{UAH} Dismissal of Ugandan PM likely to expose growing fracture within ruling party and military while increasing terrorism risk

Dismissal of Ugandan PM likely to expose growing fracture within ruling party and military while increasing terrorism risk

IHS Jane's Intelligence Review

10 October 2014

   

Uganda's prime minister Amama Mbabazi, right, holds a key, symbol of an agreement for China to build Ugandan government buildings in Kampala, on 12 January 2012. Source: PA

Key Points

• Museveni's decision to dismiss Mbabazi is likely to expose the growing fault lines within the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the military, amid growing opposition to the president's plans to extend his rule into its fourth decade.
• With Uganda having no presidential term limit and Museveni showing no sign of quitting the presidency, Mbabazi's dismissal adds to the growing uncertainty surrounding his possible long-term successor. One of the president's sons, who leads the Special Forces - General Muhoozi Kainerugaba - is now widely considered as the current long-term favourite.
• This uncertainty, coupled with the growing numbers of army desertions, is likely to increase the risk of terrorist attacks in Uganda, focusing on military targets, such as army bases and arms depots by military figures working independently or in coalition with Mbabazi in the 15-month period leading up to the next election.

EVENT

On 18 September, President Yoweri Museveni dismissed his long-time ally-turned-potential political rival Amama Mbabazi as prime minister following an apparent power struggle, replacing him with former Minister of Health Ruhakana Rugunda, a politically moderate figure.

Museveni gave no reason for Mbabazi's dismissal. However, government spokesperson Ofwono Opondo and Museveni's press secretary Tamale Mirundi have said the president replaced Mbabazi - who is also the National Resistance Movement (NRM) secretary general - after he ignored calls from the party to relinquish one of his positions to abide by internal party rules. The subsequent, and highly-publicised, withdrawal of Mbabazi's security detail and personal attacks against him by senior NRM colleagues suggests that there was more to Mbabazi's sacking and that he is now considered an NRM outsider despite still remaining its secretary general.

This is in contrast to his former status as one of Museveni's closest allies and a founding NRM member. During his 28 years' of service in government, Mbabazi served as the Director General of External Security Organisation (1986-92), Minister of State for Defence (1992-97), Minister of State in the Office of the President for Political Affairs (1997-98), Minister of State for Regional Affairs (1998-2001), Minister of Defence (2001-06), Attorney General (2004-06), and Minister of Security (2006-11) before becoming Prime Minister in May 2011. However, his position became uncertain as soon as rumours began to circulate that he was planning to contest the 2016 presidential election. Speculation peaked in March 2014 when a secret recording was released that purportedly suggested Mbabazi's wife, Jacqueline Mbabazi - a chairperson of the NRM Women's League - was mobilising support for her husband's presidential bid.

Museveni's troubleshooting

Museveni, who will be contesting his fifth presidential election in 2016 (his seventh presidential term in total), is almost certain to win the ballot whoever is challenging him. The NRM is officially due to pick its prospective presidential candidate at its delegates' conference, which will be held in late 2015. Museveni has all but declared his candidacy after endorsing a call in August 2014 from NRM MPs "urging" him to stand again, around six months after they had passed a motion backing Museveni as the NRM's sole party candidate. This suggests that Mbabazi's chances of challenging Museveni within the NRM structures are very limited or non-existent. Therefore, the former premier would have to pursue his presidential ambitions through other means, including forming an opposition party or joining an existing one if he still plans to stand. The former prime minister has already received overtures from the official opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) party, which invited Mbabazi to join its ranks ahead of 2016 polls, although the invitation is unlikely to involve him becoming the party's presidential candidate.

Museveni is likely to pre-empt the prospect of a political challenge from Mbabazi by instigating politically-motivated corruption charges against him. Other former associates of Museveni that fell out with the president in the past have been subjected to intense personal attacks, as well as facing legal problems. Chief among those include retired Colonel Kizza Besigye - the president's former personal physician who became an opposition presidential candidate and faced multiple charges including treason and rape, although he was cleared on both charges. Even challengers who have shown some political ambition but remained within the NRM umbrella - such as former vice-president Gilbert Bukenya - faced legal accusations. Bukenya was forced to spend more than a week in prison in 2011 on corruption charges that were later dropped.

Outlook and implications

Businesses involved with the Mbabazi family or in smaller projects across the agriculture, tourism, real estate, and construction sectors will be at greatest risk of contract frustration and cancellation. Local Ugandan press reported that in 2012 that the licence for the National Bank of Commerce, partly owned by Mbabazi, was revoked and closed by the Bank of Uganda (the central bank). However, risks to Chinese investors will be mitigated given deepening bilateral ties.

The former premier has yet to confirm or deny his aspirations to occupy the country's highest political office, but it is highly likely that he will be able to secure support from disaffected NRM partisans and leverage mounting discontent among the rank and file of the regular forces and intelligence. Disgruntlement in the armed and security services has grown due to Museveni's extended rule, preferential treatment for the Special Forces led by the president's son General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, as well as low pay, and a lack of promotion opportunities. Local sources report that significant numbers of soldiers are defecting with their uniform and kit, with most moving across the porous western border to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Their activities are largely unknown at present as they are keeping a low profile, perhaps to avoid detection by the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), which is deployed in region to hunt dissident rebel groups from neighbouring states. There is a moderate likelihood that defecting soldiers are involved in illicit gold smuggling in the affected area of DRC, but an IHS source in Uganda suggested that they could be a rebel force in waiting.

Military discontent against Museveni has intensified as he concentrates more powers under Inspector General of Police, Kale Kayihura, following the defection of his former ally and intelligence chief David Sejusa in 2013. It is increasingly likely that the president's detractors, mainly Mbabazi and Sejusa (who alleged Museveni was preparing a dynastic succession to pass power to his son Muhoozi), will try to mobilize deserters against Museveni. On 16 September, a communiqué amongst district commissioners noted that "self-serving" politicians linked to an unnamed rebel group were trying to recruit unemployed youth in the capital Kampala.

Museveni and his security apparatus - led by Kayihura and Muhoozi - appear to be prepared, at least in the three-month outlook, for any unconstitutional initiatives to seize power in the wake of Mbabazi's removal from office. Their sensitivity to this risk has been demonstrated by the decision to place the Uganda People's Defence Force's elite units on "stand-by class one", the highest level of military alertness, the day before Mbabazi's dismissal and since, according to the local newspaper, The Observer.Furthermore, the authorities are also likely to deal harshly with any civil unrest - either in support of Mbabazi or advocating change from Museveni's rule - ahead of and after the 2016 elections, mitigating risks of operational disruption and collateral property damage.

FORECAST

Despite this, it is increasingly likely that Museveni's opponents will seek to remove the president from office by force in the two-year outlook, especially if further indications of a dynastic succession arise.

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