{UAH} HOW THE BAHIMA MAFIA SLAUGHTERED THE FIRST HUTU PRESIDENT IN BURUNDI

HOW THE BAHIMA MAFIA SLAUGHTERED THE FIRST HUTU PRESIDENT IN BURUNDI

In 1966 Captain Mucombero a Tutsi of the Bahima sub-division from Bururi province took over government through a military coup. He abolished the monarchy, declared Burundi a republic and went on to build a Hima higemony that was to run Burundi for the next three decades. During that period all the three successive presidents were Bahima from Bururi province, the military commanded by exclusively Hima from Bururi province took central role in running the affairs of state, all Hutu and to some extent Tutsi of the Banyaruguru sub-class were excluded from the affairs of state more especially the military. Any form of dissent by the Hutu and moderate Tutsi was met with brutal force that left thousands dead and displaced over the three decades. The country has 86% Hutu and 14% Tutsi population.

In 1990 a group of Hutu militants headed by Melchoir Ndadaye - a young bank employee who had returned three earlier from exile in Rwanda, created a Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRDEBU). On 1st June 1993 over 97% of the 2,360,096 registered voters went to the polls for the first democratic presidential elections in Burundi. Ndadaye got 64.79% against the incumbent Tutsi President Buyoya's 32.47%. For the first time in the history of Burundi, a Hutu had come to head the government. Tutsi students matched through the streets chanting: No to the victory of division! No to the victory of the unity charter! In the countryside, the Hutu peasantry took the FRODEBU victory as a personal victory over the "state" which was perceived by them as a Tutsi matter. In the Legislative elections that followed shortly after, FFRODEBU won with 76.40% against UPRONA's 21.86%. Eight of the 65 FRODEBU members were Tutsi while 12 of the 16 UPRONA members were Hutu. No doubt, the voting patterns clearly reflected a Hutu (FRDEBU) Vs Tutsi (UPRONA).

Immediately after elections, President Ndadaye embarked on a reconciliation and unity path. By July the country seemed to return to economic, administrative, and social reality in what seemed like a succcessful political transition. However, Ndadaye's victory had left bitter after taste for the extremist factions. The first to act were the Tutsi extremist in the army. On 23rd July four days after legislative elections, elements of the 2nd Commando Battallion from Muha Barracks tried to power by force. The plan was led by Lt. Col. Slyvester Ningaba who had been an ADC to defeated President Buyoya. The attempted coup was quickly stopped by another Officer Major Isaie Bibizi who managed to talk to the men out of joining the mutinous Officer.  The reaction in the military circles was ambiguous. Many officers criticized Lt.Col Ningaba not for attempting a coup but for doing so with little serious planning. Many of the officer corps seemed to be paying only lip-service to democratic principles in spite of a clear verdict by the polls. The feeling was clearly racist in tone: Those people (meaning Hutu) were described as not being capable of actually governing the country.

Unfortunately the criticism was not entirely devoid of merit even if its basis had nothing to do with 'race'. FRODEBU cadres were largely inexperienced for the  simple reason that firstly, there had always been a marked anti-Hutu bias in the civil service recruitment and secondly, the 1972 massacre had achieved its purpose by decimating the Hutu elite. The result was that many of the newly nominated FRODEBU administrators at the regional level, and many of their men now entering the central government administration were tragically incompetent. This was at the moment when the Hutu peasantry were expecting wonders from them and many in the Tutsi administration were discreetly doing their best to complicate their work in the hope of seeing them fail. Furthermore the FRODEBU were prompted to adopt to a quick changeover from the old personnel to the new by the feeling of having to deal with an enormous backlog of discrimination and the fear of disappointing their electorate (Hutu).

One of the main problems was the question of the refugees, most of whom had been living in Tanzania since 1972 although smaller groups had fled in 1988 and 1991to Rwanda, were watching the situation in the hope of being able to come back. Ndadaye in his swearing in speech had appealed to those refugees to return home. This rang dangerBELLS for the Tutsi minority which had taken over the lands and properties left behind by those refugees. A new cabinet had been announced on 10th July led by Slyvie Kinigi - a liberal female Tutsi UPRONA member. It was ethnically and politically balanced. It immediately drew fire from the Hutu extremists who had hoped for a "radical" Hutu cabinet and found the new government much too moderate for the taste. An extremist Hutu leader - Cossan Kabura threatened an armed attack on the capital if the Hutu did not get more cabinet postsand his guerrilla troops were not allowed to join the national army. President Ndadaye was very anxious to reassure the army and declared that no officer would be dismissed from the force. The Tutsi extremist remained unconvinced; they knew there were plans to 'open up' the army to the Hutu and that the President was discreetly arranging for his own (Hutu) presidential guards to be formed.  

Government was functioning according to the principle ofSHARED power but this really worked only at the highest government levels. The expectations of the Hutu electorates were too great and in order to try to satisfy them, all the lower and regional administration were being solidly 'FRODEBU-sed' with uneven results. Even on national level,clumsy errors were prevalent - the biggest one was the September 25th dismissal of the National Radio and Television Director Louis Marie Nindorera by the Information Minister Jean Marie Ngendahayo appointed barely a few weeks earlier. His only mistake had been to try and practice an open and vigorous investigative form of information, which spared neither the new government nor the opposition. Years of media control had taken their toll on people's minds even among the opponents, and by this action the new government gave an impression not only of not tolerating criticism but of having something to hide. This was the most unfortunate since not only the issue of any democratisation but the question of return of refugees gave publicDEBATE a rather heated tone. In late August, the Refugee Commission admitted the principle according to which land illegally acquired during the last 20 years could be open to legal proceedings to ensure restitution to its rightful owners.

Thus the political situation was tense, but not overly so. This kind of debate seemed unavoidable with the advent of such great and radical social changes. Former President Buyoya's moderation coupled by President Ndadaye's obvious goodwill seemed to guarantee a basic framework of political reason in which the experiment had its own chance of developing peacefully. This is why when on the evening of 20th October President Ndadaye was warned by his Defense Minister Lt.Col Charles Nditije of the possibility of a coup during the night, he didn't seem worried. Major Isaie Nibizi the officer who had foiled the 3rd July attempted coup attempt and who had been made the head of the Presidential Security, only took minimal precautions. At midnight, elements of the 11th Armored Battalion came out of their barracks and moved towards the Presidential Palace. When Major Nibizi ordered his troops to take defensive positions in order to take stop the advancing mutineers from penetrating the Presidential Palace, they obeyed reluctantly. Elsewhere in town, elements of the 11th Battalion and Gendarmes all under  the command of a low ranking officer Lt. Jean Paul Kamana were firing in the air.

At 1.30 a.m Lt. Col Ntakije who was not present in the palace, advised the President by telephone to climb into an Armored Personnel Carrier (APC). He complied and the APC remained parked in the palace compound with the President inside. Finally at 6.00 a.m the APCDRIVER was ordered by an unknown officer to drive the APC to Muha barracks 'where the President would be safe'. Only two soldiers were wounded not by shorts but hurt themselves as they crushed their tanks through the palace walls. Army Chief of Staff Col John Bikomagu was present at Muha barracks. He talked briefly with the President as he emerged from the APC and told him everything would be alright. The puchists had by this time arrested the President of the National Assembly Pontien Karibwami and taken him to Muha Barracks. The COS Col John Bikomagu then walked away from the barracks, apparently without leaving any orders. At 10.00 a.m Lt Jean Paul Kamana ordered the President Ndadaye and Karibwami. They were biyonated to death but not mutilated as had earlier been rumored.

Meanwhile the rebellious soldiers rampaged the city killing the Minister of Territorial Administration Juvenal Ndayikeze, Gilles Bimazobute  the Cice President of the National Assembly, and Richard Ndukumwami the head of the Secret Service. They missed theFOREIGN AFFAIRS Minister Slyvester Ntibatubganya but killed his wife and a female visitor. The rebels had freed Lt Col Slyvester Ningaba the leader of the aborted July 2nd-3rd attempted coup. Public buildings had been occupied by mutineers and telephone lines cut off. Remnants of government took refuge in the French Embassy. A political Crisis Committee a UPRONA Hutu civilian FrancoisNgezewho had been former President Buyoya's Minister of the Interior and assisted by 4 UPRONA members as Advisers ( Charles Mukasi, Jean Baptist Manwangari, Andre Kadege and Libere Bararunyeretse) but its usefulness remained vague. Instead, a military Crisis Committee headed by Chief of Staff Col John Bikomagu assisted by Lt Col Jean Bosco Darandagwe and Lt Col. Pascal Sibanduku operated separately from the Ngeze political committee. The USA, Germany, Belgium, France and the EU suspended economic aid. Political parties and civil society condemned the coup. On 23rd October the COS Col John Bikomagu went on national radio and condemned the coup.

The coup collapsed but the mass killing of Tutsi had started as early as October 21st. Two days later when the army moved in to stop the killing, it immediately started its own indiscriminate killings of Hutu. The army regrouped Tutsi in towns, schools, and other public places and ensured their security. During electoral campaigns, Tutsi extremists kept repeating that a Hutu was not fit to rule Burundi. After the failed coup of 2nd - 3rd July, the Hutu extremists started to prepare  on their side and to arm the population in case something would be done against their President. The country descended into anarchy with both ethnic groups killing each other indiscriminately before over a million Hutu fled the country and started armed rebellion that lasted over a decade. There has neither been any public inquiry on the violence since 1972 and in particular this slaughter of the President has ever been conducted nor anyone held responsible for what happened. 

At the time, the Museveni backed Rwandese Tutsi were battling with the Hutu government in Rwanda. The Tutsi-Hima dominated government in Burundi was an ally of the then Rwandese Tutsi rebels from Uganda thus the new Hutu government in Burundi threatened to strengthen the then Hutu government in Rwanda. No wonder, the Tutsi won the war and took over government in Rwanda while the defeated Tutsi former President BuyoyaRESUMED the Presidency in Burundi. For Museveni, immediately after the slaughter of President Ndadaye, he realised the strategic importance of the Mechanized Units of the army by moving some tanks to State House to boost his personal security and since then its not every Tom and Dick to head his Mechanised Unit. The Junior Officer Lt. Jean Paul Kamana and group were reported to have fled to Uganda.

INFORMATION IS POWER

Posted by Uganda - A Change of Guards! a

Viele GruBe

Robukui

--
Disclaimer:Everyone posting to this Forum bears the sole responsibility for any legal consequences of his or her postings, and hence statements and facts must be presented responsibly. Your continued membership signifies that you agree to this disclaimer and pledge to abide by our Rules and Guidelines.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to: ugandans-at-heart+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com or Abbey Semuwemba at: abbeysemuwemba@gmail.com.