[UAH] FW: [angbayan_updates_English] On what can be done to help in the resumption and continuation of the peace talks between the NDFP and the GPH
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On the resumption of peace talks in the Philippines. I am in favour and will once again play a role although the Philippines government does not want my involvement because they claim I am disruptive and have a bad tendency of lecturing to people.
George Okello
To: angbayan@yahoo.com
From: cppmedia@gmail.com
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2013 10:09:48 +0000
Subject: [angbayan_updates_English] On what can be done to help in the resumption and continuation of the peace talks between the NDFP and the GPH
George Okello
To: angbayan@yahoo.com
From: cppmedia@gmail.com
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2013 10:09:48 +0000
Subject: [angbayan_updates_English] On what can be done to help in the resumption and continuation of the peace talks between the NDFP and the GPH
On what can be done to help in the resumption and continuation of the
peace talks between the NDFP and the GPH
Alan Jazmines
Emeterio Antalan
Leopoldo Caloza
Tirso Alcantara
(NDFP peace consultants detained at the Security Intensive Care Area
(SICA), Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig City)
30 June 2013
The NDFP firmly affirms the principled basis, historical correctness and
legitimacy in practice through the years of its revolutionary struggle
for fundamental (political, socio-economic, cultural, and other) reforms
in the interest of the mass of the people. Consistently in pursuit of
these, it has developed a significantly large, solid and growing
revolutionary following and mass base.
Even if the revolutionary struggle has been protracted (since 1969,
already the longest running in the world) and continues to be faced with
tough challenges, the determination to advance towards victory and the
liberation of the people from long-prevailing political and social ills
is unwavering, no matter how formidable may be the resistance of the
prevailing state and its forces and how difficult and much longer the
struggle would take.
Conditions in the world and locally have, however, presently been
becoming more and more favorable for the resurgence and advance of the
people's protest and democratic movements and of the more highly
organized, more scientific and more forceful revolutionary movements.
The NDFP and the revolutionary movement it leads, even then, remain very
much open to peace talks, and in fact always prefer to try to gain the
most or whatever can realistically be gained in peace negotiations with
whatever ruling GPH regime that in attitude and actual deeds is seen by
the NDFP as open and interested enough at talking peace towards the
possibility of agreeing on significant issues, basic frameworks,
fundamental reforms, and up to the conclusion of the already
long-prevailing civil strife in the country.
It has actually only been during the GPH regime of Fidel Ramos when
there were significant and substantive agreements that were achieved,
including The Hague Joint Declaration containing agreements on the
framework of the peace talks and the need to come out sequentially, but
not necessarily exclusively or only one at a time, with comprehensive
agreements on four key substantive agenda (human rights; socio-economic
reforms; political and constitutional reforms; truce, military
reorganization and end of hostilities) toward a final agreement and
settlement.
Further major agreements were later achieved to significantly back up
the peace process, such as the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity
Guarantees (JASIG) in 1995 and the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect
for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) in 1998.
A number of NDFP peace consultants and staffs who were arrested were
released by virtue of the NDFP's assertion of and the GPH's compliance
with their JASIG protection.
In 2004, under the GPH regime of Gloria Arroyo, a number of agreements
were also attained, including the affirmation of previous agreements
(such as The Hague Declaration, JASIG and CARHRIHL). There were also
agreements reached on the common draft of the guidelines for the work of
the Reciprocal Working Committees on the second substantive agenda
(Socio-Economic Reforms, or SER) and the sub-committees for each of its
major topics; a draft preamble of the envisioned Comprehensive Agreement
on Socio-Economic Reforms (CASER); a draft declaration of principles of
the CASER; an agreement for the enhancement/acceleration of the process
in this scope of work; and a further meeting to complete common
tentative drafts on major sections of SER, including on Economic
Sovereignty and National Patrimony, Agrarian Reform and Agricultural
Development, and National Industrialization and Economic Development.
To further speed up the whole peace process, it was also agreed upon
that simultaneously with the work on SER, preparatory work on the third
substantive agenda (Political and Constitutional Reforms, or PCR) would
already be started, even as the heart of the agenda on PCR would be
initiated and completed as soon as the reciprocal work on SER is completed.
There was also an agreement for the GPH to review, monitor and evaluate
the cases of political prisoners (about 300 of these, documented by
KARAPATAN) and to immediately release those found to have been arrested,
detained, charged, tried, or even convicted of what were made to appear
as common crimes, contrary to the Hernandez Doctrine (which prohibits
charging with common crimes those with supposed political offenses).
There was also a particular agreement for the GPH to release within 30
days 32 named political prisoners, consisting of women, minors, sick and
elderly.
And a further agreement was made for the indemnification of the victims
of human rights violations during the Marcos martial law regime.
A big, glaring problem, however, has been that most of these agreements
were actually not implemented by the GPH regime of Gloria Arroyo,
resulting in strong clashes between the NDFP and the Arroyo regime.
Bulk of the 300 or so political prisoners were not released, and more
kept on being arrested, detained, tortured and swamped with trumped-up
criminal charges, including a number of JASIG-protected NDFP peace
consultants.
Worse, a number of these NDFP peace consultants, including their staffs
and families, were involuntarily disappeared and extra-judicially killed.
When the NDFP demanded the GPH's compliance with the JASIG, the CARHRIHL
and other peace agreements and the latter's rectification of its
violations of these, in line with its all-out war against the
revolutionary movement, the Arroyo regime even went the opposite way and
indefinitely suspended the JASIG (even if the agreement provides only
two choices -- either to implement it or to altogether terminate it).
The Arroyo regime went further and connived with the Dutch police for
the latter to arrest the NDFP's Chief Political and Peace Adviser, Jose
Ma. Sison; to raid the offices and residences of NDFP peace panel
members, consultants and staffs in The Netherlands; and to confiscate
the latter's papers, computer disks and other files, including those
related to the peace talks and other sensitive data. The computer disks
were corrupted/damaged when they were returned (one computer disk
containing the encryption codes was, however, not returned) by the Dutch
police. The returned computer disks were then deposited in a safety
deposit box in a Dutch bank for safe keeping.
When, four years later, the next GPH regime of Benigno S. Aquino III had
agreed to the resumption of the long-stalled NDFP-GPH peace talks, but
did not want to just release JASIG-protected but still detained NDFP
peace consultants and was insisting that the JASIG files of the detained
NDFP peace consultants be verified direct from the JASIG files first
before releasing them, there was a problem of verifying directly from
the JASIG files in the corrupted/damaged computer disk returned to the
NDFP and stored in the bank. The said computer disk was still attempted
to be opened and deciphered by the NDFP panel in the presence of the GPH
panel and 3rd party peace facilitators, but the JASIG files could no
longer be properly extracted, deciphered and read, as the computer disk
containing them was already corrupted/damaged.
All protests by arrested and detained NDFP peace consultants on the
violation of the JASIG in their cases were totally ignored by the
arresting forces and the prevailing GPH regimes since the Arroyo regime.
JASIG documents of information in the hands of arrested NDFP peace
consultants were also always confiscated from them upon arrest, and no
longer showed up.
One of us, Alan Jazmines, was arrested just a few hours before the
resumption in February 14, 2011 of the peace talks suspended during the
Arroyo regime, and he protested his arrest as a violation of the JASIG
and a slap at the face of the peace talks even as it was just to begin
again. But the protest was ignored.
Some more JASIG-protected NDFP peace consultants were arrested even
after the peace talks had resumed. The GPH regime of Benigno S. Aquino
III and its peace panel continued to just ignore the protests.
The Aquino regime deceptively terms the demand for the release of
arrested and detained JASIG-protected NDFP peace consultants as a
"precondition" by the NDFP. But, in fact, it is an obligation -- to
correct a serious violation of a standing NDFP-GPH agreement, in order
for the peace talks to proceed.
So that the peace talks can be resumed fully, the NDFP had suggested a
practical solution to the problem of the loss of the JASIG files -- a
reconstitution of the JASIG files in cooperation by both the NDFP and
the GPH peace panels. But the GPH has been rejecting the proposal.
The current Aquino region has also been totally ignoring the wider
demand of the NDFP for the release of all political prisoners (more than
400 of them now, with more than half of these arrested since the onset
of the current Aquino regime). Their release should rectify gross
violations of justice, human rights and even the GPH's own laws,
especially as in practically all their cases, the Hernandez Doctrine has
rampantly, intentionally and cruelly been violated.
While the continuing detention of NDFP peace consultants has continued
to be a major snag to the continuation of the NDFP-GPH peace talks,
especially in the holding of "regular track" peace talks (in accordance
with The Hague Declaration and related agreement on the substantive
agenda regarding fundamental reforms), the NDFP peace panel has taken
the initiative of flexibility proposing "special track" peace talks.
The NDFP peace panel has initiated and the GPH has accepted the "special
track" peace talks, initially without the prior release of all detained
NDFP peace consultants. But for the "special track" peace talks to
continue and progress, the GPH is still unqualifiedly obliged to
immediately release all detained NDFP peace consultants. Otherwise,
aside from continuing to violate the JASIG, CARHRIHL and other peace
agreements, their continued detention will only continue to reveal bad
faith on the side of the GPH, prevent the detained NDFP peace
consultants from performing their respective roles in the peace process,
and will soon if not yet immediately cause the stalling once again of
the peace talks.
The initial agenda of the "special track" peace talks may start with
more urgent and more generalized formulations, even if with more easily
stage-by-stage implementable portions of the new combined reform agenda,
but will still have to cover the same whole range of agenda as the
"regular track" peace talks, as had been agreed upon in The Hague
Declaration, although no longer strictly according to the sequence and
schedule specified in The Hague Declaration. The proposed Committee on
National Unity, Peace and Development to be jointly formed by the NDFP
and the GPH should be able to already adequately, even if
stage-by-stage, implement major parts of the reform agenda outlined in
The Hague Declaration, and supposed to be taken up subject-by-subject in
the "regular track" peace talks.
All this, on the assumption that the current Aquino regime may be easier
to negotiate peace with through the "special track" process.
In the supposed "special track" meeting in Amsterdam last February
25-26, and in the GPH's communications and proposals even prior to this,
it however made the big mistake of assuming too little of the NDFP and
angling only for an indefinite ceasefire and "henceforth peaceful
means," but without even any serious discussion -- much less any
agreement at all -- on fundamental reform agenda that the NDFP has laid,
with all intent, seriousness and priority, across the negotiation table,
and also without the GPH's rectifying its recalcitrant violations of the
JASIG, CARHRIHL and other standing peace agreements, and without even
releasing just the detained NDFP peace consultants, much less the other
political prisoners.
While the GPH has practically killed the "special track", and further
refuses to go back to the "regular track" (declaring its anchor in The
Hague Declaration as a source of "perpetual division" as it has all the
time been showing the absence of intent and preparation to really
discuss in depth and substance the fundamental issues that are at the
root of the civil war and conflict between the NDFP and the GPH; and
chastising the "regular track" for the overly long -- 27 years already
and running -- process but without admitting at all that the many long
delays were due to the series of serious violations on the part of
various GPH regimes, including the current.
The NDFP has always been and remains intent on seriously pursuing peace
talks -- and even at giving it priority when realistically feasible --
for the purpose of more immediately attaining fundamental reforms and
hastening the end of the long-running civil strife, all in the interest
of the mass of the people, their rights, their progress and their future.
The NDFP has always been and remains open to whatever GPH regime is also
open and interested enough in the process and its objectives. If a
current GPH regime has been or has become totally antagonistic and
refuses to talk peace, the only choice left is to wait out a next regime
that would be the opposite.
While the current regime has practically killed the "special track"
while refusing to go back to the "regular track", and has also been
continuing with its violations of the JASIG, CARHRIHL and other peace
agreements, including its obligation to immediately release NDFP peace
consultants who continue to be detained, the NDFP has not totally given
up the peace talks with the current regime.
The NDFP also views positively the removal of late -- and likely
replacement with a much better and more open one -- of the last GPH
peace panel head, who had been the most hardline, insincere and arrogant
in refusing to forge a meeting of will and minds with the NDFP peace
panel, to recognize the need to rectify the GPH's violations and serious
failures of its peace panel's work, preparations and readiness to
positively resolve problems and really talk peace with the NDFP.
The NDFP also awaits drastic decisive changes and improvements in the
leadership, orientation and work of the Office of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) in order to make it more conducive
and helpful, instead of remaining hostile to the peace process.
The NDFP would very much like to obtain the help of various local and
international organizations, groups and personalities with the potential
of somehow being able to relink the broken bridge between the NDFP and
the GPH, including the present Aquino regime, and also suggest urgent
improvements and rectifications in problematic areas of the peace
process. Such help may be obtained from the likes of the Norwegian
Third Party Facilitators, Conciliation Resources, International Alert,
Philippine Ecumenical Peace Platform, Philippine Peace Center, and others.
Some of the most problematic areas where they can help in strongly
suggesting urgent improvements and rectifications concern: 1) The need
to seriously reaffirm the JASIG -- protection of presently detained NDFP
peace consultants and make way for their participation in the peace
process; and 2) The need to seriously and fully make way for
comprehensive and in-depth studies and discussions on fundamental reform
agenda as laid out in The Hague Declaration, immediately, especially in
the socio-economic-cultural and political-constitutional concerns,
instead of putting the cart before the horse and prioritizing an
indefinite ceasefire even as the roots of the armed conflict have not
yet been adequately addressed and resolved. After all the very purpose
and objective of the peace talks is to address the roots of the civil
strife and agree on fundamental reforms in the interest of the mass of
the people and their future.
peace talks between the NDFP and the GPH
Alan Jazmines
Emeterio Antalan
Leopoldo Caloza
Tirso Alcantara
(NDFP peace consultants detained at the Security Intensive Care Area
(SICA), Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig City)
30 June 2013
The NDFP firmly affirms the principled basis, historical correctness and
legitimacy in practice through the years of its revolutionary struggle
for fundamental (political, socio-economic, cultural, and other) reforms
in the interest of the mass of the people. Consistently in pursuit of
these, it has developed a significantly large, solid and growing
revolutionary following and mass base.
Even if the revolutionary struggle has been protracted (since 1969,
already the longest running in the world) and continues to be faced with
tough challenges, the determination to advance towards victory and the
liberation of the people from long-prevailing political and social ills
is unwavering, no matter how formidable may be the resistance of the
prevailing state and its forces and how difficult and much longer the
struggle would take.
Conditions in the world and locally have, however, presently been
becoming more and more favorable for the resurgence and advance of the
people's protest and democratic movements and of the more highly
organized, more scientific and more forceful revolutionary movements.
The NDFP and the revolutionary movement it leads, even then, remain very
much open to peace talks, and in fact always prefer to try to gain the
most or whatever can realistically be gained in peace negotiations with
whatever ruling GPH regime that in attitude and actual deeds is seen by
the NDFP as open and interested enough at talking peace towards the
possibility of agreeing on significant issues, basic frameworks,
fundamental reforms, and up to the conclusion of the already
long-prevailing civil strife in the country.
It has actually only been during the GPH regime of Fidel Ramos when
there were significant and substantive agreements that were achieved,
including The Hague Joint Declaration containing agreements on the
framework of the peace talks and the need to come out sequentially, but
not necessarily exclusively or only one at a time, with comprehensive
agreements on four key substantive agenda (human rights; socio-economic
reforms; political and constitutional reforms; truce, military
reorganization and end of hostilities) toward a final agreement and
settlement.
Further major agreements were later achieved to significantly back up
the peace process, such as the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity
Guarantees (JASIG) in 1995 and the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect
for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) in 1998.
A number of NDFP peace consultants and staffs who were arrested were
released by virtue of the NDFP's assertion of and the GPH's compliance
with their JASIG protection.
In 2004, under the GPH regime of Gloria Arroyo, a number of agreements
were also attained, including the affirmation of previous agreements
(such as The Hague Declaration, JASIG and CARHRIHL). There were also
agreements reached on the common draft of the guidelines for the work of
the Reciprocal Working Committees on the second substantive agenda
(Socio-Economic Reforms, or SER) and the sub-committees for each of its
major topics; a draft preamble of the envisioned Comprehensive Agreement
on Socio-Economic Reforms (CASER); a draft declaration of principles of
the CASER; an agreement for the enhancement/acceleration of the process
in this scope of work; and a further meeting to complete common
tentative drafts on major sections of SER, including on Economic
Sovereignty and National Patrimony, Agrarian Reform and Agricultural
Development, and National Industrialization and Economic Development.
To further speed up the whole peace process, it was also agreed upon
that simultaneously with the work on SER, preparatory work on the third
substantive agenda (Political and Constitutional Reforms, or PCR) would
already be started, even as the heart of the agenda on PCR would be
initiated and completed as soon as the reciprocal work on SER is completed.
There was also an agreement for the GPH to review, monitor and evaluate
the cases of political prisoners (about 300 of these, documented by
KARAPATAN) and to immediately release those found to have been arrested,
detained, charged, tried, or even convicted of what were made to appear
as common crimes, contrary to the Hernandez Doctrine (which prohibits
charging with common crimes those with supposed political offenses).
There was also a particular agreement for the GPH to release within 30
days 32 named political prisoners, consisting of women, minors, sick and
elderly.
And a further agreement was made for the indemnification of the victims
of human rights violations during the Marcos martial law regime.
A big, glaring problem, however, has been that most of these agreements
were actually not implemented by the GPH regime of Gloria Arroyo,
resulting in strong clashes between the NDFP and the Arroyo regime.
Bulk of the 300 or so political prisoners were not released, and more
kept on being arrested, detained, tortured and swamped with trumped-up
criminal charges, including a number of JASIG-protected NDFP peace
consultants.
Worse, a number of these NDFP peace consultants, including their staffs
and families, were involuntarily disappeared and extra-judicially killed.
When the NDFP demanded the GPH's compliance with the JASIG, the CARHRIHL
and other peace agreements and the latter's rectification of its
violations of these, in line with its all-out war against the
revolutionary movement, the Arroyo regime even went the opposite way and
indefinitely suspended the JASIG (even if the agreement provides only
two choices -- either to implement it or to altogether terminate it).
The Arroyo regime went further and connived with the Dutch police for
the latter to arrest the NDFP's Chief Political and Peace Adviser, Jose
Ma. Sison; to raid the offices and residences of NDFP peace panel
members, consultants and staffs in The Netherlands; and to confiscate
the latter's papers, computer disks and other files, including those
related to the peace talks and other sensitive data. The computer disks
were corrupted/damaged when they were returned (one computer disk
containing the encryption codes was, however, not returned) by the Dutch
police. The returned computer disks were then deposited in a safety
deposit box in a Dutch bank for safe keeping.
When, four years later, the next GPH regime of Benigno S. Aquino III had
agreed to the resumption of the long-stalled NDFP-GPH peace talks, but
did not want to just release JASIG-protected but still detained NDFP
peace consultants and was insisting that the JASIG files of the detained
NDFP peace consultants be verified direct from the JASIG files first
before releasing them, there was a problem of verifying directly from
the JASIG files in the corrupted/damaged computer disk returned to the
NDFP and stored in the bank. The said computer disk was still attempted
to be opened and deciphered by the NDFP panel in the presence of the GPH
panel and 3rd party peace facilitators, but the JASIG files could no
longer be properly extracted, deciphered and read, as the computer disk
containing them was already corrupted/damaged.
All protests by arrested and detained NDFP peace consultants on the
violation of the JASIG in their cases were totally ignored by the
arresting forces and the prevailing GPH regimes since the Arroyo regime.
JASIG documents of information in the hands of arrested NDFP peace
consultants were also always confiscated from them upon arrest, and no
longer showed up.
One of us, Alan Jazmines, was arrested just a few hours before the
resumption in February 14, 2011 of the peace talks suspended during the
Arroyo regime, and he protested his arrest as a violation of the JASIG
and a slap at the face of the peace talks even as it was just to begin
again. But the protest was ignored.
Some more JASIG-protected NDFP peace consultants were arrested even
after the peace talks had resumed. The GPH regime of Benigno S. Aquino
III and its peace panel continued to just ignore the protests.
The Aquino regime deceptively terms the demand for the release of
arrested and detained JASIG-protected NDFP peace consultants as a
"precondition" by the NDFP. But, in fact, it is an obligation -- to
correct a serious violation of a standing NDFP-GPH agreement, in order
for the peace talks to proceed.
So that the peace talks can be resumed fully, the NDFP had suggested a
practical solution to the problem of the loss of the JASIG files -- a
reconstitution of the JASIG files in cooperation by both the NDFP and
the GPH peace panels. But the GPH has been rejecting the proposal.
The current Aquino region has also been totally ignoring the wider
demand of the NDFP for the release of all political prisoners (more than
400 of them now, with more than half of these arrested since the onset
of the current Aquino regime). Their release should rectify gross
violations of justice, human rights and even the GPH's own laws,
especially as in practically all their cases, the Hernandez Doctrine has
rampantly, intentionally and cruelly been violated.
While the continuing detention of NDFP peace consultants has continued
to be a major snag to the continuation of the NDFP-GPH peace talks,
especially in the holding of "regular track" peace talks (in accordance
with The Hague Declaration and related agreement on the substantive
agenda regarding fundamental reforms), the NDFP peace panel has taken
the initiative of flexibility proposing "special track" peace talks.
The NDFP peace panel has initiated and the GPH has accepted the "special
track" peace talks, initially without the prior release of all detained
NDFP peace consultants. But for the "special track" peace talks to
continue and progress, the GPH is still unqualifiedly obliged to
immediately release all detained NDFP peace consultants. Otherwise,
aside from continuing to violate the JASIG, CARHRIHL and other peace
agreements, their continued detention will only continue to reveal bad
faith on the side of the GPH, prevent the detained NDFP peace
consultants from performing their respective roles in the peace process,
and will soon if not yet immediately cause the stalling once again of
the peace talks.
The initial agenda of the "special track" peace talks may start with
more urgent and more generalized formulations, even if with more easily
stage-by-stage implementable portions of the new combined reform agenda,
but will still have to cover the same whole range of agenda as the
"regular track" peace talks, as had been agreed upon in The Hague
Declaration, although no longer strictly according to the sequence and
schedule specified in The Hague Declaration. The proposed Committee on
National Unity, Peace and Development to be jointly formed by the NDFP
and the GPH should be able to already adequately, even if
stage-by-stage, implement major parts of the reform agenda outlined in
The Hague Declaration, and supposed to be taken up subject-by-subject in
the "regular track" peace talks.
All this, on the assumption that the current Aquino regime may be easier
to negotiate peace with through the "special track" process.
In the supposed "special track" meeting in Amsterdam last February
25-26, and in the GPH's communications and proposals even prior to this,
it however made the big mistake of assuming too little of the NDFP and
angling only for an indefinite ceasefire and "henceforth peaceful
means," but without even any serious discussion -- much less any
agreement at all -- on fundamental reform agenda that the NDFP has laid,
with all intent, seriousness and priority, across the negotiation table,
and also without the GPH's rectifying its recalcitrant violations of the
JASIG, CARHRIHL and other standing peace agreements, and without even
releasing just the detained NDFP peace consultants, much less the other
political prisoners.
While the GPH has practically killed the "special track", and further
refuses to go back to the "regular track" (declaring its anchor in The
Hague Declaration as a source of "perpetual division" as it has all the
time been showing the absence of intent and preparation to really
discuss in depth and substance the fundamental issues that are at the
root of the civil war and conflict between the NDFP and the GPH; and
chastising the "regular track" for the overly long -- 27 years already
and running -- process but without admitting at all that the many long
delays were due to the series of serious violations on the part of
various GPH regimes, including the current.
The NDFP has always been and remains intent on seriously pursuing peace
talks -- and even at giving it priority when realistically feasible --
for the purpose of more immediately attaining fundamental reforms and
hastening the end of the long-running civil strife, all in the interest
of the mass of the people, their rights, their progress and their future.
The NDFP has always been and remains open to whatever GPH regime is also
open and interested enough in the process and its objectives. If a
current GPH regime has been or has become totally antagonistic and
refuses to talk peace, the only choice left is to wait out a next regime
that would be the opposite.
While the current regime has practically killed the "special track"
while refusing to go back to the "regular track", and has also been
continuing with its violations of the JASIG, CARHRIHL and other peace
agreements, including its obligation to immediately release NDFP peace
consultants who continue to be detained, the NDFP has not totally given
up the peace talks with the current regime.
The NDFP also views positively the removal of late -- and likely
replacement with a much better and more open one -- of the last GPH
peace panel head, who had been the most hardline, insincere and arrogant
in refusing to forge a meeting of will and minds with the NDFP peace
panel, to recognize the need to rectify the GPH's violations and serious
failures of its peace panel's work, preparations and readiness to
positively resolve problems and really talk peace with the NDFP.
The NDFP also awaits drastic decisive changes and improvements in the
leadership, orientation and work of the Office of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) in order to make it more conducive
and helpful, instead of remaining hostile to the peace process.
The NDFP would very much like to obtain the help of various local and
international organizations, groups and personalities with the potential
of somehow being able to relink the broken bridge between the NDFP and
the GPH, including the present Aquino regime, and also suggest urgent
improvements and rectifications in problematic areas of the peace
process. Such help may be obtained from the likes of the Norwegian
Third Party Facilitators, Conciliation Resources, International Alert,
Philippine Ecumenical Peace Platform, Philippine Peace Center, and others.
Some of the most problematic areas where they can help in strongly
suggesting urgent improvements and rectifications concern: 1) The need
to seriously reaffirm the JASIG -- protection of presently detained NDFP
peace consultants and make way for their participation in the peace
process; and 2) The need to seriously and fully make way for
comprehensive and in-depth studies and discussions on fundamental reform
agenda as laid out in The Hague Declaration, immediately, especially in
the socio-economic-cultural and political-constitutional concerns,
instead of putting the cart before the horse and prioritizing an
indefinite ceasefire even as the roots of the armed conflict have not
yet been adequately addressed and resolved. After all the very purpose
and objective of the peace talks is to address the roots of the civil
strife and agree on fundamental reforms in the interest of the mass of
the people and their future.
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