{UAH} GENERAL SEJUSA, PLEASE TELL US MORE ABOUT TINYEFUZA'S ROLE IN 2006, 2001 AND 2011

(Time isn't on our side so this is an appeal to the General to satisfy
our curiosity as we map out a revolutionary long trek)

Over the weekend, defector Gen. David Sejusa addressed a gathering in
London where, among other things, he told his amazed audience that the
2006 elections had been fixed in favour of eventual winner, President
Yoweri Museveni (of NRM) against FDC's Dr. Kiiza Besigye and three
others. The same election had come in the wake of a reversion to
multi-partyism and removal of term limits under article 105(2) of the
constitution to allow the incumbent contest again.

The 2006 election stands out as a time when President Museveni's
vitality was under severe test, with several factors ganging up bring
down his score. The foregoing season had seen the spread of LRA
activities to Eastern region on top of Karimojong cattle rustler
incursions. The anguish this created alienated that part of the
country against Museveni. In the North, the people were still
disillusioned at their suffering, living in camps in unbelievable
conditions. There were unprecedented power shortages countrywide after
the failure to put up a new dam at Bujagali and carefree attitude of
consumers who hadn't woken up to alternatives.

Buganda too had lost patience as it was over a decade since the
kingdom had been reinstated but with ceremonial existence, short of
grounded belongings and real power sharing. When Dr. Besigye returned
from exile late 2005, he was sure he was a new face of hope for
unhappy circles and in his estimation had landslide in the making. In
fact, even the 69% which Sejusa accorded him in London is small in
comparison.

When all was said and done, Museveni took home 59%, while Besigye
retained 38% or thereabout. At Parliamentary and Local Council level,
NRM swept the scene with a majority but the discontent persisted
including after the Supreme Court dismissed Dr. Besigye's. The
majority verdict reiterated that the polls had had irregularities but
not significant enough to cause a cancellation of the same. And the
same learned bench said nothing of whether a Museveni loss would
automatically denote a Besigye win despite the fact that he was the
lead petitioner.

True, the Besigye camp despised all other candidates and couldn't have
tolerated any surprise emergencies. The tone of their campaign alone
said a lot. During the same campaign Besigye was under trial before
court for high crime, from which sympathy votes were expected, hence
skepticism of defeat that has persisted. And that the nature of
elections; that it is not over till it is.

As a former insider, Sejusa's angle refreshes the stockpile of
lingering questions. The exiled soldier has quickly learnt how to feed
sentiments, thereby attracting a rubbing in of clarification and
further assurance from the "bubble buster", if sources in attendance
reported accurately. The soldier has quickly learnt how to feed
sentiments in distinctive field operation style. Pick on something
juicy and rub it in! Which approach attracts a rubbing in of questions
that beg clarification and further assurance from the "bubble buster".

He said as Intelligence Chief he set up a base at Basiima House where
results from the field were altered before filing them to the National
Electoral Commission, whose operation headquarters were situated at
Namboole (Mandela National Stadium). FDC too ran its own tally centre,
according to party officials. Did FDC gain access to General Sejusa's
favourable results? This renders it quite a job to determine whom he
fed with correct data.

He wasn't in NRM, therefore, there is nil to show that he could have
worked for the party's good against others since he was a serving
soldier. The public would also be pleased to know why he believes
Museveni couldn't have defeated Besigye at the time and why the winner
limped away with 59% and not some "dictatorial" figure like 93%.

Research reveals a puzzling flashback on the ownership and use of the
alleged operational base of Sejusa's (then Tinyefuza) electoral
commission and this information can be crosschecked. By that election
year, the headquarters of Military Intelligence was at Yusuf Lule
(Kittante) Road, near Mulago Hospital.

Previously, Basiima House had been headquarters for the Directorate of
Military Intelligence (DMI) of the National Resistance Army (NRA)
before it was handed back to its owners - Buganda – under the regime
of Brig. Fred Toolit, somewhere around 2000. Could Buganda have hired
it to then Gen Tinyefuza for his election-thieving operation (against
Dr. Besigye, for whom he was bestman at his 1999 wedding)?

In 2006, the Chief of Military Intelligence (CMI) was the late Brig.
Noble Mayombo, then a colonel, whose closeness to Sejusa was suspect,
before he later met a sudden demise (2007). As for Mengo's stand, the
Katikkiro then was Owek. Dan Muliika, a very sensitive gentleman who
has since been with Ssuubi and IPC. He was so culturally embedded with
the whole exercise that for him to have overseen Mengo take a devotee
stand in favour of the regime by letting out to them a monumental
structure such as Basiima is to be further subjected to
cross-examination.

General Sejusa should help cross-cutting audiences who need to
understand if he was operating with orders from a particular
beneficiary or implementing a policy passed by a large group such a
party caucus or council. As well, what role did he play in the 2001
and 2011 seasons? There exists a possibility of self-incriminating as
the sole architect of a project similar to what took him to the
jungles in the 1980s, and that would be exceedingly dreadful for his
imposing career.

Robert Atuhairwe

This is an original version of the article published in Observer, Dec. 27, 2013
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"TRY TO GROW UP!"