{UAH} MUSEVENI'S ROADS PROJECT IS SECURITY DRIVEN
MUSEVENI'S ROADS PROJECT IS SECURITY DRIVEN
Being a war monger, Museveni has prioritized repairin and construction of highway roads more especially those that not only link major urban centres but also link us to neighboring countries so as to ease mobility of troops and war materials.
Mobility in military terms refers to the ability of a weapon system, combat unit or armed force to move towards a military objective. Combat forces with a higher mobility are able to move quickly around and across more hostile terrain then forces with a lower mobility. Mobility is a vital cmponent of modern battlefield; as the ability to deliver weapon systems or combat units to their objective quickly can often mean the difference between victory and defeat. During World I, combat units could only move on the as far as a soldier could walk, resulting in a stalemate and inability to outmanoeuvre the enemy. By World War II the development of tanks improved mobility. Tracked and other mechanised vehicles eased movement of troops to and from the battle front.
Since the of World War II, armies have continued to develop their mobility. By 1980s, intercontinental travel shifted from sea to air transport enabling military forces to move from one part of the world to another within hours or a few days instead of weeks. Mobility is also referred to as a combat multiplier - a highly mobile unit can use its own combat strength of less mobile units. This was the case with the German Panzer Divisions during World War II when they were considered the equivalent of of two or three infantry divisions partly due to their superior mobility and partly due to inherently greater fire power. Mobility has also been defined in terms of three generally recognized levels of warfare; tactical, operational and strategic.
Tactical mobility is usually defined as the ability to move under fire during a combat angagement. Operational mobility is the ability to move men and materials to the decisive point of battle. Strategic mobility is the ability to move an army to the area of operations. In World War I most armies lacked tactical mobility but enjoyed good strategic mobility through the use of railroads thus leading to a situation where armies could be deployed to the front with ease and rapidty; but once they reached they became bogged down by their inability to move under fire. Operational mobility is a concept that begun during the period of the mechanisation of armed forces. It became a method of managing the movement of forces by strategic commanders from the staging area (place where troops or equipments in transit are assembled or processed) to their tactical area of responsibility ahead of an attack or invasion. Museveni has put in place roads that enable his troops and their war materials to reach the furthest urban/commercial centers in every corner of the country save for the politically inactive inactive Karamoja region. These centres are the staging areas in strategic mobility from where foot soldiers and light combat vehicles can penetrate the rural areas in order to suppress and down any uprising. In both Kanungu and Kisoro, Team Besigye delved into operational and tactical mobility and were bogged down by poor rural road network.
These military/security roads have been built and used in several countries for purposes of strategic mobilility by the military and later developed into public roads. Gen. Wade spearheaded the construction of a wide network of security roads in Scotland during the Jacobite unrest in the 18th century to facilitate movement of troops as part of the overall military strategy for controlling the highlands by linking the different forts. The imperial Russian authorities in the Caucasus constructed military roads that linked the northern Caucasus to the Black Sea via Klukhorski. A modern road was also built in the second half of the 19th century during Russo-Turkish war and campaigns to conquer the mountain tribes of the Caucasus. antiwar.com/US army building roads in eastern Europe , citing Russian aggression. The Roman Empire built roads that were used to suppress and exert control on over local populations. In Israel, the Jewish NationalFUND
(JNF) together with the Ministry of Defense, Agriculture, and regional councils builds security and agricultural roads for easy passage of Israel Defence Forces (IDF).
Museveni pumps 3000 billion shillings from loans and tax payerMONEY
into the road sector annually. The military being his power base, he has prioritized road construction as a component of his strategic regime security plan. He is basing his prioritization on personal experience during the Tanzania/Iddi Amin war in 1979 wheen the Tanzanian troops got bogged down by poor road infrastructure in the Kagera region. During his Congo expedition, the troops advance was undermined by the allmost non existence of roads in eastern Congo. However, this was an advantage to the Congo government as the non existence of roads halted the swift advance by the invading Uganda and Rwanda forces. During the northern Uganda insurgency, his troops had trouble moving heavy military material through the border area into southern Sudan. He spent billions of tax payer's money on construction of what he termed as security roads linking Kit gum to Ngomorom at the far end. Because of superb roads, the Hutu government in Rwanda was able to swiftly move to the border with Uganda and halt the Tutsi invasion and constant supply kept the invaders around the border area for the next four years. In the mid 1990s, rebels overran and occupied Kisoro and its the Rwanda army using good roads in Rwanda that came in to dislodge them because the poor road to Kisoro at the time could not help his army to easily reach Kisoro.
The road construction project is also used as conduit to siphon tax payer's money as already evidenced by theFINANCIAL
scandals that have rocked the roads sector. The commission of inquiry that was appointed to look into the mismanagement of the sector was meant to hoodwink Ugandans during this election season. That is why even before it could finalise it work, the Museveni appointed ED of the roads authority (UNRA), Allen Kagina dismissed the entire workforce. This arbitrary dismissal was designed to pave way fort the 'home boys' and other regime cadres to access these huge funds in form of employment as has been the case with other sectors that attract huge funding. That the reason why it was nobody else other than Allen Kagina after she successfully accomplished a similar task in the country's tax body (URA). In the near future, road construction and maintenance will be managed by the army's construction/Engeering Corps.
Ever since Museveni came to power 30 years ago, he has successfully his deliberate design to impoverish majority Ugandans. He deliberately suffocated farmer's cooperative movement, farmersBANKS
(UCB and Cooperative Bank), undermined the traditional cash crops like coffee and cotton in favor of promoting traditional cattle keepers, he killed the railway lines that connected the western region through region and the northern region through eastern region to the Kenya seaport of Mombasa. That is why there is almost no serious product that Ugandans can transport using these roads apart from a few bunches of Bananas, some milk and beef cattle from Ankle and the cattle corridor. In some areas the locals use some sections of the tarmac highway to dry their cassava for local consumption - since that is the only use they have for the road.
Therefore, the selective road network being put in place by the regime is all designed to ease strategic mobility of his security forces in their schemes to suppress and subdue Ugandans. That is why the roads in Kampala city are in appealing state - their current state can enable the mobility of foot soldiers and military vehicles with ease. Again, Kampala city is already cated for by the regulàr anti-riot security forces with their street battle vehicles (Mambas), water canon vehicles and teargass canisters. Luwero was left out in the roads construction simply because its rough murram roads are suitable for motorracing racing. Therefore, Museveni's roads project are not for economic development but rather for strategic mobility of his security forces.
INFORMATION IS POWER
Mobility in military terms refers to the ability of a weapon system, combat unit or armed force to move towards a military objective. Combat forces with a higher mobility are able to move quickly around and across more hostile terrain then forces with a lower mobility. Mobility is a vital cmponent of modern battlefield; as the ability to deliver weapon systems or combat units to their objective quickly can often mean the difference between victory and defeat. During World I, combat units could only move on the as far as a soldier could walk, resulting in a stalemate and inability to outmanoeuvre the enemy. By World War II the development of tanks improved mobility. Tracked and other mechanised vehicles eased movement of troops to and from the battle front.
Since the of World War II, armies have continued to develop their mobility. By 1980s, intercontinental travel shifted from sea to air transport enabling military forces to move from one part of the world to another within hours or a few days instead of weeks. Mobility is also referred to as a combat multiplier - a highly mobile unit can use its own combat strength of less mobile units. This was the case with the German Panzer Divisions during World War II when they were considered the equivalent of of two or three infantry divisions partly due to their superior mobility and partly due to inherently greater fire power. Mobility has also been defined in terms of three generally recognized levels of warfare; tactical, operational and strategic.
Tactical mobility is usually defined as the ability to move under fire during a combat angagement. Operational mobility is the ability to move men and materials to the decisive point of battle. Strategic mobility is the ability to move an army to the area of operations. In World War I most armies lacked tactical mobility but enjoyed good strategic mobility through the use of railroads thus leading to a situation where armies could be deployed to the front with ease and rapidty; but once they reached they became bogged down by their inability to move under fire. Operational mobility is a concept that begun during the period of the mechanisation of armed forces. It became a method of managing the movement of forces by strategic commanders from the staging area (place where troops or equipments in transit are assembled or processed) to their tactical area of responsibility ahead of an attack or invasion. Museveni has put in place roads that enable his troops and their war materials to reach the furthest urban/commercial centers in every corner of the country save for the politically inactive inactive Karamoja region. These centres are the staging areas in strategic mobility from where foot soldiers and light combat vehicles can penetrate the rural areas in order to suppress and down any uprising. In both Kanungu and Kisoro, Team Besigye delved into operational and tactical mobility and were bogged down by poor rural road network.
These military/security roads have been built and used in several countries for purposes of strategic mobilility by the military and later developed into public roads. Gen. Wade spearheaded the construction of a wide network of security roads in Scotland during the Jacobite unrest in the 18th century to facilitate movement of troops as part of the overall military strategy for controlling the highlands by linking the different forts. The imperial Russian authorities in the Caucasus constructed military roads that linked the northern Caucasus to the Black Sea via Klukhorski. A modern road was also built in the second half of the 19th century during Russo-Turkish war and campaigns to conquer the mountain tribes of the Caucasus. antiwar.com/US army building roads in eastern Europe , citing Russian aggression. The Roman Empire built roads that were used to suppress and exert control on over local populations. In Israel, the Jewish NationalFUND
Museveni pumps 3000 billion shillings from loans and tax payerMONEY
The road construction project is also used as conduit to siphon tax payer's money as already evidenced by theFINANCIAL
Ever since Museveni came to power 30 years ago, he has successfully his deliberate design to impoverish majority Ugandans. He deliberately suffocated farmer's cooperative movement, farmersBANKS
Therefore, the selective road network being put in place by the regime is all designed to ease strategic mobility of his security forces in their schemes to suppress and subdue Ugandans. That is why the roads in Kampala city are in appealing state - their current state can enable the mobility of foot soldiers and military vehicles with ease. Again, Kampala city is already cated for by the regulàr anti-riot security forces with their street battle vehicles (Mambas), water canon vehicles and teargass canisters. Luwero was left out in the roads construction simply because its rough murram roads are suitable for motorracing racing. Therefore, Museveni's roads project are not for economic development but rather for strategic mobility of his security forces.
INFORMATION IS POWER
Viele GruBe
Robukui
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