{UAH} Ocen, WBK//Terrorism wins only if we respond the way it wants us to....

Folks;

Onyango-Obbo is emphasizing what we have been discussing here: coordination of the various security agencies.

Pojim

Terrorism wins only if we respond the way it wants us to — we can refuse to

 0

 4

 0

 

 0

 0

 

 

Mourners say prayers and light candles in remembrance of the victims of the Garissa attack outside the National Archives in Nairobi on April 7, 2015. PHOTO | JENNIFER MUIRURI |  NATION MEDIA GROUP

In Summary

• The real tragedy of that attack is that Ugandan security forces knew everything, including the houses where the terrorists were staying, but did nothing.
• It cannot defeat the Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia, but if public opinion at home turns fully against the KDF's continued presence there and the government buckles and withdraws, then Shabaab wins.
• They hit buses, restaurants, and so forth. When the French security forces came to the scenes of the terrorist attacks, they would round up, hammer, and imprison the "natives" and spare the Europeans.

ADVERTISEMENT

By CHARLES ONYANGO-OBBO
More by this Author

As we contemplated the meaning of the horrific massacre of more than 140 Garissa University students by Al-Shabaab terrorists last Thursday, I sought deeper understanding — especially on ways to deal with terrorism. And that is how I landed on counter-terrorism insights from the Ugandan capital, Kampala.

The week of the Garissa attacks, there had been similar warnings of Shabaab assaults in Uganda. The approach in that country varies slightly from Kenya's.

When there are travel advisories and alerts, the practice is to make a lot of noise about them. And, then, Kampala can look like a war zone. Bwana Yoweri Museveni basically opens all his armouries and floods the streets with guns, armoured cars, and scary-looking men.

Uganda was burnt badly by Shabaab on World Cup finals night in July 2010, with two bomb attacks that killed nearly 80. Shabaab has not been lucky there again — and it is not for lack of trying.

The real tragedy of that attack is that Ugandan security forces knew everything, including the houses where the terrorists were staying, but did nothing.

Why? Different security agencies had different pieces of the puzzle. If they had all sat together for just 30 minutes, they would have had the complete picture. They did not because they were playing politics, each hoping to nip the plot in the bud, take the glory alone, and thus get a bigger share of the security budget. It backfired.

The powers that be put an end to that nonsense. What did they do next? Simple, really, dramatically improve coordination. But Uganda did more, and that is how I learnt of David Fromkin.

Fromkin is a well-regarded author, lawyer, and historian with many influential books under his belt. He is now 82 years old. Apparently his work is the bible of one of the top people in charge of Uganda's counter-terrorism operations.

Fromkin has a book on this matter, but for a quick reference, an article in Foreign Affairs (www.foreignaffairs.com) journal, "The Strategy of Terrorism" — wait for it — published in its July 1975 issue, was recommended. It is 40 years later, but you will not have read anything more insightful on terrorism. He argues that "Revolution, like war, is the strategy of the strong; terrorism is the strategy of the weak".

Terrorism on its own, he argues, accomplishes nothing. It is the reaction of the public, and in turn the government's response, that achieves results. Says Fromkin: "Terrorism wins only if you respond to it in the way that the terrorists want you to; which means that its fate is in your hands and not in theirs. If you… respond in a way different from that which they desire, they will fail to achieve their objectives.

"That is the ultimate weakness of terrorism as a strategy. It means that, though terrorism cannot always be prevented, it can always be defeated. You can always refuse to do what they want you to do."

Therefore, whether Shabaab succeeds in its goals is entirely in the hands of the Kenyan people and government. It cannot defeat the Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia, but if public opinion at home turns fully against the KDF's continued presence there and the government buckles and withdraws, then Shabaab wins.

In Algeria in the 1950s, the National Liberation Front (FLN) wanted independence for Algeria. However Algerian nationalism was virtually non-existent and there was no appetite for kicking the French out. The large European French community in Algeria and the "natives" were all French. The FNL decided it would dabble in what today would be considered terror methods to force the French to create a distinction between the Europeans (them) and the locals (us).

They hit buses, restaurants, and so forth. When the French security forces came to the scenes of the terrorist attacks, they would round up, hammer, and imprison the "natives" and spare the Europeans.

In their punishment the French did what the FNL had failed to do — they finally created the distinction in people's minds that the Europeans were "outsiders" and the indigenous people were a distinct Algerian nation. The path to victory for the FLN was assured. This might be a good background to look at the decision to freeze the accounts of 86 individuals and companies in Kenya, nearly all of them owned by Somalis, for suspected links to Shabaab.

The author is editor of Mail & Guardian Africa (mgafrica.com). Twitter@cobbo3