{UAH} TO THOSE OF US THAT ARE NOT EDUCATED THIS IS VIOLENCE AND IT NEEDS TO BE STOPPED

LRA Attacks on Northern Uganda

Continuing their mission, the LRA launched several massacres in Northern

Ugandan communities, killing almost 1,000 people.  The first of the attacks occurred in

1995 in Atiak, killing between 170-220 people.  In 1996, they forged two more deadly

attacks on the Karuma village, killing 50 and the Acholi refugee camp, killing 100

people.  The deadliest attack held in 1997, was the Lokung-Parbek attack where more

than 400 people were left dead.  The LRA used tactics such as hacking and cubing people

to death, leaving their remainders for anyone who stumbles upon the scene to find their

mangled bodies (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999).

 With each attack by the LRA, the level of confidence in Museveni diminished as

they believed that he could not protect his people and end the war that had waged on for

more than two decades became common belief.  To further their lack of confidence in

Museveni, an LRA ambush led to the abduction of 245 schoolgirls at St. MaryÕs College,

near Lira, and gained attention of people around the world.  The LRA went to the school

during the early hours of the morning and abducted all 245 girls, tying them together so

none could escape and used the girls as sexual slaves, domestic servants, soldiers, and

wives.  The girls were taken to Southern Sudan where escape is extremely difficult due to

the isolated location, ensuring they are easily found by the LRA and the SPLA.  The

 

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widespread attention to this case raised many questions as to why Museveni was not

doing more for the Ugandans to provide them protection from rebel armies such as the

LRA (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999).

 In attempt to provide security for the Ugandan people, the government created

Òprotected villagesÓ in 1996, which was an attempt to isolate LRA fighters and create a

safe haven for civilians.  What seemed like an ideal plan became a displacement

nightmare, making people living within the boundaries of the Òprotected villagesÓ easy

targets for the LRA, and failed to provide safety for the civilians.  To further their efforts

to reach peace, the Ugandan and Sudanese governments signed agreements that they

would release all people captured during times of conflict.  (Doom Ruddy and Koen

Vlassenroot, 1999).)

 1997 appeared to have been a successful year in the striving for peace. Kacoke

Madi, an organization advocating for the peaceful resolution to war, comprised of Acholi

Diaspora in Europe and North America, held a conference where they outlined a program

where the LRA would be able to articulate their agenda and explain their motives.  Also

in 1997, the Acholi Religious Leaders and Peace Initiative (ARLPI) comprised of

traditional and religious leaders, joined forces to bring peace to Uganda.  The ARLPI has

continued to meet since their beginning, eleven years ago.  SantÕ Egidio, a Catholic group

from Rome offered to mediate negotiations, serving as an outside source that could act

objectively, in light of the trouble they were experiencing with the peace talks. 

Unfortunately both ARLPI and SantÕ Egidio failed to bring peace to Uganda because the

LRAÕs goals remained unclear to the peace initiators (Resolve Uganda, 2007).  As the

 

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motives of the LRA were incomprehensible over the years, the LRA gained the term

Òrebel army.Ó and Kony, himself, has used the term ÒrebelÓ to define his movement. 

(Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999).  

 The Acholi have experienced the highest degree of violence since 1986 and have

been targeted for many of the heinous acts committed against civilians in Northern

Uganda.  Politicians in Uganda have labeled the conflict as ÒNorthern based,Ó affecting

mainly the Acholi, and having little influence on the rest of the country (Doom and

Vlassenroot, 1999).  The question has been raised, ÒHow can the president support the

SPLA, RPF, Kabila, and still pretend he is lacking the means to support the Acholis from

the LRA, a first step toward peace?Ó (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999).  For the twenty

years Kony has been in control of the LRA, Museveni has been encouraged from both

local and international officials to begin peace talks and reach a conclusion that would

bring civility, stability, and peace to Uganda.  When the LRA announced they built an

office in London, Museveni was forced to take action, so he had a road built along the

Sudan border that would allow for rapid military movement and reinforcements when

needed, unsure of what resources would spawn from the LRAÕs expansion. (Doom and

Vlassenroot, 1999).

 

The LRA Loses Support 

In 1999, funding for the LRA from the Sudanese government was cut; however,

their primary bases remained in Southern Sudan for years to follow (Dodge, 1991).  After

years of attempts to calm the violence, the Amnesty Act of 2000 is said to be one of the

 

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most important initiatives, as it offered amnesty to LRA fighters who surrendered and

ended their violent acts. Since the Amnesty Act was in 2000, more than 8,000 members

of the LRA have agreed and turned themselves in to the Amnesty Commission.  Several

problems have presented themselves as reported from Resolve Uganda: ÒFirst, only about

half of the amnesty packages have been distributed. Second, many former LRA fighters

remain discontented because they return to squalid displacement camps and lack basic

resources. Some have even expressed their desire to return to the rebel army because

camp conditions are so poorÓ (Resolve Uganda, 2007).  The fear that soldiers would

return to the LRA because of unsatisfactory living conditions merely encourages the

rebels to remain in the army rather than turn themselves in at all.  

 Launching another attempt to create peace in Uganda, the government began

Operation Iron Fist in 2002, pushing the rebels south Sudan into the Northern regions of

Uganda.  This program, in addition to the Amnesty Act of 2000 that failed former LRA

fighters, and other ceasefire attempts perpetuated a system of mistrust between the

government and LRA, creating a tainted vision for future negotiations (Resolve Uganda,

2007).  The LRA soldiers were informed that they would be treated one way and receive

certain benefits, but when the time came to receive their side of the deal, the government

failed to follow through.  LRA leaders became more hesitant in trusting the Ugandan

government after they had seen the reliability of their offers.  

 

 

 

 

 

EM

On the 49^th Parallel          

                 Thé Mulindwas Communication Group
"With Yoweri Museveni, Ssabassajja and Dr. Kiiza Besigye, Uganda is in anarchy"
                    Kuungana Mulindwa Mawasiliano Kikundi
"Pamoja na Yoweri Museveni, Ssabassajja na Dk. Kiiza Besigye, Uganda ni katika machafuko"