{UAH} KIBOKO DEATH SQUAD: SON OF ALSA MASA DEATH SQUAD IN THE PHILIPPINES
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Robert Atuhairwe/Diana Semogerere/ Frank Mujabi/Alan Barigye,
Regarding the recent news of the setting up of the Kiboko Death Squad
in Mbarara and environs by Kayihura and Museveni Kayibanda, please
find herein below an article written on the Alsa Masa Death Squad in
1989. The Alsa Masa, which terrorised the city of Davao, Mindanao,
Philippines in the 1980's, became a world-wide symbol of right wing
para-military vigilantism through-out the world, much in the same way
that the Intarahamwe was later to do in Rwanda in the 1990s. What many
people don't know is that the phenomenon of vigilante death squads was
developed by the CIA in the 1970s, in a doctrine titled "LOW INTENSITY
CONFLICT" (LIC) and the Philippines became its testing laboratory in
Asia. The LIC doctrine was later to be used very extensively in Latin
America, and is the doctrine that Museveni Kayibanda and his mercenery
NRA used to crush the Joseph Kony insurgency in northern Uganda. The
LIC doctrine arose out of a conclusion drawn out by the CIA that
left-wing or nationalist insurgencies in third world countries would
never be defeated in a conventional war, using conventional methods.
So the CIA developed its very detailed Manual on Unconventional
Warfare, which became known as Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine or LIC.
What was needed, the CIA Manual advises, is to take the war right
inside the communities that supported the insurgency or provided it
with a mass base. This would be done in various ways, but would
include establishment of concentration camps,;cantoning and
militarising entire communities; constant use of "saturation drives"
(unannounced military searches); economic and food blockades,
transport dislocation through road blocks and route disruption;
constant arrests, illegal detentions, intimidation and harrassment;
heightened tension through a campaign of misinformation and
disinformation. The final weapon to complement all of these tactics
would be the setting up of the vigilante death squad, of which the
ALSA MASA became its imprimatur and world-wide exponent and symbol.The
rationale of the death squad was that it would be recruited locally,
mainly from local criminals and social misfits, because they know the
terrain, and their operations would be para-military in style and they
would operate outside the normal control of the conventional military,
police and security and local government authorities in the area. In
effect, though heavily armed, it would remain shadowy and
unaccountable, and in this way, no one would take responsibility for
their actions. Museveni Kayibanda used this CIA Manual very
extentensively in his battle with the Joseph Kony insurgency, a fact
acknowledged by Corporal Otto Mutengesa in my past debates with him,
as he was an actor in the field. Mutengesa acknowldeged how useful the
CIA Manual was invaluable to them to combatting the insurgents and
cutting off their air supply. I arrived in Davao City in 1987, as a
very young and idealistic lawyer,precisely at a time when the Alsa
Masa was being unleashed in the city, and began the painstaking job of
monitoring the activities of the death squad, the most difficult and
dangerous job I have ever done in my life. But read the article below
because it highlights the dangerous territory that Museveni Kayibanda,
in desperation and facing total political isolation, is prepared to
push the country. That he would consider setting up the Kiboko Death
Squad in Uganda is very astonishing and very disturbing.
George Okello
Philippine Vigilantes Reflect U.S. Strategy for 'Low-Intensity Conflict'
October 11, 1987|Peter Tarr | Peter Tarr, who is writing a book about
the Philippines, .
Alsa Masa, which in the local dialect means "Masses Arise," was
organized by the leader of one of those gangs early in 1986. But the
movement went nowhere until Calida assumed his Davao command in July,
1986. It was at that time that Calida received a visit from Singlaub.
They "chitchatted," Calida said, but did not discuss Alsa Masa.
Nevertheless, in the months following Singlaub's visit, Alsa Masa grew
exponentially. It now claims 10,000 members. "The Alsa Masa was never
a CIA project," Calida told Filipino journalists several months ago.
"It is the product of abuses of the communist New People's Army. The
people were left with no choice but to band together to protect
themselves."
In Davao, virulently anti-communist radio announcer Jun Porras Pala
admitted that the vigilante groups lumped together all manner of
riffraff, from members of criminal gangs to adherents of fanatical
religious cult groups.
In Negros, Cebu and Mindanao there were ominous signs that
anti-communist fanaticism was putting innocent people in danger. In
Davao, the houses of people who did not join or make financial
contributions to Alsa Masa (a practice one member called "extortion
for democracy") were marked with the letter X. Anti-communist
broadcasters threatened supposed sympathizers over the airwaves.
In all three islands, liberal members of the Catholic Church had been
threatened both by vigilantes and military officials. During my stay
in Negros, 35 clerics and newsmen were accused of being NPA
sympathizers by a local military commander, and had received death
threats in the mail. A similar scenario was simultaneously unfolding
in Cebu. And in Davao, the Redemptorist Church was strafed from a
passing truck late one August night. Earlier, Catholic members of the
congregation had been called "redemterrorists" by broadcaster Pala.
Redemptorists in Cebu had been similarly branded.
Why did President Corazon Aquino, an uncommonly religious woman, agree
to endorse the vigilante movement? The answer lies partly in a
meaningless distinction she makes between armed and unarmed vigilante
groups. Aquino favors the mobilization of unarmed citizen patrols,
called Nakasaka, that warn the military of NPA activity. She favors
these groups, but does not proscribe the activities of armed groups.
American officials may have influenced Aquino's policy. On March 16,
1987, she ordered a government-trained militia, the Civilian Home
Defense Force, "and all private armies and other armed groups" to
disband. The CHDF, with 70,000 members nationwide, had been active
since the 1970s in the fight against the NPA, but its ill-disciplined
members had been blamed for many of the military abuses committed
against civilians in counterinsurgency operations.
A phase-out of the CHDF was mandated in the new Philippine
constitution, adopted in February. But soon after Aquino issued the
order to disband paramilitary groups, she rescinded it. The Philippine
military, led by Gen. Fidel Ramos, was lobbying hard for retention of
the CHDF. So was Local Goverment Secretary Jamie Ferrer, slain in
August. Aquino and her military had been repeatedly lectured, directly
and indirectly, by high-ranking U.S. officials on how to fight the
communists. One such lecture was delivered on March 19, 1987, by
Richard L. Armitage, the assistant secretary of defense for
international security affairs. He offered a blunt critique of AFP
tactics in testimony before the House subcommittee on Asian and
Pacific Affairs.
Armitage's remarks clearly indicated American impatience with Aquino's
policy of reconciliation, in effect during her first 12 months in
office. Even after the failure of peace talks with the radical left
and the collapse of a cease-fire in the AFP-NPA war that had held for
only 60 days, Aquino continued to offer an olive branch to the left.
On Feb. 28, she proposed amnesty and rehabilitation for rebels who
would lay down their arms, in the interests of "healing the wounds of
our nation."
On March 18, a time bomb exploded at the Philippine Military Academy.
It was apparently intended to kill Aquino, who was to address the
academy's graduating class four days later. When commencement day
arrived, the Philippine president unveiled a new strategy--one that
might have gratified Singlaub himself. "The answer to terrorism of the
left and the right is not social and economic reform, but police and
military action," she said, turning her back on a philosophy she had
espoused since coming to power.
It was in this climate that Aquino rescinded her order to disband the
paramilitary groups. In keeping with her new policy of "total war"
against the communists, and in light of her growing reliance on Ramos,
who repeatedly put down attempts by disgruntled AFP officers to take
over her government, Aquino found herself, by the end of March,
implementing the very counterinsurgency policies she had resisted for
more than a year. She was now prepared to wage low-intensity warfare.
Her shift to a hard-line policy is likely to encourage a similarly
militant response from the radical left. But even more important, the
legitimation of vigilante "justice" will most likely serve to
accentuate a culture of violence that has prevailed for decades in the
Philippine countryside. At the core of the vigilante movement are
incompetent CHDF commandos, religious cultists and members of private
armies that flourished during the Marcos years.
The Philippines needs more than civic action and "humanitarian" aid
programs carried out by civilian and military authorities waging
low-intensity warfare. The country needs structural reforms, the most
important of which is land reform. As Aquino often noted during her
first year in office, the insurgency has economic and social roots. It
will continue to flourish--no matter how many vigilantes are
mobilized--unless the root causes are addressed.
--
Disclaimer:Everyone posting to this Forum bears the sole responsibility for any legal consequences of his or her postings, and hence statements and facts must be presented responsibly. Your continued membership signifies that you agree to this disclaimer and pledge to abide by our Rules and Guidelines.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to: ugandans-at-heart+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com or Abbey Semuwemba at: abbeysemuwemba@gmail.com.
Regarding the recent news of the setting up of the Kiboko Death Squad
in Mbarara and environs by Kayihura and Museveni Kayibanda, please
find herein below an article written on the Alsa Masa Death Squad in
1989. The Alsa Masa, which terrorised the city of Davao, Mindanao,
Philippines in the 1980's, became a world-wide symbol of right wing
para-military vigilantism through-out the world, much in the same way
that the Intarahamwe was later to do in Rwanda in the 1990s. What many
people don't know is that the phenomenon of vigilante death squads was
developed by the CIA in the 1970s, in a doctrine titled "LOW INTENSITY
CONFLICT" (LIC) and the Philippines became its testing laboratory in
Asia. The LIC doctrine was later to be used very extensively in Latin
America, and is the doctrine that Museveni Kayibanda and his mercenery
NRA used to crush the Joseph Kony insurgency in northern Uganda. The
LIC doctrine arose out of a conclusion drawn out by the CIA that
left-wing or nationalist insurgencies in third world countries would
never be defeated in a conventional war, using conventional methods.
So the CIA developed its very detailed Manual on Unconventional
Warfare, which became known as Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine or LIC.
What was needed, the CIA Manual advises, is to take the war right
inside the communities that supported the insurgency or provided it
with a mass base. This would be done in various ways, but would
include establishment of concentration camps,;cantoning and
militarising entire communities; constant use of "saturation drives"
(unannounced military searches); economic and food blockades,
transport dislocation through road blocks and route disruption;
constant arrests, illegal detentions, intimidation and harrassment;
heightened tension through a campaign of misinformation and
disinformation. The final weapon to complement all of these tactics
would be the setting up of the vigilante death squad, of which the
ALSA MASA became its imprimatur and world-wide exponent and symbol.The
rationale of the death squad was that it would be recruited locally,
mainly from local criminals and social misfits, because they know the
terrain, and their operations would be para-military in style and they
would operate outside the normal control of the conventional military,
police and security and local government authorities in the area. In
effect, though heavily armed, it would remain shadowy and
unaccountable, and in this way, no one would take responsibility for
their actions. Museveni Kayibanda used this CIA Manual very
extentensively in his battle with the Joseph Kony insurgency, a fact
acknowledged by Corporal Otto Mutengesa in my past debates with him,
as he was an actor in the field. Mutengesa acknowldeged how useful the
CIA Manual was invaluable to them to combatting the insurgents and
cutting off their air supply. I arrived in Davao City in 1987, as a
very young and idealistic lawyer,precisely at a time when the Alsa
Masa was being unleashed in the city, and began the painstaking job of
monitoring the activities of the death squad, the most difficult and
dangerous job I have ever done in my life. But read the article below
because it highlights the dangerous territory that Museveni Kayibanda,
in desperation and facing total political isolation, is prepared to
push the country. That he would consider setting up the Kiboko Death
Squad in Uganda is very astonishing and very disturbing.
George Okello
Philippine Vigilantes Reflect U.S. Strategy for 'Low-Intensity Conflict'
October 11, 1987|Peter Tarr | Peter Tarr, who is writing a book about
the Philippines, .
Alsa Masa, which in the local dialect means "Masses Arise," was
organized by the leader of one of those gangs early in 1986. But the
movement went nowhere until Calida assumed his Davao command in July,
1986. It was at that time that Calida received a visit from Singlaub.
They "chitchatted," Calida said, but did not discuss Alsa Masa.
Nevertheless, in the months following Singlaub's visit, Alsa Masa grew
exponentially. It now claims 10,000 members. "The Alsa Masa was never
a CIA project," Calida told Filipino journalists several months ago.
"It is the product of abuses of the communist New People's Army. The
people were left with no choice but to band together to protect
themselves."
In Davao, virulently anti-communist radio announcer Jun Porras Pala
admitted that the vigilante groups lumped together all manner of
riffraff, from members of criminal gangs to adherents of fanatical
religious cult groups.
In Negros, Cebu and Mindanao there were ominous signs that
anti-communist fanaticism was putting innocent people in danger. In
Davao, the houses of people who did not join or make financial
contributions to Alsa Masa (a practice one member called "extortion
for democracy") were marked with the letter X. Anti-communist
broadcasters threatened supposed sympathizers over the airwaves.
In all three islands, liberal members of the Catholic Church had been
threatened both by vigilantes and military officials. During my stay
in Negros, 35 clerics and newsmen were accused of being NPA
sympathizers by a local military commander, and had received death
threats in the mail. A similar scenario was simultaneously unfolding
in Cebu. And in Davao, the Redemptorist Church was strafed from a
passing truck late one August night. Earlier, Catholic members of the
congregation had been called "redemterrorists" by broadcaster Pala.
Redemptorists in Cebu had been similarly branded.
Why did President Corazon Aquino, an uncommonly religious woman, agree
to endorse the vigilante movement? The answer lies partly in a
meaningless distinction she makes between armed and unarmed vigilante
groups. Aquino favors the mobilization of unarmed citizen patrols,
called Nakasaka, that warn the military of NPA activity. She favors
these groups, but does not proscribe the activities of armed groups.
American officials may have influenced Aquino's policy. On March 16,
1987, she ordered a government-trained militia, the Civilian Home
Defense Force, "and all private armies and other armed groups" to
disband. The CHDF, with 70,000 members nationwide, had been active
since the 1970s in the fight against the NPA, but its ill-disciplined
members had been blamed for many of the military abuses committed
against civilians in counterinsurgency operations.
A phase-out of the CHDF was mandated in the new Philippine
constitution, adopted in February. But soon after Aquino issued the
order to disband paramilitary groups, she rescinded it. The Philippine
military, led by Gen. Fidel Ramos, was lobbying hard for retention of
the CHDF. So was Local Goverment Secretary Jamie Ferrer, slain in
August. Aquino and her military had been repeatedly lectured, directly
and indirectly, by high-ranking U.S. officials on how to fight the
communists. One such lecture was delivered on March 19, 1987, by
Richard L. Armitage, the assistant secretary of defense for
international security affairs. He offered a blunt critique of AFP
tactics in testimony before the House subcommittee on Asian and
Pacific Affairs.
Armitage's remarks clearly indicated American impatience with Aquino's
policy of reconciliation, in effect during her first 12 months in
office. Even after the failure of peace talks with the radical left
and the collapse of a cease-fire in the AFP-NPA war that had held for
only 60 days, Aquino continued to offer an olive branch to the left.
On Feb. 28, she proposed amnesty and rehabilitation for rebels who
would lay down their arms, in the interests of "healing the wounds of
our nation."
On March 18, a time bomb exploded at the Philippine Military Academy.
It was apparently intended to kill Aquino, who was to address the
academy's graduating class four days later. When commencement day
arrived, the Philippine president unveiled a new strategy--one that
might have gratified Singlaub himself. "The answer to terrorism of the
left and the right is not social and economic reform, but police and
military action," she said, turning her back on a philosophy she had
espoused since coming to power.
It was in this climate that Aquino rescinded her order to disband the
paramilitary groups. In keeping with her new policy of "total war"
against the communists, and in light of her growing reliance on Ramos,
who repeatedly put down attempts by disgruntled AFP officers to take
over her government, Aquino found herself, by the end of March,
implementing the very counterinsurgency policies she had resisted for
more than a year. She was now prepared to wage low-intensity warfare.
Her shift to a hard-line policy is likely to encourage a similarly
militant response from the radical left. But even more important, the
legitimation of vigilante "justice" will most likely serve to
accentuate a culture of violence that has prevailed for decades in the
Philippine countryside. At the core of the vigilante movement are
incompetent CHDF commandos, religious cultists and members of private
armies that flourished during the Marcos years.
The Philippines needs more than civic action and "humanitarian" aid
programs carried out by civilian and military authorities waging
low-intensity warfare. The country needs structural reforms, the most
important of which is land reform. As Aquino often noted during her
first year in office, the insurgency has economic and social roots. It
will continue to flourish--no matter how many vigilantes are
mobilized--unless the root causes are addressed.
--
Disclaimer:Everyone posting to this Forum bears the sole responsibility for any legal consequences of his or her postings, and hence statements and facts must be presented responsibly. Your continued membership signifies that you agree to this disclaimer and pledge to abide by our Rules and Guidelines.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to: ugandans-at-heart+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com or Abbey Semuwemba at: abbeysemuwemba@gmail.com.
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