{UAH} CAN A STAGE MANAGED COUP ATTEMPT WORK FOR MUSEVENI?

Museveni's 30 years hold on power is facing its greatest uncertainty.  Both Ugandans and the international community have lost hope in his capacity to offer anything new owing to his ever increasing autocracy.  The west has clearly branded him as a threat to regional security and stability.  Internally, Ugandans including even the majority of those who have been thriving on his dictatorship and mismanagement are simply sitting on the fence ready to jump ship.  His dictatorship is no longer a disguise bua fully blown autocracy.  His three decades of political manipulation is now hitting a dead end.  His deliberate economic mismanagement aimed at impoverishing citizens is getting exposed.  Institutionalized corruption, abuse of office, out right theft of public resources, nepotism, sectarianism, tribalism, and such other vices aimed at breeding a pro-regime so called Middle Income class is breeding serious discontent across the country.  Sectarianism based on regionalism, tribal, ethnicity, religion, and traditional institutions is threatening national cohesion.

The performance of his traditional power base - the security forces is being undermined by gross nepotism, favoritism, sectarianism, and poor welfare.  The dominance of top strategic command positions by officers from one region is posing a serious threat to the cohesion of the armed forces.  As a result there is a wave of mistrust, suspicion, and lack of job security amongst members of the three major subgroups of the armed forces i.e the Army, Police and Intelligence services.  Parallel groups like the Special Forces Group (SFG) under his son, Crime Preventers under the Police Chief and State House Intelligence are afforded preferential treatment in terms of facilitation on account of being considered as being more loyal to the regime than the country.  The mushrooming parallel special security squads within the respective security organs is undermining command and control.  Lack of accountability and gross human rights abuse with impunity is another resultant phenomena.  Within the intelligence services the situation is alarming.  Other than Military Intelligence (CMI) which is Museveni's favourite, the other statutory intelligence outfits like ISO, ESO and the traditional police intelligence are in shambles.  Museveni is relying more on ad hoc quasi intelligence outfits under the police chief, SFG and SH just because he believes that the statutory Ines were infiltrated by the opposition and in particular his former PM, Amama Mbabazi.  It is this respect that during the recently concluded Kyankwanzi retreat the Opposition ISO chief warned that rampant corruption could make the regime to loose power.  Shortly after the same fellow while appearing before the parliamentary committee he publicly expressed frustrations over poor facilitation of his organisation.

Though Museveni rightly believes that the much cherished mass protests championed by the pro change activists can not effectively take off, he is concerned over rising levels of political and economic discontent amongst majority Ugandans.  He knows that the will for mass protests highly exists within the population and that it could bring down his regime if only it were not for his guns.  It is in the same respect that whenever there is a threat of strikes by teachers, students, traders, transporters etc, he panics thinking that it can spark off massive national mass protests.  He is also more disturbed by his main challenger, Dr. Besigye's growing popularity at home, acceptability and recognition at international level.  Museveni's over a decade long attempt to destroy the institution of parliament is not giving him his desired results  because the presumed 'hostility' by the Speaker, Rebecca Kadaga.  However, to some extent he has succeeded in incorporating the prosecutory authority (DPP)  to his regime but he he getting trouble with an independent minded lower level judicial officers as opposed to the top cream judial officers whom he has compromised. 

With the looming harder economic times, Museveni is fearful of escalation of discontent among the population - a situation that may avail a fertile ground for an armed insurrection.  In his accurate estimates, his incohesice armed forces can not sustain a counter insurgency campaign.  Instead it will give rise to a situation similar to the 1984/1985 like situation that undermined the UNLA's counter insurgency against his NRA at the time.   As had been the case at the time, even now its the security forces that is setting the agenda for the political leadership.  The only difference is that unlike Obote who was not sectarian, Museveni has built a more personal amy (SFG) out of the bigger personalised army (UPDF) and a regime police force.  However, depending on what lenses you are using, the good or bad news is that the SFG is dissented by the majority in UPDF. 

His traditional terror scares as a means of internal suppression while blackmailing the west no longer sells not only at home but even to his traditional backers; the West.  With the terror scare off the menu, he is more worries of how best he can diffuse the tension and uncertainty that is building up by the day.  The situation is potentially economically and politically explosive.  On the diplomatic front, his growing hostility and humiliation towards the west and the UN while shifting alliances to the communist east (Russia, China, Kore), is not sustainable and will in the end leave him with featured limbs; if he will be lucky.  His semblance of relations with the West and the UN is only held by by a thin thread  - the Somali Mission and the hosting of fens of thousands of refugees from troubled neighboring countries who are victims of his imperialistic agendas.  Therefore, anyone seeking to dislodge Museveni from power has an uphill task of reassuring the West over the Somali Mission. 

It is against the above background that Museveni has undoubtedly run out of options.  His usual stage managed terror attacks meant to rally support from the West while at the same time a tool for stifling domestic political opposition, is no longer a viable option given the negative economic effects.  Therefore, he is left with only one option; to stage manage an attempted military take over.  A well organised stage managed attempted military take over will in his estimates salvage the status quo.  Some people will be killed, many targeted arrests effected and detained, property destroyed and a state of emergency declared.  That way, he will be able to stiffle the growing influence of the opposition, parliament will be suspended, the so called traitors purged from public service and the security forces and the regime party, the independent media destroyed etc.  That way he will be able to silence dissent that is currently at explosive proportations will enshrining in a new era of a fully blown military dictatorship that will catalyze his long term agenda if destroying Uganda.

INFORMATION IS POWER AND DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO.

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Where there is a will, there is always a way.

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