{UAH} WHY THE SOUTH SUDAN PEACE TALKS ARE BAD NEWS FOR MUSEVENI
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WHY THE SOUTH SUDAN PEACE TALKS ARE BAD NEWS FOR MUSEVENI
Right from the regimes of Obote 1, Iddi Amin, Obote 11 and now Museveni, Uganda had been a key ally of the struggling Southern Sudanese people. Starting with the Anyanya rebellion in the 1960s and 70s to the SPLA during the 80s and 90s, successive Ugandan goverments offered support to the Southern Sudanese struggle.
However, its during Museveni's reign that Uganda's support took discrimatory dimensions - "our southern christian brothers". According to Museveni, the struggle was against the Arab Islamic regime of Kharatoum that was bent on spreading Islamic Fundamentalism orchestrated by Hassan Ali Tourabi. The truith is that Museveni opportunistically wanted to detach the people of northern and West Nile regions from any dirrect link with their cousins in Southern Sudan. Northern and West Nile regions had rejected the Museveni government right from its inception and had gone into armed rebellion with rear bases in Southern Sudan. The Museveni government refered to the people from northern Uganda and west Nile as Anyanyas in reference to the Southern Sudan liberation struggle.
Khartoum decided to offer retaliatory support to Uganda dissidents based in Southern Sudan. Relations between Kampala and Khartoum deteriorated to the extent that during the early 90s the NRA assaulted the Sudan embasy in Kampala with armoured personel carriers (APC) leading to shivering diplomatic relations.
The USA threw its weight behind the Uganda's support for the SPLA. A full fledged supply line was established and coordinated by the Gen. Joram Mugume the then NRA Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) and Fred Tolit the then Director of Military Intelligence (DMI). Actually Fred Tolit was just a figure head DMI meant to hoodwink the Acholis. He was a mere head of the Sudan desk concerned with matters of Southern Sudan and the LRA. The real DMI was instead his deputy, Aronda Nyakairima. Worst of all, Tolit was viewed as a General Tinyefuza confidant since its the later who had brought him to the fore.
This did not deter the Ugandan armed groups from getting support from some sections of the SPLA fighters. One of the deceptive ways was for the SPLA to pretend that the LRA had overan its camps and seized arms. As the South was heading towards gaining full autonomy from Khartoum, the legendary SPLA leader John Garang had to die in a helcopter crash provided to him by Museveni. No doubt, like all revolutionaries an autonomous state of Southern Sudan under Garang would have sought to support other liberation movements that already had bases in its teritory. Garang had a softer approach towards Khartoum - Museveni's arch enemy and a bait for USA support. Garang's successor, Silva Kiir set up a Museveni client regime in Southern Sudan. Being an internal figure, Johm Garang would not have taken orders from Museveni without question. In return Museveni has been fighting hard to have it incorporated into the East African Community solely in order to secure the northern border.
It is against this background that Museveni has had to move very fast to to intervene and save his client regime of Silva Kiir. In the same vein of keeping the ethinic Luo influence in check, Museveni intervened in Kenya against a Railla Odinga victory. Earlier, during the early 90s, he had denied Kenyan dissident Col. Odong's FERA bases in Uganda against the Arap Moi government.
INFORMATION IS POWER.
However, its during Museveni's reign that Uganda's support took discrimatory dimensions - "our southern christian brothers". According to Museveni, the struggle was against the Arab Islamic regime of Kharatoum that was bent on spreading Islamic Fundamentalism orchestrated by Hassan Ali Tourabi. The truith is that Museveni opportunistically wanted to detach the people of northern and West Nile regions from any dirrect link with their cousins in Southern Sudan. Northern and West Nile regions had rejected the Museveni government right from its inception and had gone into armed rebellion with rear bases in Southern Sudan. The Museveni government refered to the people from northern Uganda and west Nile as Anyanyas in reference to the Southern Sudan liberation struggle.
Khartoum decided to offer retaliatory support to Uganda dissidents based in Southern Sudan. Relations between Kampala and Khartoum deteriorated to the extent that during the early 90s the NRA assaulted the Sudan embasy in Kampala with armoured personel carriers (APC) leading to shivering diplomatic relations.
The USA threw its weight behind the Uganda's support for the SPLA. A full fledged supply line was established and coordinated by the Gen. Joram Mugume the then NRA Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) and Fred Tolit the then Director of Military Intelligence (DMI). Actually Fred Tolit was just a figure head DMI meant to hoodwink the Acholis. He was a mere head of the Sudan desk concerned with matters of Southern Sudan and the LRA. The real DMI was instead his deputy, Aronda Nyakairima. Worst of all, Tolit was viewed as a General Tinyefuza confidant since its the later who had brought him to the fore.
This did not deter the Ugandan armed groups from getting support from some sections of the SPLA fighters. One of the deceptive ways was for the SPLA to pretend that the LRA had overan its camps and seized arms. As the South was heading towards gaining full autonomy from Khartoum, the legendary SPLA leader John Garang had to die in a helcopter crash provided to him by Museveni. No doubt, like all revolutionaries an autonomous state of Southern Sudan under Garang would have sought to support other liberation movements that already had bases in its teritory. Garang had a softer approach towards Khartoum - Museveni's arch enemy and a bait for USA support. Garang's successor, Silva Kiir set up a Museveni client regime in Southern Sudan. Being an internal figure, Johm Garang would not have taken orders from Museveni without question. In return Museveni has been fighting hard to have it incorporated into the East African Community solely in order to secure the northern border.
It is against this background that Museveni has had to move very fast to to intervene and save his client regime of Silva Kiir. In the same vein of keeping the ethinic Luo influence in check, Museveni intervened in Kenya against a Railla Odinga victory. Earlier, during the early 90s, he had denied Kenyan dissident Col. Odong's FERA bases in Uganda against the Arap Moi government.
INFORMATION IS POWER.
Viele GruBe
Robukui
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