{UAH} WHY MAO HAD TO RETREAT FROM BUGANDA.
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WHY MAO HAD TO RETREAT FROM BUGANDA.
"You Westerners are giving me headache; am going to EMPLOY
my Northerners because for them when they don't like you they let you know" - Museveni lamenting to his then chief driver Godfrey Kisembo before his services were terminated; as narrated in an interview with the Daily Monitor, Nov 23rd 2013.
'NORTHERNERS'
In Uganda, the term North or Northern Region is generally used to refer to the northern and north-eastern region more especially if used in a demographic context especially by people from the southern and western regions. More often the people of northern Uganda (Acholi and Langi) and those of north eastern (Iteso, Karamojong and the Luos of Tororo and Busia) are referred to as 'Northerners' because of their Nilotic/Luo ethnic background. Since independence, its these tribes that had dominated the national security services sector. Apart from the Sudanic tribes of West Nile region, the central, eastern and western region is dominated by the Bantus.
FIGHTING IDDI AMIN
In 1971 Iddi Amin overthrew Milton Obote in a military coup. Milton Obote was from the Langi/Nilotic of northern Uganda and Iddi Amin was from the Kakwa/Sudanic of West Nile region. Obote fled to exiled in Tanzania together with some of his UPC party officials and army officers from the Acholi and Langi tribes. In exile they planned an armed comeback in 1972 that was decisively defeated by Iddi Amin prompting a purge of Acholi and Langi tribesmen in the army thus swelling their numbers in exile by defectors. In the meantime, the Uganda army under Iddi Amin came to be dominated by Sudanics and Bantus. Also in exile were a good number of Bantu UPC cadres and among them the militant Yoweri Museveni who after the failed 1972 attack opted to form his own briefcase armed group FRONASA. In 1978 Ugandan exiles backed by Tanzanian troops invaded Uganda in retaliation to Iddi Amin's attack and annexation of the Kagera salient. The Ugandan exiles contingent comprised of predominantly Acholi and Langi was branded Kikosi Malum (Task Force). On entering Uganda territory, Museveni embarked on recruiting from Rwandese refugee camps in order to swell the ranks of his FRONASA.
POST IDDI AMIN ARMY
By the time Iddi Amin was overthrown in April 1979 Museveni as Minister of Defence had raised a formidable force of his personal army FRONASA faction comprised of Bantus within the new Uganda army that had been branded Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). His sinister actions had sparked off a recruitment race based on ethnic considerations in order for the key players to catch up with the strength of numbers in the new army. Museveni's schemes suffered a setback when his militant Rwandese refugees were by law eliminated from the new national army. Sill wtithin FRONASA there were mischievous boys who ended up serving under the UNLA uninterrupted during his five years guerilla war. That is how the UNLA ended up with all sorts of rogue and vagabonds that were to become a liability later.
BUSH WAR
By the time Museveni opted to fight the UPC government in 1981 he knew he has so much undermined the UNLA's internal cohesion. Initially he took along with him a private army that had been eliminated by law from UNLA and had hoped for mass defection of Bantu soldiers. His war became clearly a Bantu southern army fighting against the northern Luo dominated government and army. In 1985 the Acholi dominated UNLA overthrew the UPC government on grounds that the Langi in the army were leaving the Acholis to do much of the fighting against the Musevenis Bantu army (NRA). The new military government invited all fighting groups to join it prompting the West Nile groups composed mainly of former Iddi Amin soldiers and some Buganda groups to respond but Museveni refused. He accused the military government of working with Iddi Amin Murderers (fighting groups from West Nile) whom he referred to as Anyanyas. Eventually the term Anyanya came to signify the entire populations of northern Uganda and particularly the UNLA. In return, the people from northern Uganda also referred to Museveni's army as Nyanrwandas (Rwandese). Through the manipulation of the Nairobi peace talks, Museveni defeated the military government and took over power.
INSURGENCY AGAINST THE MUSEVENI GOVERNMENT
Museveni's defeat of UNLA was a devastating blow on the people of northern Uganda more especially the Acholi sub-region whose connection with military service had been historically entrenched. A good number of Acholi former soldiers established bases in the Southern Sudan from where they launched come back attacks. The sectarian and retaliatory conduct by Museveni's NRA in northern Uganda fueled the Acholi resistance against the NRA that was being perceived as an army of occupation. However, quite a formidable number of northerners in the NRA at the time (either incorporated former soldiers or newly recruited) though not in top command positions, fought against the insurgents with dedication. The initial rebel group under UPDA struck a DEAL with government by signing a peace deal at Pecce Stadium. Some top Political and military leaders of the UPDA (Charles Alai and group) joined the Museveni government. Owing to to the continued repression by Museveni's NRA coupled by the desperate desire to regain the lost glory of possessing gun and donning of military fatigue. Consequently, the Holly Spirit Movement (HSM) under Alice Lakwena and later the LRA under Joseph Kony came into place. The government could not contain the carnage of armed bands of Karamajong warriors' raids for pillage into Acholi, Teso and Lango thus depriving these communities of their cattle. Some senior NRA commanders like Gen Matayo Kyaligonza had also helped themselves with huge stocks of cattle from Teso sub-region. More insurgent groups came up as a result of attempting to put in place a kind of self defence. The UPA (Uganda Peoples' Army) in Teso sub-region was one such example. Because of the differences owing to the 1985 coup, the Langis could not joint hands with the Acholis under LRA. However, they bore the brunt of LRA atrocities and attempted to form their own rebel group under the former Chief of Staff Brig Opon Achak before he was mysteriously killed by the NRA. In the meantime, other rebel groups cropped up in the West Nile region. Of all those groups, its only the Acholi dominated LRA that thrived to-date.
THE SPLA FACTOR
During the cold war era, the USSR backed the rebel SPLA through Ethiopia's Haille Mengistu while the USA backed Khartoum. When the oil giant Chevron discovered oil in Sudan, the USA ignored Sudan's atrocities in its war against the SPLA. Consequently Khartoum pushed the SPLA further south to the border with Uganda and it split into different factions. When the communist leaning Museveni took over power in 1986 he had embarked on supporting the SPLA rebels. The LRA had established bases in Southern Sudan; a territory inhabited by their ethnic cousins. With the end of the cold war, the collapse of the USSR and the Mengistu in Ethiopia but more so Khartoum's Islamic radicalisation coupled by its opposition to the Iraq invasion, the USA withdrew ITS SUPPORT to Khartoum. Museveni whose anti-imperialism stance had put off both the Reagan and Bush (Sr) administrations, was now courted by the Clinton administration for the Somali Mission. When he opportunistically embraced IMF/WB SAP, he registered the overwhelming backing of the West. With the backing of USA, he embarked on full military support to the SPLA on grounds that he was containing the spread of Islamic Fundamentalism by Khartoum and helping black Southern Sudanese against the Arab north. In return Khartoum doubled its support for the LRA and some parts of northern and west Nile region of Uganda bore the brunt of constant bombing by Sudan's Antonovs. Even when Khartoum seemed to lessen its support to the LRA, some factions of the SPLA would continue to replenish its stocks. When South Sudan got its independence, it created a buffer zone between Khartoum and the LRA but Museveni continued to get worried of the ethnic connection between the predominantly Acholi LRA and a stable South Sudan. This partly explains why SPLA's John Garang had to die in a Ugandan helicopter crash and Museveni's recent panicky military intervention in the South Sudan crisis.
INSURGENT POPULATIONS FIGHT ARMED INSURGENTS
As the rebellion intensified in the northern and north eastern regions, Museveni realised that his army was viewed by the local population as an army of occupation. He devised a means of encamping the local population into what he termed as IDPs (Internally Displaced People's camps). Thereafter he sought to exploit the economic deprivation of the local population for military service by creating local militias like Amuka, Arrow Boys, Home Guards etc. With quasi military training, army uniform and guns, and some little or no pay, these militias though initially meant to guard IDPs ended up engaging the LRA in distant field battles thus leaving the camps vulnerable to attacks. The army reabsorbed the former soldiers who had earlier been demobilised during the IMF/WB imposed Reduction In Force (RIF) for the Congo expedition who upon return were deployed to fight against the LRA. After disbanding the militia groups, personnel were incorporated into the army while others went to the Police as SPCs (SPECIAL Police Constables). In Teso where the UPA rebellion seemed to have been more politically focused, it ended through a negotiated settlement where the political leadership like Musa Echweru, Max Omeda and a few others landed juicy government jobs while the fighters were incorporated into the army. But even with the LRA, thousands of former fighters who have been reporting/surrendering have been incorporated into the army. This conscription coupled by the low rate of desertion by soldiers from these regions has seen their strength grow higher in the army. That is how the Nilotics have been able to dominate the army in terms of numbers though Museveni has systematically maintained the top command structure for the 'Home Boys'. Unlike their colleagues from other regions, they soldiers from northern Uganda seemed to be contented with military service no matter the appalling terms and conditions.
LRA'S BRUTAL MILITARY CAMPAIGN
Following the move by government to use the suppressed local population to fight the insurgents, the LRA in turn resorted to murder, looting, and abductions against the local population. At the time, the army did not have the capacity to render full protection to the locals as the LRA had so much capacity that it could in dome instances overran and wipe out entire units of the NRA. A series of negotiations between the government and the LRA did not bear the desired goals because both sides were not committed to peaceful resolution of the rebellion. The 1994 negotiated regrouping and assembling of LRA at Rikwamba could not hold because the LRA feared being entrapped by the NRA. During the government's Operation Iron Fist inside Sudan, the LRA attacked inside Uganda in retaliation for the government's blatant statement that the LRA had been decimated. The 2006 - 2008 peace talks mediated by SPLA's Riek Marcha that required the LRA to assemble in Garamba - DRC, it could not hold when a combined force of Uganda, DRC and South Sudan launched an aerial assault against the LRA positions. Consequently, this breach of trust prompted the LRA to start brutal attacks and abductions against Congolese civilians while expanding its operation area to CAR and South Sudan. The blotched up Operation Lightening Thunder by the NRA inside CAR only ended up scattering the LRA and its ensuing atrocities against civilians in DRC, CAR and parts of Sudan. In 2012 an Africa Union deployed a 5000 strong force comprised of the NRA among others. In 2011, the USA reinforced the AU with a 100 man SPECIAL force to train and advice but above all the provision of financial and logistical boost to the international efforts to decimate the LRA.
LRA'S POLITICAL AGENDA
The Northern Uganda insurgency had initially started as an attempt by the defeated former government soldiers (UNLA) to fight back and regain military power that they believed they had treacherously lost through the Nairobi Peace Talks. This was coupled by the gross misconduct by the NRA in the northern region. The first blow to the seemingly unity of purpose came about when the UPDA signed a piece deal with government in 1988 paving way for many former soldiers joining the NRA. The UPDA political leadership in Uganda joined government while its backers in the diaspora continued to render support to the reminants who regrouped under HSM and later LRA. The local population, some church leaders and some foreign governments provided political backing to the LRA. The Acholi as an ethinic group, Acholi elders and local leaders, Catholic church Bishop Odama and Fr. Carlos, governments of Italy (the oil factor) and Sudan (SPLA factor) were all perceived to have been providing political backing to the LRA rebellion. Unfortunately, the LRA military leadership in the field could not tap into this political back up for proper direction but instead they seemed comfortable with marauding the countryside just as armed bandits, to and from Sudan, and committing atrocities. Even when rebel PRA's Opoka made contact with them (LRA) for a possible alliance from which they would benefit from political guidance, he was instead killed straight away. This partly explains why they ended up in distant places like CAR.
Despite the the systematic oppression meted out on the people of northern Uganda by the Museveni government, all those who were either in political or military positions in government were very deligently serving Museveni. That is why there has never been any known defections from NRA to LRA or any acts of treachery by ethnic Acholis in the NRA through covert collaboration with the LRA. Either party seemed to be contented with whichever side of the fence (LRA/NRA) that they fond themselves. The few individuals like Dr. Ochen, Elaborot, Olanya, Otieno, Dan Opito and a few others who were suspected to have been collaborating with the insurgents were cleared of any suspicion with time. The few unlucky Officers like major Kilama and Oliver Odweyo were killed. The LRA lost the thin political semblance years ago and they seemed to merely to enjoy holding the gun, donning colorful military fatigue with pips/insignias of Generals on their shoulders and collars. They also seem contented with carrying out raids against civilian targets for abductions and basic supplies and then against military targets for acquisition of logistics for their survival. Yet during the early days, the UPDA, HSM, and LRA had the capacity to deliver heavy military blows to the NRA and in some instances even shattering entire NRA units.
Around 2005 there had been serious calls by Acholis to government for declaring Northern Uganda a disaster zone but was swatted by the declaration by the USA of the LRA as a terrorist group and the indictment of five of its top commanders in the same year. The ICC indictment had the positive effect of scaring off the LRA supporters both at home and in the diaspora. That is what Joseph Kony alluded to during the Rikwamba peace mission in 2006 when he told Acholi leaders thus: "You sent me to wage this war but you have left me holding the tigers tail alone" in reference to the ICC indictment. Still the Acholi as a community advocated for reconciliation between government and victims on one hand and the LRA on the other through traditional justice systems like Mato Oputi. With the return of peace in northern Uganda, Acholi overwhelmingly voted for Museveni in the 2011 presidential elections.
MUSEVENI CONSOLIDATES THE GAINS
Billions of donor money though swindled has been poured into the rehabilitation and reconstruction of northern Uganda. The insurgency has seen both Lira and Gulu towns experience rapid growth; courtesy of the huge defence expenditures and diaspora remittances by both communities. Acholi and Langi top the number of Ugandans living in exile mostly in western capitals. Museveni has enjoyed the historical differences between the two communities that arose from the 1985 coup. The same APPLIES to West Nilers owing to the events that followed the ouster of Iddi Amin. Its only his own Gen Ssejusa who recently made an attempt to bring them together under his diaspora based political organisation. No wonder, the alliance could not hold and it crumbled in its infancy. Museveni panicked over that development and had to move very fast to counter it by getting northern Uganda much closer to his regime. In order to discredit Gen Ssejusa, he immediately announced that he would probe into the atrocities that were committed by his army officers in northern Uganda.
Since then he has secured a Luo body guard; which must be pleasing to some people though the fellow is just a figure head as the actual body guards are the home boys. Actually, Museveni knows that given the current political terrain, that Luo body guard could more trustworthy than the home boys. Its not by accident that youth leader Omodo Omodo is publicly displayed while having a ride in Museveni's car as the later is behind the wheels. In the same regard, Museveni speaheads the reburial of Erinayo Oryem, attends the memorial service of Akello's parents in Lira and is preparing the Archibishop Janan Luwum memorial service. Soon he will arrange the return of the body of Alice Lakwena for a descent burial. The recent uncoordinated statements by government to the effect that it was to avail defence to the ICC indicted Gen Dominic Ongwen during his trial in the Heague is a demonstration of the highest level of hypocrisy. If West Nile demands, he will give in to repatriating the remains of Iddi Amin; why not! With Deputy Speaker Jacob Olanya carrying the task of taming DP's Norbert Mao, the likes of Tadwong, Tangi Odoi, Anite, Doris Akol and many others holding top positions in the regime coupled by the dominance of his army by Luos, he is assured that the people of northern Uganda are contented.Bipingamizis (counter revolutionaries) are no longer in northern Uganda but are concentrated in South and Western regions and specifically Kigezi region.
Iddi Amin commanded the invasion of Mutesa's palace forcing him to flee to exile from where he died but it was the same Iddi Amin who arranged the return of his remains and accorded it a state burial! To what extent did he tame the Baganda?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
INFORMATION IS POWER.
my Northerners because for them when they don't like you they let you know" - Museveni lamenting to his then chief driver Godfrey Kisembo before his services were terminated; as narrated in an interview with the Daily Monitor, Nov 23rd 2013. 'NORTHERNERS'
In Uganda, the term North or Northern Region is generally used to refer to the northern and north-eastern region more especially if used in a demographic context especially by people from the southern and western regions. More often the people of northern Uganda (Acholi and Langi) and those of north eastern (Iteso, Karamojong and the Luos of Tororo and Busia) are referred to as 'Northerners' because of their Nilotic/Luo ethnic background. Since independence, its these tribes that had dominated the national security services sector. Apart from the Sudanic tribes of West Nile region, the central, eastern and western region is dominated by the Bantus.
FIGHTING IDDI AMIN
In 1971 Iddi Amin overthrew Milton Obote in a military coup. Milton Obote was from the Langi/Nilotic of northern Uganda and Iddi Amin was from the Kakwa/Sudanic of West Nile region. Obote fled to exiled in Tanzania together with some of his UPC party officials and army officers from the Acholi and Langi tribes. In exile they planned an armed comeback in 1972 that was decisively defeated by Iddi Amin prompting a purge of Acholi and Langi tribesmen in the army thus swelling their numbers in exile by defectors. In the meantime, the Uganda army under Iddi Amin came to be dominated by Sudanics and Bantus. Also in exile were a good number of Bantu UPC cadres and among them the militant Yoweri Museveni who after the failed 1972 attack opted to form his own briefcase armed group FRONASA. In 1978 Ugandan exiles backed by Tanzanian troops invaded Uganda in retaliation to Iddi Amin's attack and annexation of the Kagera salient. The Ugandan exiles contingent comprised of predominantly Acholi and Langi was branded Kikosi Malum (Task Force). On entering Uganda territory, Museveni embarked on recruiting from Rwandese refugee camps in order to swell the ranks of his FRONASA.
POST IDDI AMIN ARMY
By the time Iddi Amin was overthrown in April 1979 Museveni as Minister of Defence had raised a formidable force of his personal army FRONASA faction comprised of Bantus within the new Uganda army that had been branded Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). His sinister actions had sparked off a recruitment race based on ethnic considerations in order for the key players to catch up with the strength of numbers in the new army. Museveni's schemes suffered a setback when his militant Rwandese refugees were by law eliminated from the new national army. Sill wtithin FRONASA there were mischievous boys who ended up serving under the UNLA uninterrupted during his five years guerilla war. That is how the UNLA ended up with all sorts of rogue and vagabonds that were to become a liability later.
BUSH WAR
By the time Museveni opted to fight the UPC government in 1981 he knew he has so much undermined the UNLA's internal cohesion. Initially he took along with him a private army that had been eliminated by law from UNLA and had hoped for mass defection of Bantu soldiers. His war became clearly a Bantu southern army fighting against the northern Luo dominated government and army. In 1985 the Acholi dominated UNLA overthrew the UPC government on grounds that the Langi in the army were leaving the Acholis to do much of the fighting against the Musevenis Bantu army (NRA). The new military government invited all fighting groups to join it prompting the West Nile groups composed mainly of former Iddi Amin soldiers and some Buganda groups to respond but Museveni refused. He accused the military government of working with Iddi Amin Murderers (fighting groups from West Nile) whom he referred to as Anyanyas. Eventually the term Anyanya came to signify the entire populations of northern Uganda and particularly the UNLA. In return, the people from northern Uganda also referred to Museveni's army as Nyanrwandas (Rwandese). Through the manipulation of the Nairobi peace talks, Museveni defeated the military government and took over power.
INSURGENCY AGAINST THE MUSEVENI GOVERNMENT
Museveni's defeat of UNLA was a devastating blow on the people of northern Uganda more especially the Acholi sub-region whose connection with military service had been historically entrenched. A good number of Acholi former soldiers established bases in the Southern Sudan from where they launched come back attacks. The sectarian and retaliatory conduct by Museveni's NRA in northern Uganda fueled the Acholi resistance against the NRA that was being perceived as an army of occupation. However, quite a formidable number of northerners in the NRA at the time (either incorporated former soldiers or newly recruited) though not in top command positions, fought against the insurgents with dedication. The initial rebel group under UPDA struck a DEAL
with government by signing a peace deal at Pecce Stadium. Some top Political and military leaders of the UPDA (Charles Alai and group) joined the Museveni government. Owing to to the continued repression by Museveni's NRA coupled by the desperate desire to regain the lost glory of possessing gun and donning of military fatigue. Consequently, the Holly Spirit Movement (HSM) under Alice Lakwena and later the LRA under Joseph Kony came into place. The government could not contain the carnage of armed bands of Karamajong warriors' raids for pillage into Acholi, Teso and Lango thus depriving these communities of their cattle. Some senior NRA commanders like Gen Matayo Kyaligonza had also helped themselves with huge stocks of cattle from Teso sub-region. More insurgent groups came up as a result of attempting to put in place a kind of self defence. The UPA (Uganda Peoples' Army) in Teso sub-region was one such example. Because of the differences owing to the 1985 coup, the Langis could not joint hands with the Acholis under LRA. However, they bore the brunt of LRA atrocities and attempted to form their own rebel group under the former Chief of Staff Brig Opon Achak before he was mysteriously killed by the NRA. In the meantime, other rebel groups cropped up in the West Nile region. Of all those groups, its only the Acholi dominated LRA that thrived to-date.THE SPLA FACTOR
During the cold war era, the USSR backed the rebel SPLA through Ethiopia's Haille Mengistu while the USA backed Khartoum. When the oil giant Chevron discovered oil in Sudan, the USA ignored Sudan's atrocities in its war against the SPLA. Consequently Khartoum pushed the SPLA further south to the border with Uganda and it split into different factions. When the communist leaning Museveni took over power in 1986 he had embarked on supporting the SPLA rebels. The LRA had established bases in Southern Sudan; a territory inhabited by their ethnic cousins. With the end of the cold war, the collapse of the USSR and the Mengistu in Ethiopia but more so Khartoum's Islamic radicalisation coupled by its opposition to the Iraq invasion, the USA withdrew ITS SUPPORT
to Khartoum. Museveni whose anti-imperialism stance had put off both the Reagan and Bush (Sr) administrations, was now courted by the Clinton administration for the Somali Mission. When he opportunistically embraced IMF/WB SAP, he registered the overwhelming backing of the West. With the backing of USA, he embarked on full military support to the SPLA on grounds that he was containing the spread of Islamic Fundamentalism by Khartoum and helping black Southern Sudanese against the Arab north. In return Khartoum doubled its support for the LRA and some parts of northern and west Nile region of Uganda bore the brunt of constant bombing by Sudan's Antonovs. Even when Khartoum seemed to lessen its support to the LRA, some factions of the SPLA would continue to replenish its stocks. When South Sudan got its independence, it created a buffer zone between Khartoum and the LRA but Museveni continued to get worried of the ethnic connection between the predominantly Acholi LRA and a stable South Sudan. This partly explains why SPLA's John Garang had to die in a Ugandan helicopter crash and Museveni's recent panicky military intervention in the South Sudan crisis.INSURGENT POPULATIONS FIGHT ARMED INSURGENTS
As the rebellion intensified in the northern and north eastern regions, Museveni realised that his army was viewed by the local population as an army of occupation. He devised a means of encamping the local population into what he termed as IDPs (Internally Displaced People's camps). Thereafter he sought to exploit the economic deprivation of the local population for military service by creating local militias like Amuka, Arrow Boys, Home Guards etc. With quasi military training, army uniform and guns, and some little or no pay, these militias though initially meant to guard IDPs ended up engaging the LRA in distant field battles thus leaving the camps vulnerable to attacks. The army reabsorbed the former soldiers who had earlier been demobilised during the IMF/WB imposed Reduction In Force (RIF) for the Congo expedition who upon return were deployed to fight against the LRA. After disbanding the militia groups, personnel were incorporated into the army while others went to the Police as SPCs (SPECIAL
Police Constables). In Teso where the UPA rebellion seemed to have been more politically focused, it ended through a negotiated settlement where the political leadership like Musa Echweru, Max Omeda and a few others landed juicy government jobs while the fighters were incorporated into the army. But even with the LRA, thousands of former fighters who have been reporting/surrendering have been incorporated into the army. This conscription coupled by the low rate of desertion by soldiers from these regions has seen their strength grow higher in the army. That is how the Nilotics have been able to dominate the army in terms of numbers though Museveni has systematically maintained the top command structure for the 'Home Boys'. Unlike their colleagues from other regions, they soldiers from northern Uganda seemed to be contented with military service no matter the appalling terms and conditions.LRA'S BRUTAL MILITARY CAMPAIGN
Following the move by government to use the suppressed local population to fight the insurgents, the LRA in turn resorted to murder, looting, and abductions against the local population. At the time, the army did not have the capacity to render full protection to the locals as the LRA had so much capacity that it could in dome instances overran and wipe out entire units of the NRA. A series of negotiations between the government and the LRA did not bear the desired goals because both sides were not committed to peaceful resolution of the rebellion. The 1994 negotiated regrouping and assembling of LRA at Rikwamba could not hold because the LRA feared being entrapped by the NRA. During the government's Operation Iron Fist inside Sudan, the LRA attacked inside Uganda in retaliation for the government's blatant statement that the LRA had been decimated. The 2006 - 2008 peace talks mediated by SPLA's Riek Marcha that required the LRA to assemble in Garamba - DRC, it could not hold when a combined force of Uganda, DRC and South Sudan launched an aerial assault against the LRA positions. Consequently, this breach of trust prompted the LRA to start brutal attacks and abductions against Congolese civilians while expanding its operation area to CAR and South Sudan. The blotched up Operation Lightening Thunder by the NRA inside CAR only ended up scattering the LRA and its ensuing atrocities against civilians in DRC, CAR and parts of Sudan. In 2012 an Africa Union deployed a 5000 strong force comprised of the NRA among others. In 2011, the USA reinforced the AU with a 100 man SPECIAL
force to train and advice but above all the provision of financial and logistical boost to the international efforts to decimate the LRA.LRA'S POLITICAL AGENDA
The Northern Uganda insurgency had initially started as an attempt by the defeated former government soldiers (UNLA) to fight back and regain military power that they believed they had treacherously lost through the Nairobi Peace Talks. This was coupled by the gross misconduct by the NRA in the northern region. The first blow to the seemingly unity of purpose came about when the UPDA signed a piece deal with government in 1988 paving way for many former soldiers joining the NRA. The UPDA political leadership in Uganda joined government while its backers in the diaspora continued to render support to the reminants who regrouped under HSM and later LRA. The local population, some church leaders and some foreign governments provided political backing to the LRA. The Acholi as an ethinic group, Acholi elders and local leaders, Catholic church Bishop Odama and Fr. Carlos, governments of Italy (the oil factor) and Sudan (SPLA factor) were all perceived to have been providing political backing to the LRA rebellion. Unfortunately, the LRA military leadership in the field could not tap into this political back up for proper direction but instead they seemed comfortable with marauding the countryside just as armed bandits, to and from Sudan, and committing atrocities. Even when rebel PRA's Opoka made contact with them (LRA) for a possible alliance from which they would benefit from political guidance, he was instead killed straight away. This partly explains why they ended up in distant places like CAR.
Despite the the systematic oppression meted out on the people of northern Uganda by the Museveni government, all those who were either in political or military positions in government were very deligently serving Museveni. That is why there has never been any known defections from NRA to LRA or any acts of treachery by ethnic Acholis in the NRA through covert collaboration with the LRA. Either party seemed to be contented with whichever side of the fence (LRA/NRA) that they fond themselves. The few individuals like Dr. Ochen, Elaborot, Olanya, Otieno, Dan Opito and a few others who were suspected to have been collaborating with the insurgents were cleared of any suspicion with time. The few unlucky Officers like major Kilama and Oliver Odweyo were killed. The LRA lost the thin political semblance years ago and they seemed to merely to enjoy holding the gun, donning colorful military fatigue with pips/insignias of Generals on their shoulders and collars. They also seem contented with carrying out raids against civilian targets for abductions and basic supplies and then against military targets for acquisition of logistics for their survival. Yet during the early days, the UPDA, HSM, and LRA had the capacity to deliver heavy military blows to the NRA and in some instances even shattering entire NRA units.
Around 2005 there had been serious calls by Acholis to government for declaring Northern Uganda a disaster zone but was swatted by the declaration by the USA of the LRA as a terrorist group and the indictment of five of its top commanders in the same year. The ICC indictment had the positive effect of scaring off the LRA supporters both at home and in the diaspora. That is what Joseph Kony alluded to during the Rikwamba peace mission in 2006 when he told Acholi leaders thus: "You sent me to wage this war but you have left me holding the tigers tail alone" in reference to the ICC indictment. Still the Acholi as a community advocated for reconciliation between government and victims on one hand and the LRA on the other through traditional justice systems like Mato Oputi. With the return of peace in northern Uganda, Acholi overwhelmingly voted for Museveni in the 2011 presidential elections.
MUSEVENI CONSOLIDATES
THE GAINSBillions of donor money though swindled has been poured into the rehabilitation and reconstruction of northern Uganda. The insurgency has seen both Lira and Gulu towns experience rapid growth; courtesy of the huge defence expenditures and diaspora remittances by both communities. Acholi and Langi top the number of Ugandans living in exile mostly in western capitals. Museveni has enjoyed the historical differences between the two communities that arose from the 1985 coup. The same APPLIES
to West Nilers owing to the events that followed the ouster of Iddi Amin. Its only his own Gen Ssejusa who recently made an attempt to bring them together under his diaspora based political organisation. No wonder, the alliance could not hold and it crumbled in its infancy. Museveni panicked over that development and had to move very fast to counter it by getting northern Uganda much closer to his regime. In order to discredit Gen Ssejusa, he immediately announced that he would probe into the atrocities that were committed by his army officers in northern Uganda.Since then he has secured a Luo body guard; which must be pleasing to some people though the fellow is just a figure head as the actual body guards are the home boys. Actually, Museveni knows that given the current political terrain, that Luo body guard could more trustworthy than the home boys. Its not by accident that youth leader Omodo Omodo is publicly displayed while having a ride in Museveni's car as the later is behind the wheels. In the same regard, Museveni speaheads the reburial of Erinayo Oryem, attends the memorial service of Akello's parents in Lira and is preparing the Archibishop Janan Luwum memorial service. Soon he will arrange the return of the body of Alice Lakwena for a descent burial. The recent uncoordinated statements by government to the effect that it was to avail defence to the ICC indicted Gen Dominic Ongwen during his trial in the Heague is a demonstration of the highest level of hypocrisy. If West Nile demands, he will give in to repatriating the remains of Iddi Amin; why not! With Deputy Speaker Jacob Olanya carrying the task of taming DP's Norbert Mao, the likes of Tadwong, Tangi Odoi, Anite, Doris Akol and many others holding top positions in the regime coupled by the dominance of his army by Luos, he is assured that the people of northern Uganda are contented.Bipingamizis (counter revolutionaries) are no longer in northern Uganda but are concentrated in South and Western regions and specifically Kigezi region.
Iddi Amin commanded the invasion of Mutesa's palace forcing him to flee to exile from where he died but it was the same Iddi Amin who arranged the return of his remains and accorded it a state burial! To what extent did he tame the Baganda?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
INFORMATION IS POWER.
Posted by Uganda - A Change of Guards! a
Viele GruBe
Robukui
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