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Swaziland: Wither absolute monarchism?

Moses Tofa

2013-05-16, Issue 630

In Africa's last monarchy – the kingdom of Swaziland, the major question
is: for how long multi-party politics should be construed as incompatible
with Swazi tradition, when that tradition is static? It appears that Swazi
tradition was not only hijacked by the monarchy but has arrested the
development of genuine democratic participation of Swazi citizens

Swaziland has retained and continues to indefinitely retain its
controversial status as an absolute constitutional monarchy. It is the
only country in Africa with such a `distinctly maverick' political order.
The country's political establishment is regarded by many critics as
`archaic.' There is not a vestige of doubt that there is a constant
contest between the ancient norms and practices on which the Swazi
monarchy is anchored and the progressive forces of democracy and
fundamental freedoms which have become the linchpin of the contemporary
political order. Swaziland is very rich in a diversity of cultural beliefs
and practices which have been subjected to censorious criticism because of
their patent incompatibility with contemporary fundamental freedoms. The
international community as well as some critical sections of the Swazi
community have made many calls for Swaziland to transform to a multi-party
state. Contrary to the calls for democratic reforms, the Swazi monarchy
has not moved an inch from its traditional position that multi-party
politics is `divisive' and `incompatible' with Swazi tradition and
therefore `undesirable' in the kingdom. It is important to note that
tradition is not static, it changes over time and space and that these
changes are not negotiable. That tradition changes is what makes societies
progressive.

THE `TINKHUNDLA' SYSTEM

Swaziland is a small Landlocked Developing Country (LLDC) which is located
in Southern Africa. It is bordered by South Africa on the north, west and
south and by Mozambique on the east. It has a population which is in the
region of 1.2 million. Its local language is called `siSwati' and the
Dhlamini is the royal clan. Its local currency is called the `Lilangeni'
which is pegged at par with the South African Rand. Like Botswana and
Lesotho, the country is a former British protectorate. It gained its
independence on a multi-party platform through a tortuous negotiated
settlement on 6 September 1968 under the leadership of then king Sobhuza
II. At independence, Swaziland adopted a Westminster-oriented constitution
which provided for multi-party politics on the basis of the
first-past-the-post electoral system. However, in 1976, Sobhuza repealed
the independence constitution via an arbitrary royal decree which outlawed
political parties. He established the `Tinkhundla' system which is the
basis of governance in contemporary Swaziland. This system effectively
replaced multi-party politics and transformed the country into an absolute
monarchy, the status which it retains today.

THE RISE OF MONOLITHIC POLITICS

The Tinkhundla system is based on ancient Swazi tradition and norms. In
order to consolidate this system of governance, Sobhuza made Swazi
tradition supreme over liberal principles and practices. He died in 1983
and left the country in the clutches of unique monolithic politics. After
the death of Sobhuza, there were some fierce disputes over his succession.
These disputes threatened to plunge the country into turmoil as different
vociferous antagonists took tenacious positions. The outcome of the power
struggle was that Mswati III was appointed king in 1986 in order to occupy
the position that had been left vacant by his father's death. The
incumbent king has incorporated elements of modern processes of governance
as a way of clothing the monarchy with a veneer of legitimacy and
democratic virtue. This has created a hybrid political system which
consists of badly meshed traditional and modern processes of governance.
According to section 82 (1) of the constitution, Swaziland is basically
partitioned into four administrative regions. These are Hhohho (this is
where the capital city Mbabane is located and where the government
ministries are based), Lubombo (this is where the vast of the country's
plantations are located), Manzini (this is the country's largest
commercial and industrial site) and Shiselweni (which is the country's
most impoverished region). Each region is administered by a regional
administrator who is appointed by the king using his personal discretion.

THE LAST ABSOLUTE MONARCHY IN THE CONTINENT

In his character as `Ingwenyama,' Mswati is construed by the majority of
Swazis as the final custodian and repository of Swazi cultural beliefs and
practices. He is the highest political authority in the Kingdom. He holds
executive powers and he unilaterally appoints some members of the
bicameral legislature, viz. the senate and the house of assembly. The
present parliament consists of 65 parliamentarians. Fifty five of these
parliamentarians are elected via the popular vote while the remaining 10
are unilaterally appointed by the king. All members of the Swazi
parliament are independents because of the prohibition on political
parties. The senate consists of 30 members of which 10 are elected by the
house of assembly while 20 are appointed by the king. The King also
appoints the prime minister and the incumbent prime minister is Barnabas
Sibusiso Dhlamini. The prime minister is the head of government. Members
of the cabinet are appointed by the prime minister after the king's
approval. Swaziland has been criticised both locally and internationally
for being the last absolute monarchy in the continent. The majority view
is that absolute monarchism has been outdistanced by liberal principles
and practices, especially with the advent of the 21st century.

VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Because of the restrictions which have been imposed by the monarchy on
democratic freedoms, Swaziland is among the African countries which have a
chequered human rights record. According to the 2012 Ibrahim Index of
Governance in Africa, Swaziland is among the six most imbalanced states in
Africa. This imbalance is engendered by its poor performance in human
rights and citizen participation in political processes and institutions.

The overall governance status in Swaziland is summarized in the table below.

Source: The sixth Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) 15 October 2012.

THE TRAJECTORY OF STATE POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN SWAZILAND

It is difficult to see why king Sobhuza II declared that political parties
are incompatible with Swazi tradition when political parties existed in
both colonial and post-colonial Swaziland. The Swaziland Progressive Party
(SPP) was the first main nationalist political party to be founded in
colonial Swaziland. It was headed by a distinguished intellectual and a
trusted `point man' of King Sobhuza II, DR John June Nquku who was also
its founder. However, the party quickly bifurcated due to internal
internecine and a splinter party, the Ngwane National Liberation Congress
(NNLC) was founded in 1962. The NNLC was founded by a South African
trained physician, Dr Ambrose Zwane. It gained ground against the SPP as
most of the SPP supporters defected to the NNLC because of discontentment
with the leadership style of Nquku. After a failed attempt to gain
independence via the vehicle of monarchical values and beliefs, king
Sobhuza II move to form the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM) in 1964.
There were also a number of other political parties which were founded in
colonial Swaziland. These were the Swaziland Democratic Party (SDP), the
Swaziland United Front (SUF), the Mbandzeni National Convention (MNC) and
the exclusively white United Swaziland Association (USA). Of all the
political parties which were founded in colonial Swaziland, the INM became
the most popular party as it gained overwhelming support. This is because
it largely identified with the needs and aspirations of many Swazis.

The party overwhelmingly won the 1964 and the 1967 elections, winning all
the seats in the house of assembly. At independence, Swaziland's political
landscape was dominated by the INM and Sobhuza enjoyed his party's
hegemony. However, by the beginning of the late 1960s, opposition
political parties began to gradually mount a challenge to Sobhuza. In the
1972 post-independence parliamentary elections, the NNLC wrestled 3 of the
24 seats from the INM. This development did not please Sobhuza, who has
always wanted to completely dominate Swaziland's political dispensation.
Sobhuza started to criticize the independence constitution, particularly
its Bill of Rights which provided for fundamental freedoms, particularly
the freedom of association. Despite that Swaziland got its independence
via political organisation, the King started to abhor opposition politics.
In order to secure his interests of becoming Swaziland's `undisputed
deity', he decided that his best bet was to outlaw political parties in
the kingdom. He argued that the Swazi constitution has many shortcomings
and he enacted the Legislative Procedure Order number 7 of 12 April 1973
in which he authoritatively stated that:

`The constitution has indeed failed to provide the machinery for good
government and for the maintenance of peace and order
The constitution is indeed the cause of growing unrest, insecurity,
dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in our country and impediment to
free and progressive development in all spheres of life

The constitution has permitted the importation into our country of highly
undesirable political parties alien to, and incompatible with, the way of
life in our society and designed to disrupt and destroy our own peaceful
and constructive and essentially democratic methods of political activity;
increasingly this element engenders hostility, bitterness and unrest in
our peaceful society.' (Mzizi; 2005:30,31).

The Proclamation further stipulated that `the constitution of the Kingdom
of Swaziland which commenced on the 6 September 1968 is hereby repealed.'
After this proclamation the King usurped legislative, judicial and
executive powers. The carte blanche with which the king started to
exercise control over the affairs of the nation marked a new ricochet in
the trajectory of state politics in Swaziland. The King's action was a
classical `civilian coup d'etat' which Swaziland is likely to take some
more decades to recuperate from. Political parties were outlawed under the
proclamation's decrees 11, 12, and 13 of 1973 which stipulate that:

11. All political parties and similar bodies that cultivate and bring
about disturbances and ill-feelings within the nation are hereby dissolved
and prohibited
12. No meeting of a political nature and no procession or demonstration
shall be held or take place in any public place unless with prior written
consent of the commissioner of police, and consent shall not be given if
the commissioner of police has reason to believe that such meeting,
procession or demonstration, is directly or indirectly related to
political movements or the riotous assemblies which may disturb the peace
or otherwise disturb the maintenance of law and order.
13. Any person who forms or attempts or conspires to form a political
party or who organises or participates in any way in any meeting,
procession or demonstration in contravention of this decree shall be guilt
of an offence and liable, on conviction, to imprisonment not exceeding six
months (Mzizi; 2005:30,34).

After this proclamation, political parties, including the king's INM went
underground. The NNLC, which was the major political party during that
time, was forced to disintegrate. Leaders of opposition parties began to
be harassed and detained without trial as a way of eliminating every
remnant of opposition politics in the kingdom.

ELECTIONS WITHOUT CONTEST: SWAZILAND'S TINKHUNDLA SYSTEM

In order to consolidate his position that opposition political parties are
`alien' to the Swazi way of life, Sobhuza II immediately appointed a Royal
Constitutional Review Commission (RCRC) in 1973. The primary objective of
the commission was to delve into ways in which Swazi cultural values and
practices could be manipulated in a way that they can form the basis of
the country's monolithic constitutional order. In 1978, the king enacted
the Establishment of the Parliament of Swaziland Order which formed the
basis for the present-day Tinkhundla system (see Motsami; 2012:1). The
Tinkhundla system was established in and through the spirit, letter and
context of the 1973 proclamation. The 1973 proclamation, coupled with the
Tinkhundla system, imposed on the people of Swaziland a seemingly bogus
Swazi identity which has become the lifeblood of the monarchy.

Swaziland has a bifurcated political architecture that is characterized by
ancient forms and processes of governance which are badly meshed with
modern ones.According to section 79 of the Swazi constitution, `the system
of government in Swaziland is a democratic, participatory,
Tinkhundla-based system which emphasises devolution of state power from
central government to Tinkhundla areas and individual merit as a basis for
election or appointment to public office.' Section 80 (3) stipulates that
the Tinkhundla units or areas are `inspired by a policy of
decentralization of state power' and that they `are the engines of
development and the central pillars underpinning the political
organization and economic infrastructure of the country through which
social services to the different parts of the Swazi community are
facilitated and delivered.'

The Tinkhundla system effectively replaced the multi-party system. Under
the system, those who contest for public office are bound to do that in
their personal capacity and not as ambassadors of political parties or any
other form of political association. Traditional authorities, particularly
chiefs are the linchpin of the Tinkhundla regime. These authorities play a
concrete role in vitiating dissent and entrenching the monarchy in a
changing context. Purported Swazi cultural values, norms and beliefs are
used via the Tinkhundla regime to make the monarchy a `sacred cow' which
is scarcely accountable to the Swazi nation for its actions of commission
and omission. The concept of separation of powers does not exist in the
Tinkhundla system primarily because the head of government is appointed by
the head of state (the king). The head of government is therefore not
accountable to the Swazi community but to the king maker who determines
the duration of the appointment (Joubert, Masilela, and Langwenya, 2008:
28). Swaziland is therefore a classical case of fusion of powers. Chiefs
are expected to ensure that the people who live within their area of
jurisdiction continue to be loyal to the monarchy.

They act as `Swazi's cultural old guards' whose chief objective is to
perpetuate the cultural principles, values and practices on which the
monarchy is built. The Tinkhundla regime is therefore entirely the king's
watchdog. The chiefs are responsible for the administration of communal
land as well as the allocation of land and they directly report to the
king. Subjects who participate in politics are often victimised by the
responsible chief and in some cases they can even be evicted from their
community. In order to divert their subjects' attention from politics, the
chiefs often keep them occupied by requiring them to participate in
community projects and royal functions like umhlanga (reed dance), incwala
(Swazi's annual `national prayer' which takes place at the king's palaces,
lusekwane (an equivalent of a reed dance but is exclusively attended by
young boys and it culminate in the killing of a bull by the regiments
using bare hands) and kuhlakula (weeding). The chiefs are required
constitutionally to convene a meeting at least two times a year in their
respective regions.

In order to ensure that the chiefs are accountable to the king and that
they serve to propagate his interests, the chiefs are appointed by the
king via his sole discretion. Swaziland has experienced some chieftaincy
disputes because some Swazis maintain that the position of a chief should
be inherited and not necessarily appointed by the king. There is also the
Council of Chiefs whose tasks include advising the king on issues relating
to Swazi custom and chieftaincy. This council consists of twelve chiefs
from the country's four regions and they are appointed by the king
(section 251 (1) of the Swazi constitution). Chiefs have recently been
involved in the recruitment of personnel in the Swazi National Army. They
can recommend individuals from their chiefdom to be recruited in the army.
The argument here is that they are more informed of the capabilities of
their subjects because they interact with them regularly.

The chiefs are appointed by the king and most of them are either the
king's relatives or those who pay entire allegiance to the king. For
example, in 2000, Mswati arbitrarily depose chief Macetjeni and Kamkhweli
and appointed Prince Maguga Dhlamini, who is his brother and this
occasioned serious disputes in which the deposed kings refused to
recognised Maguga. Mswati is superfluously rich King with 13 wives and his
lavish lifestyle has engendered controversy and criticism in the country
and beyond. The Forbes Magazine estimated Mswati's wealth to be worth
above US $100 million yet more than two-thirds of the Swazis live in
brutish wretchedness. In April 2011, concerned Swazis reacted against
Mswati's abuse of taxpayers' money to buy a private jet, to build new
royal residences for his wives, to fund the reed festival and to purchase
`royal vehicles.'

CONSTITUTION WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE SWAZI CONSTITUTION

The constitution is the linchpin of any political order. Since the 1973
decree which nullified the independence constitution, Swaziland has been
operating without a written constitution. Between 1973 and 2006, the
monarchy used the 1973 decree, the Tinkhundla system and Swazi cultural
beliefs and practices to govern the country. As time passed, operating
without a constitution became more and more unsustainable. Swazis began to
express their discontentment with this situation. Pressure mounted on the
monarchy from pro-democracy sections of the Swazi community and the
international community at large regarding the need for a constitution. In
response to the discontentment, the king decided to establish the
Constitutional Drafting Committee in 2002, a step which led to the
enactment of a new constitution in the kingdom. The constitution of
Swaziland was signed by the King on the 26 July 2005 and entered into
force on the 8 February 2006. The entering into force of the Swazi
constitution brought the widespread optimism among the majority of Swazis
and sections of the international community that a new era had dawned in
the country. The Swazi constitution looks very attractive but it has some
unresolved contradictions. Like any other democratic constitution, the
Swazi constitution provides for a range of democratic freedoms including
the freedom of assembly and association. Section 25 states that:

(1) A person has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association
(2) A person shall not except with the free consent of that person be
hindered in the enjoyment of the freedom of peaceful assembly and
association, that is to say, the right to assemble peacefully and
associate freely with other persons for the promotion or protection of the
interests of that person.

However, despite this provision, the permissibility of political parties
in Swaziland remains uncertain. If this provision is properly interpreted,
one can arrive at the conclusion that political parties are permissible
under the constitution. However, the constitution is silent about
political parties despite that it recognises the freedom of association.
Swaziland does not have a legislative framework which regulates issues of
political parties such as membership, registration, and access to funding.
The death of this legislation points to the position that opposition
political parties are illegal in the kingdom. It is clear that the
draconian 1973 proclamation remains intact and continues to form the basis
for Swaziland's monolithic political system. This is because there is no
provision in the constitution which revokes the proclamation. The monarchy
is hostile to political parties such that in January 2011, the king's
private secretary Samuel Mkhombe and a member of the king's advisory
council, Mathendele Dhlamini were fired following their attempt to
resuscitate the INM. What makes the confusion regarding the permissibility
of opposition politics in Swaziland is that in February 2011 the Attorney
General (AG) issued a statement implying that political parties are
permissible or can operate in the country but only that they cannot form a
government.

It appears the freedom of association referred in the constitution is
constricted to organisations such as the church, community based
organisations and interest groups. One cannot divorce the freedom of
association from the freedom to form or join political parties because
this freedom forms the linchpin of the freedom of association. When it
comes to the freedom of association, Swaziland presents a classical case
of a country with a self-defeating constitution which is the epitome of
constitutional bankruptcy.
Section 63 of the Swazi constitution stipulates the duties of citizens and
some of the duties are to `promote democracy and the rule of law" and to
"combat misuse and waste of public funds and property.' This is misleading
because it is difficult to see how citizens can promote democracy in a
state where they are not allowed to form or belong to political parties.
This is because popular participation in the political processes and
institutions of a country forms the basis of democracy and political
parties are the vehicle of popular participation. Democracy is also
characterised by the ability of the citizens to make their government
accountable. This is important in the combat against the embezzlement of
public funds. Political parties and interest groups play a major role in
this regard. Swazi's inbreeding constitution is exacerbated by other
instruments which arbitrarily oppress democratic freedoms such as the
Suppression of Terrorism Act (STA).

One of the political objectives of Swaziland as stipulated in section 58
(1) is to be `a democratic country dedicated to principle which empower
and encourage the active participation of all citizens at all levels in
their own governance.' It is difficult to see how this objective can be
pursued in the context where political organisation is banned and where
legislations such as the STA are used to suppress civic liberties. The
Swazi constitution deifies the king by giving him excessive powers and the
prerogative to use his personal discretion in governing almost every
aspect of the country.

THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM ACT (STA)

King Mswati III assented to the STA on 7 August 2008. The objective of the
STA as stipulated in this instrument is to `prevent, fight, and suppress
terrorist activities' in keeping with the letter and spirit of the United
Nations. On 14 November 2008, the government declared some organisations
`terrorist entities' under the STA. These organisations include PUDEMO,
the Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO), the Swaziland People's Liberation
Army (SPLA), and the Swaziland Solidarity Network (SSN) which is based in
South Africa. These political organizations are known for their agitation
for the democratization of the kingdom. Their activities cannot in any way
be construed as acts of terrorism. The instrument is also use to suppress
the activities of civil society organizations which are critical of the
monarchy. It should be noted that the global fight against terrorism is
premised on the human rights movement. It seeks to ensure that innocent
people are not arbitrarily deprived of their lives through the infamous
acts of terrorist organisations. It also seeks to safeguard the rights of
people who are suspected of being terrorists or members of terrorist
organisations. There is overwhelming evidence to support the view that the
promotion of human rights is at the depths of the global strategy to
combat terrorism. Paragraph 85 of the Outcome Document of the September
2005 World Summit Declaration states that:

`We recognize that international cooperation to fight terrorism must be
conducted in conformity with international law, including the Charter and
relevant international conventions and protocols. States must ensure that
any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under
international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and
international humanitarian law.'

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 26 September
2008, Mswati said that the Swazi parliament had `recently promulgated the
Anti-Terrorism Act.' He said that the country `joins the rest of the world
in condemning all forms and acts of terrorism' and that it `support
efforts for the full implementation of the global counter-terrorism
strategy in order to send out a clear message to all perpetrators of
terrorism" (Amnesty International, 2009:5). What distinguishes the United
Nations' framework for combating terrorism from the STA is that the latter
serves to violate human rights in ways which purport to promote them. The
definition of a `terrorist act' under this instrument is so elastic that
even any act can potentially be regarded as an "act of terrorism,' even
singing in public. It is important to distinguish political violence from
terrorism. In a society where the state is not responsive to the needs and
aspirations of citizens and avenues of dialogue are virtually closed,
people have a tendency to resort to violent means. These include protests
which may turn violent depending largely on how the state responds to
them. Swaziland offers a good example of a state in which the avenues of
dialogue as far as the need to introduce multi-party politics is concerned
are virtually non-existent. Having been frustrated by the apparent dearth
of such avenues, progressives have resorted to mass protests as a means of
registering their discontentment. To call protests (even in cases where
they may turn violent) acts of terrorism would be itself an act of
terrorism of all acts of terrorism.

Swaziland has ratified a number of international human rights instruments.
It is a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) which it ratified on 6 March 2004, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) which it
ratified on 26 March 2004, the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) which it ratified on 07 April
1969, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) which it ratified on 26 March 2004, Convention
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT) which it ratified on 26 March 2004, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC) which it ratified in September 2005, and the
African Charter on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) which it ratified on
15 September 1995. By virtue of being a party to these international and
regional human rights instruments, Swaziland has the obligation to abide
by the provisions of these instruments. Not only that some provisions in
the STA are incompatible with the respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms but the instrument's salient purpose is to oppress dissent. The
instrument can be characterised as a `human rights coup.' It negates the
commitment which Swaziland has made when it ratified international human
rights instruments.

It is clear from the Swazi context and the texts of the STA that this
instrument is used by the monarchy as a smokescreen behind which to
arbitrarily suppress political agitation, particularly opposition
politics. The 1973 royal proclamation and the STA are some of the
instruments which demonstrate the willpower of the Swazi monarchy to
openly manipulate certain values and principles in order to maintain
power.

WHICH WAY SWAZILAND?

Since the 1973 unilateral proclamation by king Sobhuza II which banned
political parties in Swaziland, the Swazi monarchy has largely been able
to convince the Swazi community that political parties are "unSwazi" and
"inherently divisive". This is what Iqbal noted:

`The autocracy has for decades successfully convinced the majority of the
populace that since the country has always been a kingdom, a tradition
rooted in Swazi culture,... the concept of the political party and even
basic democratic principles are "alien" and therefore incompatible with
tradition.' (Iqbal: 2011)

This `imposed identity' has managed to deeply permeate the social and
political fabrics of the Swazi community. The monarchy has managed not
only to sustain but to reinvent and reanimate this identity in the face of
an overwhelming tide of change which is contrary to it. It has also
survived because unlike other Southern African countries, Swaziland has
been and continues to be largely `invisible' to the international
community. This is because the country largely finds itself on the
periphery of the attention of the international community partly because
`it is not of strategic international interest.'

The monarchy's efforts to clothe itself with the facade of democracy
through the adoption of bogus democratic instruments such as the
Tinkhundla system and the 2006 constitution demonstrates that it is aware
that there is need to constantly give Swaziland's monolithic political
order new life. However, the situation in which Swaziland finds itself is
comparable to a prisoner's dilemma. This is because the monarchy is faced
with the challenge to strike a balance between the progressive forces of
democratization and the ancient Swazi norms and practices on which the
monarchy is built. There is no doubt that the incumbent King Mswati III is
still largely popular and considered a legitimate and uncontested leader
of the monarchy. For example, the publisher of the `Times of Swaziland'
newspaper, Paul Loffler, stated that:

`Swaziland does not need democracy. We have never had genocide, we have
never nationalised farms, our municipalities run like clockwork, the
cities are clean, there are no potholes-or not many and we have little
violent crime.' (The Sunday Times, 05 June 2011).

The redeeming feature of the Swazi monarchy is that it is largely
characterized by peace as compared to many of Africa's `multi-party'
states. Swaziland has never experienced a humanitarian catastrophe such as
those which took place in Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Cote d'Ivoire,
and Libya. This is one of the chief reasons as to why many Swazis believe
in the monarchy. However, there are basically four constituencies in
Swaziland as far as the legitimacy of the absolute monarchy is concerned.
The first constituency consists of the die hard conservatives or
traditionalists. viz, those Swazis who believe that the king's legitimacy
should not be questioned and even that he should not be made accountable
for his actions of commission and omission. This position is largely based
on the conception that the king always makes the right decisions for the
Swazi community. It is also premised on what this study elects to refer to
as `hijacked nationalism.' The constituency consists of chiefs and other
traditional leaders, government officials (particularly high ranking
ones), and members of the Liqoqo. These groups support the king primarily
because of the benefits which are derived from that support. It also
consists of the ordinary Swazis who, through years and years of the
propagation of the position that opposition politics is `alien' to the
Swazi nation by the monarchy, have come to religiously believe in that
position. Some members of this constituency are prepared to pay with the
last drop of their blood in defence of the monarchy.

The second constituency consists of gradual liberalists. These are Swazis
who believe that the absolute monarchy should be Swaziland's permanent
political order. However, due to factors such as corruption, the
monopolization of the political kingdom by the Dhlaminis', poor governance
in areas such as food security and HIV/AIDS, this constituency believes
that the monarchy should be reformed but not radically. The major element
of this reformation is to ensure that it is all-inclusive. This
constituency also believes that the monarchy can also be reformed via the
adoption of pieces of legislations which prioritizes the aspirations and
needs of the people of Swaziland, excluding the agitation for dismantling
the monarchy. However, this constituency is not vocal. It tends to
constrict its aspirations to mere reveries.

The third constituency consists of `progressive' liberalists. This
consists of those Swazis who are convinced that opposition politics should
be allowed to operate in the country but the monarchy should be preserved.
They also believe in the need for Swaziland to promote other democratic
freedoms within the framework of the monarchy. The final constituency
consists of radical liberalists who believe that Swaziland needs to be
disembarrassed of the absolute monarchy and replace it with a democratic
and competitive political dispensation.

The position which is taken in this article is that history is the most
difficult thing to defy, especially when it has changed. There is not a
vestige of doubt that history has earnestly changed such that it is
becoming increasingly difficult and hardly justifiable to sustain a
political dispensation like that which obtains in contemporary Swaziland.
This is primarily because Swazi's absolute monarchy is premised on a
`shifting edifice,' that is, cultural norms and practices. It is in the
nature of societies and culture to change over time and space and this is
not negotiable.

That culture is not static is what makes societies progressive. There is
no doubt that there is a strong link between cultural change and
development. The Swazi tradition on which the monarchy is premised is
increasingly becoming a major impediment to the realization of the
aspirations of the Swazis, particularly the freedom to form and belong to
political associations. However, the Swazi monarchy is only sustainable
via the maintenance of the status quo as far as the monarchy-purported
Swazi cultural values, norms and practices are concerned. Swazi's cultural
practices are not unique in Africa.

The difference is only that some African leaders did not capitalize on
tradition to impose an identity on the people with the view to entrench
themselves in power. It can be said that the Swazi monarchy manipulated
tradition just like many incumbents in Africa manipulate elections in
order to maintain power. However, the wind of democracy and respect for
fundamental human rights and freedoms has outdistanced political systems
which are founded on ancient norms and practices such as a monarchy, let
alone an absolute monarchy like Swaziland. This is what Phiri had in mind
when he argued that:
`From this distance, the problem of Swaziland is thus the status of the
monarchy. The issue here is not openly the legitimacy of the King, but
whether in this modern era (an age of political and structural
transformations, and the respect for basic human rights) he should
continue enjoying the archaic and traditional privileges that previously
defeated communities reserved for sovereign potentates during the last two
centuries.' (Phiri as Cited by Bohler-Muller and Lukhele-Olorunju; 2011:
3).

It is becoming increasingly patent that the monarchy's entrenched position
that opposition politics is contrary to traditional Swazi norms and
beliefs has reached a `tottering and faltering' point at this point in
history. The only question remaining is not whether the monarchy will come
to a dead end but when will it do so because it cannot be permanently
sustained. There shall definitely come a point at which Swaziland will
transform to a multi-party state, voluntarily or via an unstoppable wind
of change. One of the many areas in which history is known to be foolproof
is that when it has changed, it does not matter how long a certain
establishment has been in place. This is one way in which the successes of
the Arab Spring can be explained.

It also explains the success of the Libyan revolution. That history is
sure to impose consequences when one defies it is what Gaddafi failed to
realise when he decided to invoke his military mantle with the view to
face out the Libyan revolt. Having presided over Libya for close to half a
century, Gaddafi became entirely convinced that nothing can depose him
from the presidency. Contrary to this conviction, he eventually died a
brutish and ignoble death after his capture by `cockroaches and rats', the
terms which he used to refer to the revolutionaries. Robert Mugabe of
Zimbabwe, Paul Biya of Cameroon, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, and Yahya
Jammeh of Gambia are possibly making themselves victims of a changed
history.

There already exists a sizeable and growing constituency of Swazis who
have become disaffected with the monarchy and are committed to
disembarrass Swaziland of this type of political establishment. This
`liberated zone' is slowly but earnestly growing and it has the support of
the international community because it seeks to promote internationally
valued norms of democracy and human rights. This is a `liberated zone' in
the sense that it has dissociated itself from the norms and practices
which are being used by the monarchy to suppress democratic freedoms.
Force can be used to suppress the physical aspects of the "liberated zone"
but the values, principles and norms of the zone cannot be chained or
reversed but can only be delayed.

However, while it is desirable (because it is inevitable) for Swaziland to
transform to a multi-party state, it is important to interrogate how such
a transition could possibly be effected. This is because a transition from
an absolute monarchy to a multi-party state in itself does not guarantee
that Swaziland will transform into a peaceful, democratic and progressive
state. If poorly managed, the transition can engender unprecedented
political, social and economic problems in that country. Such a transition
cannot be expected to take place overnight. It should be preceded by broad
democratic reforms which will form the basis for state politics and
society in post-monarchy Swaziland. Such reforms may take time to be
implemented especially when the political will to do so is impoverished.

There are basically two ways in which Swaziland can be transformed to a
competitive and democratic political system. The first one (which is
likely to be acceptable to the monarchy) is to maintain the monarchy in
the context of multi-party politics. This occurs when political parties
are allowed to exist and vie for public offices. However, the king and the
Ndlovukazi will continue to play an important role in Swazi politics. The
only difference is that the king will have to be divested of executive
powers. He will become a ceremonial one but he may retain the power to
accent to legislations in the context of a balance of power system. In
this political order, there will be an executive head of state who is
elected via the ballot. The position of the king will continue to be
hereditary and the king and the Ndlovukazi will continue to be
the highest custodians of Swazi cultural values and practices.

This system is capable of ensuring that Swaziland retains its cultural
tradition within the context of a modern democratic state. This appears
close to the nature of transformation which the International Crisis Group
(ICG; 2005:1), proposed when it maintained that Swaziland should be
transformed into a constitutional monarchy which is characterised by:

• The elimination of all vestiges of the 1973 state of emergency,
including removal of the king's arbitrary powers over the legislature and
judiciary as well as his right to appoint the prime minister and the
cabinet;
• Legalization of political parties
• A directly elected house of assembly with oversight of royal spending
and an elected prime minister as head of government;
• Codification of traditional law and its reconciliation with common law,
and appointment of an independent judiciary by an impartial judicial
commission, and
• Civilian oversight of professional security forces.

The second approach is a radical one. It calls for the dismantling of the
entire institution of the monarchy root and branch and the introduction of
multi-party politics. This option is difficult to achieve (especially
through dialogue) because of the nature and degree of the change involved.
What should be understood about multi-party politics is that there is
nothing inherently bad about it. It just requires leadership to respect
the will of the people. The problem comes when incumbents want to maintain
a stranglehold on power when the popular will has shifted. This is not a
problem which can be attributed to multi-party politics. It tends
therefore to be misleading to say that multi-party politics is divisive as
the Swazi monarchy has maintained.

Whichever form of transition the people of Swaziland may elect to effect;
dialogue should be at the centre of the transition. Swaziland does not
need to implement any transition via a civil war like the case of Libya.
It is important to engage the king at a highly intellectual level with the
view to influence him to effect a transition which is in the best interest
of the people of Swaziland. The major role in any transformation in
Swaziland should be played by progressive local actors. However,
progressive local actors in Swaziland have received very little
international attention and support. The international community,
particularly South Africa, SADC, the African Union, and the European Union
has a role to play in any political transformation which might need to be
implemented in Swaziland. The role would be to influence the king through
dialogue and the imposition of sanctions (where and when necessary) and
also to give financial and other forms of support to progressive local
actors.

ENDNOTES

Bohler-Muller, N. and Lukhele-Olorunju, P. August 2011. `Swaziland: The
Last Gape of an Absolute Monarch?' Policy Brief No 54, Africa Institute of
South Africa. Johannesburg: EISA.
Iqbal, Z. 2011. `Swaziland: The forgotten land of avarice.' Available at:
http:/www.iijd.org/index.php/news/entry/Swaziland-the-forgoten-land-of-avarice/
(Accessed 20 February 2012)
Joubert, P. Masilela, Z. and Langwenya, M. 2008.'Consolidating Democratic
Governance in the SADC Region: Swaziland.' EISA Research Report No. 38.
Motsami, D. `Swaziland's Non-Party System and the 2013 Tinkhundla
Elections: Breaking the SADC Impasse?' Institute for Security Studies
Situation Report, Pretoria. 15 August 2012
Mzizi, J. B. 2006. `Political Movements and the Challenges for Democracy
in Swaziland.' Research Report No 18, Johannesburg, EISA.
Amnesty International, 2009. `Suppression of Terrorism Act Undermines
Human Rights in Swaziland.' Amnesty International Publications and
International Bar Association.
International Crisis Group, `Swaziland: The Clock is Ticking.' Policy
Briefing No 29, Pretoria, Brussels. 14 July 2005.
International Trade Union Confederation, `Swaziland: The repressive side
of an absolute monarchy.' Union View No 3, May 2009.
*Moses Tofa is the author of `Humanitarian Intervention in Metaphorical
Metamorphosis: Memories from the Experiences of Libya and Cote d'Ivoire.'
He is a political analyst and a Peace, Security and Development Scholar
with the African Leadership Centre.

Thé Mulindwas Communication Group
"With Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is in anarchy"
Groupe de communication Mulindwas
"avec Yoweri Museveni, l'Ouganda est dans l'anarchie"


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