{UAH} Why Museveni launched the guerrilla war in Luwero

Museveni did not undergo military training in the mid-1960s in anticipation that the UPC led by Obote would rig the elections in 1980. Rather, the loss of Mpororo kingdom in mid-18^th century due to internal decay; the dispersal of Bahororo (Tutsi from Rwanda) who became commoners in Ankole and elsewhere they settled; the failure to gain a district for Bahororo in Ankole at independence in 1962; the defeat of Tutsi by Hutu in Rwanda; the exodus of his Tutsi cousins out of Rwanda beginning in 1959 and the takeover of Ankole politics by Bairu former Tutsi servants – all bothered Museveni who falsely believes Tutsi are Hamitic (white people with a dark skin) and therefore superior over Bantu could not accept defeat, adjust and move on.     

Museveni therefore embarked on a crusade with Tutsi refugees to restore their supremacy in Ankole and Rwanda and extend the boundaries to the entire Great Lakes region and create a Tutsi Empire, explaining in part why Rwanda and Uganda delegates met not too long ago and agreed to eliminate national boundaries among member states of the East African community. Knowing full well that he did not have the numbers for electoral victory, Museveni resorted to military training to bring him to power and use the gun to advance his interests in the region. Had it not been for Mugabe in particular and other leaders that backed Desire Kabila in the renewed war that started in 1998, Museveni would have won and with Rwanda declared a Tutsi Empire. The idea is still well and alive being pursued, inter alia, through the East African economic integration and political federation.

When he left Dar es Salaam, Museveni was hired as a research assistant in Obote's office where he worked on refugee matters – presumably that was his choice – so he could identify where Tutsi refugees lived in Uganda, get their names and contact addresses should he need them for his military activities.

Museveni's rather insignificant role against Muwanga and Oyitey-Ojok in the post-Amin transitional government and loss of a parliamentary seat to Sam Kutesa in Ankole made him conclude that war was the only way forward but could not be waged from Ankole where he had just lost an election.

Museveni then chose the Luwero Triangle as a safe base for various reasons. He knew Baganda did not like Obote and anyone who resisted Obote militarily would get the backing of Baganda that failed to defeat him politically in the 1980 elections.

Luwero was strategically located vis-à-vis Kampala, Uganda's capital city and could easily get attacked from nearby guerrilla bases. Luwero was also the economic hub of Uganda: controlling it would give Museveni the means of sustenance and cripple UPC government buy cutting off supplies for domestic consumption and export.

Museveni knew that the anticipated long guerrilla war would break the backbone of Buganda. In its weakened economic, social and demographic state Baganda would not mount resistance after he captured power. Museveni was aware of Baganda stiff resistance to Britain, Obote I, Amin and Obote II regimes. And he was not going to tolerate that resistance to his regime. That is why large parts were depopulated during the war and resettled by non-Baganda after the war. Relocating Baganda into the forest wasn't possibly primarily for security purposes. It could have been a strategy to create room for other settlers that would back him up when needed.

At the start of the war in 1981, Luwero Triangle had 1.5 million inhabitants according to the 1980 census. According to some estimates 700,000 people lost their lives and many did not return after the war. Therefore at least 50 percent of the current residents of Luwero Triangle could be non-Baganda. With the new non-Baganda settlers accumulating wealth and political power Museveni has a safe base in Buganda to wage imperial war in the Great Lakes region. Museveni's apparently rosy dealings with Mengo and the acceptance of new landlords on Buganda soil in return for restoring properties confiscated during the 1966 and 1967 crises may signal that Museveni and his people are in Buganda to stay permanently – many of them entered Buganda after 1959 as refugees for temporary stay.

Finally, Museveni chose Luwero because many Banyarwanda lived there working as crop cultivators and cattle herders. Thus, he had a ready pool to recruit from. Since becoming president, Museveni has through a wide range of strategies including unemployment and associated economic helplessness and political voicelessness as well as land grabbing tightened his hold on Buganda. Museveni's apparent rosy relationship with Mengo will make it difficult for those who oppose him to uproot him with his new landlords.

In the circumstances what is needed is a combined and harmonized effort of all Ugandans to unseat Museveni and NRM instead of Baganda trying to do it alone and only by military means.

Eric Kashambuzi      

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