{UAH} ARE ACHOLI AND LANGI FRIENDS REALLY?

Friends

 

Few days ago George Okello stated in this very forum that there is no mistrust between Acholi and Langi. He in fact stated that the friendship between Acholi and Langi is great and there is no problem between them. Now here is a piece I have pulled out of the document called “War in Acholi land and its ramifications for peace and security in Uganda” I am quoting from page 29 to page 35. This document  has no name on it but it has organizations from both in Uganda and out of Uganda. It was written to address the insecurity in The North, but also to show how Acholi were born victims and always very innocent people. The very  bad people are Langis. The fact of the matter remains that Acholi and Langi have been with a great divide right from Tanzania, and it is that divide that Museveni targeted and gained from very largely. But it is important as well to realize that at the removal of Obote two government from power, Acholi targeted Langis and murdered very many of them. With that back ground enjoy the reading on the nonsense we have in our dear country.

 

5.2 The Post-Colonial Experience

 

The political blame for this was extended to the “northerners” in general and

to the Acholi in particular because of their presence in Luwero. Prof. Yusuf Lule

was made leader of the NRM for the purpose of whipping up this support in

Buganda.

Political manipulation based on ethnic

and religious differences has become the main means used by the political elite in

Uganda to legitimate themselves in power with particular ethnic groups considered

important in the wielding of political and military power. The manipulation against

the Acholi soldiers was not restricted to the NRM. Some of the people interviewed

in Acholi were of the opinion that Obote had manipulated the Acholi in the Luwero

Triangle for his own political ends. Indeed, as Pain points out, it is true that for his

own political survival he had begun to look at the Acholi officers in the UNLA as

being rather independent of his political motivations and therefore a danger to his

rule. Obote increasingly relied on a small core of his own sub-ethnic group, the Langi officers, to take command of the army.

For instance, Captain Ageta who was a relatively junior officer was put in charge of

a newly created “Reconnaissance unit” that was equipped with mounted guns to

operate within the Central Brigade where Luwero was located. The Acholi

commander Bazilio Okello was in charge of this Brigade, but could not direct

Captain Ageta’s activities. Obote gave Captain Ageta a free hand; very much the

way Major Kakooza Mutale of the Kalangala Action Plan operates today under the

NRM. When Bazilio Okello later discovered that Ageta was engaged in unlawful

activities, he tried to apprehend him, but Brig. Smith Opon Acak (a relative of

Obote) told Okello that Ageta was directly answerable to him as Chief-of-Staff.

This increased the rift between the Acholi and Langi officers in the UNLA, which

complicated the war in the Luwero Triangle. At this time, the commander of the

“Luwero Triangle” operations was Col. Ogole, a non-Acholi officer in the UNLA.

This rift between the Obote core group

and the Acholi officers and men in the army led to their alienation as a group within

the Obote II regime. But what made matters worse was the fact that after the death

of Chief of Staff Oyite Ojok in a suspicious helicopter crash, Obote could not

promote the immediate senior Acholi officers such as Bazilio Okello and Brig.

Nyero to the post. Instead, after great delay, he appointed the little known Brig.

Smith Opon Acak to the post. Opon Acak turned out to be a kinsman of Obote. It

should be noted that prior to the helicopter crash, relations between Obote and his

cousin Oyite Ojok were characterised by mutual mistrust and lack of confidence due

to suspicions on the part of Obote that Oyite Ojok was colluding and making

contacts behind the scenes with the rebel NRM/A along with vice-president Paulo

Muwanga.

Obote made a number of promotions,

which favoured the Langi officers in the army. This increased the rift between them

and other officers so that by the end of 1984 the Acholi officers had lined up behind

Vice-president Paulo Muwanga, a Muganda, in opposition to Obote a northerner.

Muwanga used this clout to establish links with Yoweri Museveni who was then in

exile in Sweden and so the coup d’etat that took place against Obote by Bazilio

Okello was supported by the Baganda factions in UPC and the Democratic Party as

well as the NRM/A.

By the 1985 coup, Milton Obote was

gradually setting a stage for the elimination of Acholi officers from the Uganda

Army. The National Security Agency (NASA) was essentially an anti-Acholi

intelligence organ whose reports had indicated secret contacts between them, the

Democratic Party, the NRM/A and the late Cardinal Emmanuel Nsubuga (RIP). The

Special Forces were in fact created as an alternative army aimed at by-passing or

replacing the UNLA Acholi dominated officer corps. Between 1983/4, street battles

between UNLA and Special Forces were very common in Kampala. By 1984, Obote

had virtually handed over the responsibility for the Luwero Triangle to the NASA.

The Acholi officers retreated to the north and challenged the activities being carried

out by these Special Forces. 31

Hence the 1985 coup d’etat by the

Acholi officers against Obote was a pre-emptive self-defence move by Brigadier

Bazilio Olara Okello and Tito Okello Lutwa to prevent Obote’s plans of eliminating

them from the armed forces. These plans became evident when Brigadier Smith

Opon Acak, seen as a junior officer and fellow Langi as Obote, was appointed Army

Commander instead of more senior Acholi officers. Thus by the time NRA/M seized

power from Tito Okello’s military junta the level of suspicion between the Langi

and Acholi officers in the UNLA had reached very high levels.

The NRA’s abrogation of the Nairobi

Peace Accord signed between the Tito Okello military junta and the NRM/A in 1985

did not help matters. To the Military Council chaired by Tito Okello, the NRM/A

move was another attempt to marginalise and eliminate the Acholi component of the

armed forces. After the NRM/A captured power in Kampala, the Acholi officers

such as Bazilio Okello, Brig. Odong Latek, Eric Odwar, Stephen Ojukwu and Major

Kilama retreated to Acholiland to defend themselves against a possible massacre

similar to that carried out by Idi Amin. They saw the alliance between NRM/A and

Major General Moses Ali, formerly in the Amin army, as intended to continue the

Amin massacres of the Acholi officers. Former Prime Minister under Obote II

administration, Otema Alimadi and former minister Akena p’Ojok (another Acholi)

as well as many Acholi politicians embraced the logic of war rather than surrender

to the NRA, which they viewed as trying to stab them in the back after NRA had

gained from their coup against Obote.

So the threat of the Acholi officers in

UNLA was overplayed once the Nairobi Peace Agreement aborted. These peace

talks, which later became dubbed “peace jokes” were never a serious proposition to

stop the NRM/A completing its “mission” of ethnic cleansing of the Acholi from the

political scene. Bethuel Kipligat, then permanent secretary in the Kenya minis try of

foreign affairs who played a key role in facilitating the negotiations described the

four months of negotiations as a process of “haggling and cajoling” by the two

parties:

“They began the talks by hurling insults at each other and continued to

do so throughout the proceedings. Museveni denounced the previous

regimes in Uganda as ‘primitive’ and ‘backward.’ He initially refused to

negotiate with the Military Council delegation, dismissing them as

‘criminals’. He in turn was accused by the Military Council of delaying

the negotiation process unnecessarily. He then failed to show up for the

consecutive four days, having left for Europe through Dar es Salaam. On

his return, Museveni and his NRM/A raised new demands for the

agenda. Once agreement was reached on an agenda item, Museveni

would change his position the following day; or put forward new

demands on the same matter 39.”

It is clear that with this kind of

manoeuvres, no serious agreement could have been reached or even contemplated. It

is also clear that no such agreement was envisaged by the NRM/A. Participation in

these “jokes” was part of the military strategy begun in Luwero to lure the enemy in

a trap from which he could not escape. The four months were used by the NRM/A to

arm themselves; aw ash with much cash it was getting from Tiny Rowland’s Lonro

Company from the sale of coffee from the Masaka and Ankole areas to which the

NRA now had access. Through this route, the NRM/A brought in Ronnie Mutebi,

Buganda’s Kabaka -to-be in order to reinforce Baganda’s anti-northerner ethnic

politics by playing up the issue of restoration of the Buganda monarchy to win

support for the final push against “the Okellos” in Kampala.

In fact this hatred of the Acholi and the

playing up of the “Luwero Triangle” hysteria led to many ordinary Acholi people

being killed mercilessly in Buganda, with some being tied “three-piece -suits” of

torture within Kampala after the fall of the Okello regime. The anti-northerner ticket

had been played out long before in the NRA training camps in the bush, mainly by

Prof. Lule’s UFM supporters. This had built up their enemy images of the

“northerners” in general being enemies of the people of Uganda, although Museveni

had profited directly from the Acholi rebellion against the Obote regime, which

should have been held accountable for the Luwero tragedy. But because he wanted

total power himself, he rejected any settlement where he would have shared political

power with the “Acholis” yet without their rebellion against Obote, Museveni and

his NRM/A could not have gained the strength to win power in Uganda.

 

5.3 The Real Significance of the ‘Luwero Triangle’ War

What Museveni therefore exploited was not the strength of the Acholi dominance in

the army but their marginalisation by Obote that led to their revolt. Both Muwanga

and Museveni had exploited these Acholi political weaknesses and not the Acholi

political strength of dominance in the government of Uganda. The atrocities in the

Luwero Triangle were the result of this strategy of ethnic cleansing embarked on by

the NRM/A in the Triangle long before the skulls appeared. Thus, it is not the

atrocities that led to the Luwero war, but rather the NRM/A ethnic war that led to

the atrocities. What is also important in the appraisal of this angle to the Luwero

war was the kind of considerations Museveni took into account in forming the

political alliances in support of the war.

Prof. Yusuf Lule who joined his

Uganda Freedom Movement/Army (UFM/A) to Museveni’s Popular Resistance

Army (PRA) was a known staunch Muganda monarchist dedicated to restoring

monarchism in Buganda which was abolished by Obote I. Up to this point, there

was no talk in Buganda about “northern domination,” but instead there was sweet

talk about how “wise” and “clever” Obote was. Even when Amin came to power, it

was around Kampala that his military regime got its strongest support. This is what

encouraged Amin to return Mutesa’s body from London for decent burial in

Buganda. Upon this, Amin, another “northern” became a darling in Buganda,

although he had played a big role in the ouster of Mutesa as President of the

country. In a recent interview with the Times of London, Obote claimed that he

never ordered Amin to attack the Kabaka’s palace (Lubiri), but that Amin

undertook the attack on his own initiative, because his unit was allegedly under fire

from the Kabaka’s “forces40.”

Mutesa was ousted over a different

matter concerning the Bunyoro “lost counties” that the British had given to

Buganda for their collaboration in colonising Bunyoro, but which the Obote

government wanted returned to Bunyoro. So this “anti-northernism” in Buganda

was purely opportunistic since the Kabaka of Buganda had been quite happy

serving as President of the republic with a northerner as Prime Minister who had

been popularly elected. In fact at this time, his party, Kabaka Yekka (King’s Party)

was in alliance with Obote’s Uganda Peoples’ Congress (UPC). So the alliance

between Lule’s UFF/A that resulted in the formation of the NRM/A was calculated

to bring the “Baganda” aboard to support the war initiated by Museveni in Luwero

against the “northerners,” whom they equated with Obote’s administrations, when

UPC was a national party supported by Ugandans in many parts of the country.

The other allia nce that Museveni formed was with the former Amin soldiers

and officers led by Moses Ali, then called The Uganda National Rescue Front

(UNRF). This alliance was formed purely out of the fact that president Ghaddafi of

Libya who was close to Amin was prepared to supply weapons to Museveni so long

as he entered into alliance with the UNRF. The alliance was sealed in Tripoli and

signed there. Moses Ali was interested in fighting the Langi and Acholi soldiers in

the UNLA because they had worked together with the Tanzania Peoples Defence

Forces (TPDF) to overthrow Amin’s government in 1979. So the UNRF was

another proper match in the alliance to set up the Luwero Triangle as theatre for a

show down with the “Acholis,” whom both groups hated and wanted to target for

their war so they could jointly rule. In this case, Moses Ali, another “northerner”

was not a threat to the southerners. The “Declaration of Unity” between NRM/A

and UNRF signed between Museveni and Moses Ali in Tripoli, is also interesting in

another respect -- their hatred of democracy. Their alliance agreement spelt out this

hostility when they stated in the preamble as follows:

“Firmly believing that social order is a sacred right which serves as a

basis for all other rights; Believing that the strongest man can never be strong enough to be master all the time unless he transforms might into

right and obedience into duty; Having concluded that recourse to armed

struggle is the only means open to us to dislodge the Obote repressive

and dictatorial regime and restore democratic and human rights of the

people of Uganda. Now, therefore, we on our behalf and on behalf of

our respective groups do solemnly and truly resolve and declare … to

dedicate our lives and those of the members of the respective groups to

the service of Uganda.”

This combined hatred of democracy, the Obote regime and the northerners by

Museveni comes out clearly in other documents as well. As part of this agreement, it

was agreed in Tripoli that if the NRM/A won the war, Moses Ali would become the

vice-president and it the UNRF did so first, then Museveni was to become vicepresident.

The two movements therefore came

together to reinforce each other to impose a dictatorship, which they were to share.

This hostility to democracy was revealed in an interview, which Museveni gave in

Nairobi during the Nairobi peace talks to Drum Magazine, when he stated:

“The problem in Uganda is that the leadership has mainly been from the

north. The southerners who are mainly Bantu have played a per ipheral

role all these years since independence in 1962. A lot of blood has been

shed. We want genuine elections and we are sure that if these were held

the best candidates would win. We are not against the northerners as

such and if a popular man from Acholi or Lango or even Madi wins, he

will have our mandate. What we cannot stomach is a rigged election,

such as the one we had in 1980. We are still prepared to talk to Okello as

a military leader on the future of our country but we are not going to talk

out of weakness. In fact our forces are already inside Kampala and soon

we may surprise the world 41.”

This statement reveals to some extent

the real motivations of the NRM/A in embarking on war in the Luwero Triangle.

The NRM/A was more concerned that the leadership in the country had up to this

point been from the north, and not that during most of these years the UPC had

manipulated ethnic and religious divisions in the country to maintain an

undemocratic regime in power. This also revealed that the issue about the disputed

1980 general elections that Museveni used as justification for going to “the bush” to

fight the UPC government, was not that it was rigged, but that the leader who won

these elections was from the north.

Hence even if free elections had been

held and the best candidate from the north had won, it was clear that “we” (the NRM under Museveni and others from the south who supported him) could not

have allowed such a person to rule. The purpose of the war was therefore to oust the

“northerners” from power so that the “southerners” could also have an opportunity

to rule. The purpose of the Luwero war was therefore ethnic cleansing and not

about democracy, as later events were to show. Thus, at this point, we can reframe

the earlier hypothesis to state that: the war in Acholiland was not the result of the

atrocities committed in the Luwero Triangle, but rather the atrocities committed in

the Luwero Triangle were the consequence of an ethic -oriented war that was

initiated by the NRM/A in Luwero Triangle against the northerners. This also

suggests that until that objective was achieved, the war in the north had to continue.

This interpretation is supported by the

fact that Museveni himself had lost the 1980 elections in a straight fight against a

Democratic Party (DP) candidate and there was no suggestion that in that

constituency the UPC had rigged in favour of the DP candidate. In fact in that

election, only one Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) candidate won a seat

throughout the whole country and no complaint from the UPM was made to the

effect that their candidates had lost because of rigging. In fact only the DP appeared

to have a good case.

The above statement by Museveni also

suggests that the NRM, in going to the bush, had in fact no intention of ever

holding genuine free and fair elections after their victory. This is because both

himself and Moses Ali believed that the strongest men (NRM and UNRF) could

never be strong enough to be master all the time unless they were able to transform

their might into right and obedience of Ugandans into duty to the mighty. This is

the mission the NRM has over the last eighteen years been trying to implement

through the “No Party Democracy,” which has been a one party dictatorship. This

proves that so long as there was any likely threat to that “sacred right” any force

that constituted a threat would have to be fought until it was eliminated. This partly

explains the underlying causes of the war in Acholiland.

There is a lot of disagreement in the

literature about what date and occasion can be regarded as constituting the

beginnings of the war. This has a lot to do with explaining the causes of the war.

While some explanations emphasize internal rebellion by Acholi youth, others,

mainly associated with the NRM government, emphasize the external invasion by

the Acholi soldiers who had gone to Sudan. The study by Robert Gersony of 1997

entitled: The Anguish of Northern Uganda reasoned that the war in the north was in

fact a continuation of the war in the “Luw ero Triangle.” In the study Gersony

argues:

“In a sense, the struggle initiated by the NRA in Luwero in the early

1980s has never been concluded. It continued in Luwero through 1985.

In early 1986 it was fought in Kampala and has continued in Gulu and

Kitgum since that time. In essence, the opposing parties remain the

same, as do some of the tactics.”

 

EM

On the 49^th Parallel          

                 Thé Mulindwas Communication Group
"With Yoweri Museveni, Ssabassajja and Dr. Kiiza Besigye, Uganda is in anarchy"
                    Kuungana Mulindwa Mawasiliano Kikundi
"Pamoja na Yoweri Museveni, Ssabassajja na Dk. Kiiza Besigye, Uganda ni katika machafuko"