{UAH} Uganda: 30 Years of Broken promises
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http://www.burkinastyle.com/content/30-years-broken-promises-gen-museveni-words-were-invented-lying
30 Years Of Broken Promises -- To Gen. Museveni Words Were Invented For Lying
"I think this is a fundamental change in the politics of our country...." -- Yoweri Museveni, 1986
As Uganda's February 18 Presidential Elections approach let's refresh our memories about the unfulfilled promises and manipulations made by the National Resistance Movement regime of Gen. Yoweri Museveni now in power for 30 years.
History can lead us towards a better path and choices.
Let's recall that in the 1980 elections candidate Museveni himself, running for a Parliamentary seat in Uganda as leader of a party called Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), lost to a DP candidate Sam Kutesa, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs in the NRM administration.
The waging of a very destructive guerrilla war by Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) with a base in Buganda -- where 50 percent of the population in the Luwero Triangle alone lost their lives besides other areas -- originally had three principal purposes:
1. To unseat the UPC government that is believed to have cheated in the 1980 election and install a DP government that is believed to have won the election.
2. To restore the glory of Baganda that had lost their kingdom, their king and many of their people during the state of emergency in the 1960s.
3. To end the suffering of the people of Uganda.
These high-sounding promises enabled Museveni, little known at the time, to recruit heavily among Baganda, Catholics, poor people and refugees. The selection of Professor Yusuf Lule, a Muganda and DP supporter or sympathizer was designed to assure Baganda and Catholics that the next president after Milton Obote's second administration, also known as Obote II, would be a Muganda and a DP supporter.
In the course of the war, Museveni convinced Acholi soldiers in the national army to work together with him and share power under an Acholi president. He wanted their support in overthrowing Obote's government.
So what happened to these promises?
1. After capturing power in January 1986, Museveni a Protestant from Western Uganda became president, not a Muganda and DP supporter as originally planned.
To hoodwink Baganda and Catholics Museveni appointed them to high profile positions in the government -- prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, minister of internal affairs, minister of finance, attorney general and minister of education -- without authority which was exercised by ministers of state that fought in the war alongside Museveni.
Baganda now have one senior person in the cabinet, Edward Ssekandi, who is occupying the vice president post with undefined functions to this author's knowledge. A Muganda was made deputy chairman of the ruling NRM party but the power resides in the secretary-general.
2. The kingdom of Buganda was not restored until 1993 when Museveni realized he would not win Baganda vote. The Kabaka Ronald Mutebi II, was installed as a cultural head. The return of full powers of the Kabaka was denied. Gen. Museveni created mischief and Mutebi could not even travel in all parts of his kingdom freely.
When the Kabaka's supporters objected they were attacked by security forces leading to the massacre of an estimated 31 to 40 people.
Thereafter, the Kabaka need permission to travel to parts of Buganda.
3. The ten point program that had been designed to end the suffering of the people of Uganda was abandoned before its implementation began. It was replaced by a structural adjustment program that has destroyed the livelihoods of many Ugandans.
4. The Nairobi Accord and earlier plans between Gen. Tito Okello, the army commander who overthrew Obote, and Museveni, to govern together was abandoned by Museveni immediately after the Accord was signed in Kenya.
The anger of Acholi people is captured in the following paragraph. "After decades of subordination to Lango elements in the armed forces, the Acholi had achieved government power just six months earlier and had finally begun to enjoy some of the power and privileges of more senior rank, political and civil service appointments – and homes and vehicles which attain to them. They were deprived of all this by the NRA military victory. Although they themselves had come to power through a military coup, they felt cheated by Museveni when he betrayed the Nairobi agreement. 'We paved the way for the NRA by overthrowing Obote', several Acholi explained, 'and Museveni paid us back by betraying us'"(see Robert Gersony 1997).
As if that was not enough Museveni waged a war in the Northern and Eastern parts of Uganda that lasted over 20 years with massive destruction in human and animal lives and properties. If the international community had not applied pressure on Museveni to end the war, the fighting would probably have continued much longer.
Then came land grabbing. Using the pretext that his people had been deprived of their land during colonial and post-colonial governments, Museveni decided to compensate them by grabbing other people's land in virtually all parts of the country particularly in Buganda because of its strategic location; many people had perished during the guerrilla war leaving vacant land.
Museveni even justifies ongoing land-grabbing that mostly benefits people from his own region: "As a herdboy, in his youth Museveni witnessed the injustices of both colonial and post-colonial state with regard to issues of land tenure and land ownership. His people were often evicted from their grazing lands by the government, without being given compensation, and for a cattle-rearing community, grazing land was central to life"(see Joshua B. Rubogoya 2007).
Even if this were true, which is doubtful (because during and after the colonial era the rulers of Ankole, Museveni's home district, could not have cheated their cattle herders), it does not justify grabbing land in all parts of Uganda and rendering many people homeless and severely impoverished.
Museveni promised that Uganda would become an industrial and a middle income country within 15 years of his administration. Here is what he said to justify that policy option while castigating African leaders who had failed: "The present generation of African leaders [is] the strangest species of human beings in the history of man. Even in the most backward societies, all communities manufactured their own tools, they manufactured their own weapons, they produced their own food. It is only the present generation of Africans that don't produce their weapons and occasionally don't produce their food. It has never happened in the history of man. This shows the artificiality and the vulnerability of this colonial and this neo-colonial setting".
Museveni added "Uganda will be an industrial power in 15 years. I have no doubt about it. There's no doubt because nothing can stop us"(see Africa Forum Volume 1. No, 2. 1991).
That was 25 years ago.
Sadly, all this now sounds like a fantasy. What we are witnessing in Uganda is de-industrialization, not industrialization.
Museveni had declared that he was not interested in power for a long time. He would step down as soon as security returned to the country which occurred shortly afterwards.
Later on he changed his mind reasoning that he did not kill a beast to then leave the carcass for another person to consume the meat. He put it better in his own words: "You don't just tell the freedom fighter to go like you are chasing a chicken thief out of the house"(see Human Rights Watch 3/14/2006).
So what has Gen. Museveni done to ensure that he stays in power for life? He engineered the amendment of the 1995 constitution and in 2005 eliminated presidential term limits. Earlier he had crippled opposition political parties beginning with Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and then Democratic Party (DP).
However, under international pressure Museveni allowed multi-party politics but has made sure NRM doesn't lose by refusing to establish an independent Electoral Commission and applying security forces to intimidate opposition voters. So he comes into the elections with his own referee in the form of Badru Kiggundu, chairman of the Electoral Commission; the linesmen are the other commission members.
This strategy has enabled Gen. Museveni to steal the election results since 1996. Furthermore, Museveni believes that if you are weak, as he thinks Ugandans are, you should be exploited.
This implicitly came out in an interview with American journalist Bill Berkeley -- which also revealed another part of his character and his contempt for fellow Africans who suffer misfortune -- when Gen. Museveni said, "I have never blamed the whites for colonizing Africa. I have never blamed these whites for taking slaves. If you are stupid, you should be taken a slave"(see The Atlantic Monthly September 1994).
This is the mentality of the man seeking another term as president of Uganda after 30 years in power.
I have all along insisted, given Gen. Museveni destruction of Uganda's socio-economic and political fabric, and his corruption of the entire political process, that a transitional national unity government to clean the house and ready the country for genuine free and fair multi-party elections would have been preferable.
I see that most of the presidential challengers are promoting the same message.
The first task is to prevent Gen. Museveni from stealing the Feb. 18 elections; a monumental challenge.
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