{UAH} THE MUSEVENI CAMPAIGN'S LOOTING OF THE NATIONAL BUDGET(by Maseruka Bosco)
|
6:02 AM |
No comments |
THE MUSEVENI CAMPAIGN'S LOOTING OF THE NATIONAL BUDGET
Museveni is aware of the international pressure and isolation that he might face if the 2016 election's integrity is to become a subject of loud public complaint.
The Museveni campaign's looting of the national budget made the 2011 balloting the most expensive single event in Uganda's post independence history. Within weeks of the January 2011 passage of a supplemental budget of US$260 million (the original budget of $3.2 billion was already nearly 20 percent of GDP), Finance Minister Syda Bbumba declared that the government was nearly out of money just seven months into the fiscal year. It emerged that $1.3 billion, or more than a third of the entire budget, had been spent in January,2011 alone. The government denied that money had been channeled into the election campaign, but no accounting for the spending was made.
As if raiding the official budget was not enough, the executive branch also made campaign-season withdrawals totaling $740 million in off budget government funds from the Bank of Uganda. Almost a month later, Museveni personally asked ruling-party MPs to sign off on the expenditures, which under the law Parliament was supposed to approve in advance. The president reportedly told them (and has since said publicly) that the money—roughly equaling combined annual spending on health and infrastructure—had gone to pay for fighter jets and other unspecified pieces of military hardware, a classified category of purchases conveniently exempt from line-item scrutiny by Parliament. Museveni's government has a history of making dubious arms buys with overtones of corruption, the most notorious being a 1998 deal involving four Ukrainian-made helicopters that never became fit to fly.
Not surprisingly given Museveni's military background and ties, a heavy security presence was part of 2011 election day and the days beyond.
MUSEVENI IS LOSING LEGITIMACY WITHIN THE NRM PARTY AND NRM MEMBERS CALL FOR REFORM FROM WITHIN DUE TO M7'S LUST FOR POWER AND UNLIMITED SELFISH INTEREST FOR PRESIDENCY.
Between 1986 and 1996, the NRM was highly organized and functionally intact. As Museveni's personal ambitions became a contested issue within the party, however, splits grew. Before becoming a public opponent of the president in 2001, Besigye was the leader of a group of NRM dissidents who called for reform from within. In 2005, Museveni fired three major cabinet members—one of them an old and close associate—who had become known for privately opposing the president's unchecked power, his manipulation of Parliament to lift term limits, and his rumored ultimate goal, the grooming of his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba for the presidency.
The cabinet dismissals were a sign that Museveni was losing legitimacy within the NRM. Perhaps not coincidentally, his reliance on the official structures of the state was growing fast. The Office of the President and State House (the official presidential residence) became the primary engines of government. Funding for them outstripped spending on agriculture and competed with monies expended on defense, education, and health.
During the ban on multipartism, the distinction between the NRM and the state seemed to matter little. Once multipartism returned, however, the NRM reemerged as the regime's key vehicle for claiming and projecting democratic legitimacy.
Efforts to put the party in order began in 2005 and gathered more intensity after Museveni's 2006 reelection (his narrowest). Yet the years of unbridled personal ambition and exiting colleagues had taken their toll. Museveni's scheme to end term limits destroyed any pretense that the political enterprise was about anything but him.
M7's continued tenure does not come cheap, The Parliament that he expanded requires constant feeding, and the cost of moving the democratic goal posts has been rising. In 2005, lifting term limits cost 5 million Ugandan shillings. Five years later, inducing MPs to support the president took 20 million, and that is not even counting informal expenditures. Members of Parliament are now finding themselves forced to spend much more on their own reelections, meaning that the bill for the regime's efforts to keep itself in office has gone sharply up.
--
H.OGWAPITI
-----------------------------------------------------
"To announce that there must be no criticism of the president, or that we are to stand by the president right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile, but is morally treasonable to the American public."
---Theodore Roosevelt
-- Museveni is aware of the international pressure and isolation that he might face if the 2016 election's integrity is to become a subject of loud public complaint.
The Museveni campaign's looting of the national budget made the 2011 balloting the most expensive single event in Uganda's post independence history. Within weeks of the January 2011 passage of a supplemental budget of US$260 million (the original budget of $3.2 billion was already nearly 20 percent of GDP), Finance Minister Syda Bbumba declared that the government was nearly out of money just seven months into the fiscal year. It emerged that $1.3 billion, or more than a third of the entire budget, had been spent in January,2011 alone. The government denied that money had been channeled into the election campaign, but no accounting for the spending was made.
As if raiding the official budget was not enough, the executive branch also made campaign-season withdrawals totaling $740 million in off budget government funds from the Bank of Uganda. Almost a month later, Museveni personally asked ruling-party MPs to sign off on the expenditures, which under the law Parliament was supposed to approve in advance. The president reportedly told them (and has since said publicly) that the money—roughly equaling combined annual spending on health and infrastructure—had gone to pay for fighter jets and other unspecified pieces of military hardware, a classified category of purchases conveniently exempt from line-item scrutiny by Parliament. Museveni's government has a history of making dubious arms buys with overtones of corruption, the most notorious being a 1998 deal involving four Ukrainian-made helicopters that never became fit to fly.
Not surprisingly given Museveni's military background and ties, a heavy security presence was part of 2011 election day and the days beyond.
MUSEVENI IS LOSING LEGITIMACY WITHIN THE NRM PARTY AND NRM MEMBERS CALL FOR REFORM FROM WITHIN DUE TO M7'S LUST FOR POWER AND UNLIMITED SELFISH INTEREST FOR PRESIDENCY.
Between 1986 and 1996, the NRM was highly organized and functionally intact. As Museveni's personal ambitions became a contested issue within the party, however, splits grew. Before becoming a public opponent of the president in 2001, Besigye was the leader of a group of NRM dissidents who called for reform from within. In 2005, Museveni fired three major cabinet members—one of them an old and close associate—who had become known for privately opposing the president's unchecked power, his manipulation of Parliament to lift term limits, and his rumored ultimate goal, the grooming of his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba for the presidency.
The cabinet dismissals were a sign that Museveni was losing legitimacy within the NRM. Perhaps not coincidentally, his reliance on the official structures of the state was growing fast. The Office of the President and State House (the official presidential residence) became the primary engines of government. Funding for them outstripped spending on agriculture and competed with monies expended on defense, education, and health.
During the ban on multipartism, the distinction between the NRM and the state seemed to matter little. Once multipartism returned, however, the NRM reemerged as the regime's key vehicle for claiming and projecting democratic legitimacy.
Efforts to put the party in order began in 2005 and gathered more intensity after Museveni's 2006 reelection (his narrowest). Yet the years of unbridled personal ambition and exiting colleagues had taken their toll. Museveni's scheme to end term limits destroyed any pretense that the political enterprise was about anything but him.
M7's continued tenure does not come cheap, The Parliament that he expanded requires constant feeding, and the cost of moving the democratic goal posts has been rising. In 2005, lifting term limits cost 5 million Ugandan shillings. Five years later, inducing MPs to support the president took 20 million, and that is not even counting informal expenditures. Members of Parliament are now finding themselves forced to spend much more on their own reelections, meaning that the bill for the regime's efforts to keep itself in office has gone sharply up.
--
H.OGWAPITI
-----------------------------------------------------
"To announce that there must be no criticism of the president, or that we are to stand by the president right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile, but is morally treasonable to the American public."
---Theodore Roosevelt
UAH forum is devoted to matters of interest to Ugandans. Individuals are responsible for whatever they post on this forum.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to: ugandans-at-heart+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com or Abbey Semuwemba at: abbeysemuwemba@gmail.com.
Related Posts:
{UAH} Rwanda genocide victim jailed after driving from Merseyside to north Wales while nearly three times over drink-drive limit- {UAH} Princess Ruth Komuntale's New Look
- {UAH} Pope Paul VI to be beatified on October 19, 2014
- {UAH} Doctoral Training to produce next generation of scientists and engineers.
- {UAH} Acholi interpreter needed in Washington DC
0 comments:
Post a Comment