLA and taken over government. That is why during the early days the NRA was even using vehicles.
When a quick victory proved furtile, he switched to the protracted method including among others allying with other groups to win the support of Baganda. The so called Luwero Triangle was a vast savanaland with thickets. Much of the areas where the NRA established hideouts were forest reserves and innactive huge chunks of land owned by absentee landlords and used by pastrolists commonly known as Lukoola. The area was originally sparsely populated. The inhabitants were mainly Hima and Rwandese pastrolists (Balaalo). These are the people who were later to benefit from the Kanyaryeru resetllement scheme after Museveni took power. These Balalos had mastered the area very well and would act as guides to the NRA. The areas inhabited by Baganda peasants were used as sources of food and hit and run battles with the UNLA. The UNLA on the other hand operated from a strange terrain coupled by a manipulated hostile local population. The hostility arose from UNLA's internal weaknesses coupled by NRA's deceptive methods of operation. If the UPC government and the UNLA had taken on the with the seriousness it deserved, it would not have survived the first two months. Museveni's NRA, yes, Bandits indeed they were and they still are.
*A positive mind is a courageous mind, without doubts and fears, using the experience and wisdom to give the best of him/herself.
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The only way of limiting the usurpation of power by
individuals, the military or otherwise, is to put the people in charge - Capt. Thomas. Sankara {RIP} '1949-1987
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revolution inevitable"**… *J.F Kennedy
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