{UAH} WHY AND HOW DID MUSEVENI UNDERMINE OTHER ANTI-AMIN GROUPS?
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WHY AND HOW DID MUSEVENI UNDERMINE OTHER ANTI-AMIN GROUPS?
Both the foiled coup attempt and the defeated open crossborder invasion of 1972 coupled by gruesome events that followed thereafter, made Iddi Amin to repressively strengthen his grip on power. The purge of the suspected rebelious Acholi and Langi soldiers led to desertions that helped to swell the rank and file of the main anti-Amin but pro-Obote group of fighters in Tanzania. Museveni who ran a parallel briefcase group had cause to wory. Most of his own recruits had either been disbanded, deserted or joined other groups. The very few who had remained around him like Sheif Ali, Ivan, Koreta, Salim Saleh, Fred Rwigyema and a few others were not worthy being called a force but a squad in military terms. This squad had undergone some military training in southern Tanzania region alongside Mozambique's independence freedom fighters. Within FRONASA, Museveni was faced with allegations of masterminding the mysterious deaths of some founding membess among others Martin Mwesiga and Raiti Omongin. It is most likely that he eliminated his coleagues in order to secure his future leadership position. Martin Mwesiga was a lawyer and a member of the Ankole royal family which Museveni dissents so much. This is what made another Ankole royal family member, Sam Magala to abandon him and defiantly ran to Obote in Daressalaam for help with education. The likes of Saleh, Koreta, Rwigyema, Sheif Ali who stuck to Museveni missed out on education. However, many years later Sam Magara was made to pay by blood for this defiance.
During the same period, the top political leadership of FRONASA disintergrated due to Museveni's intrigue.
Museveni joined several other anti-Amin groups. But generally, Museveni's intrigues made other groups to suspect that he was an Iddi Amin agent. On several occasions he would be detained by Tanzania's security officials but would be released at the intervention of President Nyerere. Museveni enjoyed cordial relatinship with Nyerere based on strong marxist leanings.
The truith is that Museveni was not an agent of the Iddi Amin government. Driven by Presidential ambitions, he did not wish to see other groups making success thus undermined their efforts. One of the methods he used was to ensure that he kept informed of all their activities. When he couldnt frustrate such efforts through misinformation, then he would indirectly leak such information to the Iddi Amin security apparatus. An anonymous tel call or an anonymous written report by post would serve the purpose. The best example is the discovery of arms in the Anglican Archi-Bishop's custody and his subsequent murder in 1977. The plain truith is that the consignment of arms had been smuggled into the country by the pro-Obote group using the Anglican Church. 'Someone' had alerted Amin's intelligence network and the consignment was intercepted leading to the Archi-Bishop's subsequent murder.
As of 1977, liberation movements had bee outlawed in Tanzania. Museveni later took up a teaching post in the northern town of Moshi but he maintained clandestine hit squads inside Uganda coordinated by the Nairobi based team composed of Otafire, Amama Mbabazi and a few others. The fighters belonging to the main group of Milton Obote languished in Kigwa refugee settlement camp in Tabora. In Uganda the economic situation was appaling. The scale of murders, kidnapping and disappearances had subsided abit. Above all, by 1978 there was visible formidable group posing a threat to Iddi Amin regime.
INFORMATION IS POWER.
During the same period, the top political leadership of FRONASA disintergrated due to Museveni's intrigue.
Museveni joined several other anti-Amin groups. But generally, Museveni's intrigues made other groups to suspect that he was an Iddi Amin agent. On several occasions he would be detained by Tanzania's security officials but would be released at the intervention of President Nyerere. Museveni enjoyed cordial relatinship with Nyerere based on strong marxist leanings.
The truith is that Museveni was not an agent of the Iddi Amin government. Driven by Presidential ambitions, he did not wish to see other groups making success thus undermined their efforts. One of the methods he used was to ensure that he kept informed of all their activities. When he couldnt frustrate such efforts through misinformation, then he would indirectly leak such information to the Iddi Amin security apparatus. An anonymous tel call or an anonymous written report by post would serve the purpose. The best example is the discovery of arms in the Anglican Archi-Bishop's custody and his subsequent murder in 1977. The plain truith is that the consignment of arms had been smuggled into the country by the pro-Obote group using the Anglican Church. 'Someone' had alerted Amin's intelligence network and the consignment was intercepted leading to the Archi-Bishop's subsequent murder.
As of 1977, liberation movements had bee outlawed in Tanzania. Museveni later took up a teaching post in the northern town of Moshi but he maintained clandestine hit squads inside Uganda coordinated by the Nairobi based team composed of Otafire, Amama Mbabazi and a few others. The fighters belonging to the main group of Milton Obote languished in Kigwa refugee settlement camp in Tabora. In Uganda the economic situation was appaling. The scale of murders, kidnapping and disappearances had subsided abit. Above all, by 1978 there was visible formidable group posing a threat to Iddi Amin regime.
INFORMATION IS POWER.
Viele GruBe
Robukui
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