{UAH} How Sserwanga Lwanga came to his death (archives)

How Col. Sserwanga Lwanga was assasinated

COMMITTEE: We would like you to tell us who created ghosts in 4
Division to your knowledge.

KAZINI: You see we discovered there are ghosts, no army in 4 Division
at the time. We made a report to the C-I-C through the AC at that time
and he brought somebody called Nakayenga. They found ghosts in 1996,
and you remember one paymaster (Lt. Osele) killed himself because he
was cornered. He was sending Shs 400m to the Director of Finance, Maj.
Bright Rwamirama, at that time every month, even more.
We found that the army was not on ground and we scaled down. There was
merging of units. It's on record. Merged including Brigades, scaled
down because the army was not on ground. 405 Bde was deleted from the
books at that time under Lt. Col. Dradiga…At that time we didn't know
how many Bdes were supposed to be in UPDF and how many Bdes were cut
off because by the time I became COS, by establishment we could see
only Bde formations 501 and 503; the rest could appear as battalion
formations without Bde. They were there but few.
The parade was supposed to be done at Chwero of Nakayenga. They went
there, they didn't find soldiers. Then when they were going to fly
out, Dradiga threatened to shoot an RPG [at the] helicopter of
Nakayenga. We had to intervene with mambas. He didn't fire at it but
threatened and when the woman came, she went to the C-I-C and said she
has given up the work, can't continue because she is going to lose her
life.


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INTERVIEW

April 03, 2008
The testimony that sealed Kazini's fate

On September 22, 2005, The Weekly Observer exclusively published
excerpts of a testimony by now jailed MAJ. GEN. JAMES BUNANUKYE KAZINI
to the committee investigating ghost soldiers. To understand his
three-year prison sentence handed out last week by Court Martial
chairman LT. GEN. IVAN KORETA, one needs to read Kazini's testimony
again. Below we reproduce a slightly edited version.

COMMITTEE: We would like your particulars on record, army number,
name, appointment and the various offices you have held in the recent
past as an introduction.

KAZINI: I am Maj. Gen. James Kazini. RO 1331, served in various
capacities in UPDF. I begin with NRA as a regular army. I was a CO
(Commanding Officer) of 14 Bn, I will not mention the period, and then
I was CO 1 Bn (battalion), then Bde (brigade) commander 301. Then I
was camp commandant GHQs (General Headquarters), commandant Military
Police, armoured battalion CO at that time – CO mechanised regiment.
After that I was Operation Commander West Nile in Koboko. From there,
I became second in command of 4 Division, then later (1996) the
Division CO; after 4 Div I became the army (Chief of Staff) COS -
1998. During my tenure as COS, I was overseer of operations in DRC
(Operation Safe Haven) and overseer of operations against ADF, two
roles. Then I became the acting Army Commander (November 4, 2001).

COMMITTEE: We would like to hear from you the role of Army Commander
and Chief of Staff in strength management and passing of financial
claims?

KAZINI: When I became the Chief of Staff (COS)… first of all, there
was no correct handover and take over. I just inherited a stamp from
Chefe Ali. When I was appointed, I came to Bombo. I only found his
ADC, Lt. Nuwe [Kyepaka], who was seated on his desk. He said, 'Welcome
the new COS, here is the stamp'. I got the stamp, went and sat in the
chair and started working. No handover report.
The duties, which I found were actually rubber-stamping documents,
flow of documents, purchases, procurement, vouchers. There is what is
called a punched ladder, where documents come in, we don't know their
source of origin but you would see the vote holders' signature, they
just endorse to the PS [Permanent Secretary].
It took me time to understand because I was endorsing things I didn't
know about; uniforms, dry rations, fuel, etc. Then when these
documents go to the PS that ladder… those vouchers, you are the COS,
you just sign without even knowing the background of what is on the
vote.
As time went on, I started asking myself even at that time, the
question of paying soldiers was not the business of the COS.

COMMITTEE: What reasons can you give this Committee why Afande Chefe
Ali did not hand over?

KAZINI: I don't know. The culture of handover was not there in UPDF.

COMMITTEE: The genesis of ghosts in UPDF to your knowledge, the
background how the whole thing started and whom you think the main
actors and main weaknesses are?

KAZINI: I want to tell the chair that they should understand the word
ghosts and balances. These are two different things, which you need to
understand. I think ghosts originated from balances. It begins in a
given financial year; let's say financial year 2004-2005. I have a
document here, which I have brought as a case study for May this year
(2003), how much money was verified and paid out to soldiers and how
much money came out of the Treasury, which left behind a balance of
1.9 billion shillings officially.

COMMITTEE: What you are saying is that because names are not declared,
whether deserters or dead, the Treasury keeps remitting money every
month which is known?

KAZINI: Yes.

COMMITTEE: By whom?

KAZINI: By the Director of Finance and Permanent Secretary. Now the
Chief of Staff and Army Commander are aside. We don't know that.

COMMITTEE: PS knows it?

KAZINI: Yes, Director of Finance and Principal Accountant.

COMMITTEE: Those know?

KAZINI: Very well.

COMMITTEE: That this money that has come from the Treasury has no owner?

KAZINI: Yes. It remains here and it's put on what they call below the
line account.

COMMITTEE: Even before money goes to the Division or Bde to be eaten,
already there is money here at the HQ which is known and you are
giving an example that in May alone Shs 1.9 billion was availed
officially, which was put on what account?

KAZINI: Below the line account. This money comes here and is deducted
officially from the Treasury bill. Looking at the documents, the
amount of money released from Treasury in May was Shs 10.6 billion.
Then the balance of Shs 1.9 billion. Yes, and it's deducted every
month, official balance; that is what I am saying. Yes, this is a
paper on ghosts. What I meant is that big balance of the so-called
ghosts remains here. That is what I call the official balance. There
are these other small balances which people (field commanders) buy
time (with); [saying] after all if we submit this one it's going to
remain at the HQ and be eaten. Let me also remain with this one until
the financial year ends.

COMMITTEE: Does that mean that the people at the HQ actually have the
list of the dead, AWOL and deserters they already know?

KAZINI: They do! It arises because we know the verified strength, they
have already verified the strength, there are the dead, AWOL (Away
Without Official Leave), and deserters. So instead of telling the
Treasury, the wage bill should be cut by this amount this month, they
don't do it because it's internal.

COMMITTEE: So you are sure there are ghosts?

KAZINI: Yes. For sure there are ghosts in the army but controlled now.
There is the official and unofficial (in other words at the MOD HQs
and in units).

COMMITTEE: Why are some people saying that you are the one who
encouraged ghosts?

KAZINI: I don't know. I don't think I was encouraging ghosts. It's me
and it's on record in message books [who] started this question of
fighting ghosts. I am the third [fourth?] AC (Army Commander). There
was Afande [Elly] Tumwine, [Salim] Saleh, Gen. [Mugisha] Muntu, and
[Jeje] Odongo… all these things were there. Whether they were
sleeping, who knows? So absurd to say it's me. May be I got into
people's ways of …

COMMITTEE: We would like you to tell us who created ghosts in 4
Division to your knowledge.

KAZINI: You see we discovered there are ghosts, no army in 4 Division
at the time. We made a report to the C-I-C through the AC at that time
and he brought somebody called Nakayenga. They found ghosts in 1996,
and you remember one paymaster (Lt. Osele) killed himself because he
was cornered. He was sending Shs 400m to the Director of Finance, Maj.
Bright Rwamirama, at that time every month, even more.
We found that the army was not on ground and we scaled down. There was
merging of units. It's on record. Merged including Brigades, scaled
down because the army was not on ground. 405 Bde was deleted from the
books at that time under Lt. Col. Dradiga…At that time we didn't know
how many Bdes were supposed to be in UPDF and how many Bdes were cut
off because by the time I became COS, by establishment we could see
only Bde formations 501 and 503; the rest could appear as battalion
formations without Bde. They were there but few.
The parade was supposed to be done at Chwero of Nakayenga. They went
there, they didn't find soldiers. Then when they were going to fly
out, Dradiga threatened to shoot an RPG [at the] helicopter of
Nakayenga. We had to intervene with mambas. He didn't fire at it but
threatened and when the woman came, she went to the C-I-C and said she
has given up the work, can't continue because she is going to lose her
life.

COMMITTEE: You remember a Capt. Byakutaga ran away with money for our
troops in Operation Safe Haven?

KAZINI. It's on record that it's me actually who sent a message
looking for him because soldiers in Basankusu were complaining about
non-payment for a month. I sent a message and they said he had taken
the Arua route bringing the money. So we waited and he never appeared.
That is another case, he just ran away with the money. Hopefully, he
will appear one day and say he was leaving GHQs for pay in the very
eyes of the acting Chief of Staff at that time, Brig. Kashaka. So it
really disturbs me how one could withdraw Shs 1.3 billion in cash and
is not given security.

COMMITTEE: Maj. Bush would antagonise the Chief of Logistics and
Engineering (Brig. Oketa) allegedly on your orders, and Maj. Nuwe in
Military Police [antagonised Lt. Col. Dick Bujingo]?

KAZINI: Maj. Bush has been OC POL [officer in charge of petrol, oils
and lubricants] in that department since the beginning of this army…
It was not me who deployed him, it was COS. I was in Gulu. I found
that those who had come from Egypt had been deployed. But to say that
I was using him to abuse Oketa… actually that was an abuse to me.
I never sent Bush to abuse Oketa. Oketa said many things, as you know,
and he is the one saying that he is the one who removed me from the
army command as I am talking now. It's not correct.
First of all, I came with CLE [Chief of Logistics and Engineering], we
came at the same time, me as COS, Oketa as CLE. This is a kind of
conflict. What Brig. Oketa was aiming at was different. I can explain
a few things.

What he wanted [to say] actually was that I was interfering in his
work because I was implementing the President's directives. The
President said that let the army get out of procurement, and contract
with civilian organisations like Total, Shell and all that, it should
be MOD [Ministry of Defence]. That was what I was implementing.
Whenever I would not be here, he [Oketa] would bulldoze these
undersecretaries around, threaten to box them. They are here; ask
Madam Byengoma, Kakooza, etc. He would tell them that he is a fighter
– but we are the ones who captured Oketa in Masaka – that I have
brought German dogs in Gulu to guard me against him. Whenever I would
be here, he would not bulldoze the ministry. Maj. Nuwe became an OPTO
(in charge of training and operations of Military Police) after his
course in Egypt. There is not even a single day that I had given him
orders to undermine his commanding officer (Lt. Col. Dick Bujingo).
No. Maj. Nuwe is there and you know Military Police, what work do they
do apart from guarding a few soldiers here in Bombo and escorting Bank
of Uganda money?

COMMITTEE: There have been allegations that you promoted a particular
type of people, like Lt. Col. Segamwenge, Lt. Col. Mawa [Muhindo], Lt.
Col. L'Okech, Maj. Nuwe [Kyepaka]?

KAZINI: The power of promotion is vested in the C-I-C
[Commander-in-Chief]. People were promoted by the C-I-C because they
excelled in operational performance. Actually, what I was doing, I was
saying this one has done that, this one has done this, so he does
that. That one I think the C-I-C had those powers.
Now, when it comes to jumping ranks, so many people had jumped ranks,
now about Afande Muntu [Mugisha], he was a colonel and he became a
major general. How about Jeje Odongo, why don't you include them on
the list?

COMMITTEE: The question is because those ones were promoted by the
C-I-C directly.

KAZINI: Even these ones were promoted by C-I-C. There are messages
that promoted Segamwenge, Mawa, L'Okech and Nuwe directly without
referring to the promotions board.

COMMITTEE: Some people are complaining that you lied to H.E. about
those people, they have never performed?

KAZINI: If I lied, then that one I accept. If the President can be
lied to then… but why should I lie to my C-I-C, first of all I am a
soldier. I took an oath, why should I tell lies to mislead him? Then
those people who are saying that I am telling lies should give facts,
we shall listen to them.

COMMITTEE: Why do you think such a thing (promotions) should have
prompted protests?

KAZINI: They complained, then later on 1,300 officers were promoted
randomly, even those who were dead. The C-I-C was made to sign an
administrative order promoting people, even those who died. Was that
justified? When we promoted 1,300 people randomly before elections!
Because of lack of records, a list was taken even as people had
disappeared, others had gone to Rwanda, why don't you talk about
those? Just a few of those like L'Okech who did well in Congo!
Because really to complain about these four people, really we promoted
many and you don't even comment on that mistake that was made of
random promotion, these fake service numbers, fake names, the list is
there, it can be verified. Whether those people had done courses, how
were they promoted by the so-called Commissions' Board at that time,
who chaired it?

COMMITTEE: The Bihanga recruitment. 7,000 recruits were crammed into a
place which allegedly was inadequate and poorly facilitated?

KAZINI: We have trained that number before in Bihanga. Secondly, the
situation in Ituri warranted us to train them there. So we wanted
quick recruitment elsewhere in the west to reinforce Ituri if you
[know what] was happening at that time. So there was no peculiar
motive. It was purely based on the situation as it was at that time.
You see a big majority of UPDF come from irregular forces (LDUs). So
there is nobody who can [claim] that the Bihanga forces training was
shoddy when you know that 70% of the UPDF originated from LDUs.

COMMITTEE: Why was there friction between you and Chief of Training
(COT) Col. Muhesi over this Bihanga issue, and Col. Potel Kivuna?

KAZINI: The problem I think arose from supplies. Everybody here knows
that when you have a training wing you don't supply; so they thought
that now it's Potel going to do the supply, of course helping me, like
that.
So we denied the COT a chance.
So the conflict was that I was denying him that chance. He even came
to me saying, you know your sister came to me. There is this chance we
are going to train. I told him, Muhesi don't tell me this - you know
he is married to my cousin sister – that your sister is now going to
have milk because we are going to have training.
I said, me I know how to make my money, [but] not from that line. That
is the whole problem, not congestion. Saying that my sister is now
going to get milk…

COMMITTEE: So Inspector General of Military Equipment (IGME) does not
know how many guns he has?

KAZINI: Yes, returns. I started it one time as AC for these big ones
and the weapons which were not working. He failed because he had no
database. So we were telling commanders that when you are sending
nominal rolls, put the serial numbers of the weapons, it was never
done.

COMMITTEE: So really you do not know where these guns are?

KAZINI: No.

COMMITTEE: And what you are saying is that commanders can deploy them
as and when they want?

KAZINI: Yes.

COMMITTEE: Without central counter?

KAZINI: Yes. A gun is supposed to have a Bn (battalion) number and a
serial number recorded. With us it is not the case, we just give out
guns like that. For example, all those guns given to the Arrow Group,
they were just from stores anywhere and given.

COMMITTEE: But then, how do you run the army? By magic or what?

KAZINI: You know we have been running the Army because of the good
politics of the President. Because that is how LDUs come in. You get
surprised, where is the army? AC, Fanya LDUs hapa, andika document
fanya Bunyoro/Buganda LDU. Like that. The army has been surviving on
the goodwill of the President and his good politics. Fanya hii, fanya
hii. Standing army, where is it?

Even you remember when the RPAs went, they deserted about 4,000
people, and we were all here. Nobody said let us verify strength…
these people have gone, they should be counted AWOL (Absent without
official leave), then their numbers will be known. Can anybody tell us
how many RPAs left the army?

It is just an imagined number from the press. But you know really
somebody would have said no, I think they have escaped, here are their
names. There is no record of the RPA who escaped. We would have it in
data. Kalekezi, Kagame, somebody, nobody had it.

COMMITTEE: Interpersonal conflicts, first of all are they there?

KAZINI: No, they are not there. It is just undermining authority that
is there. Because I did not make myself the COS [Chief of Staff].
These people would go around saying but who made this Kazini the COS,
hii mtu hakukuwa porini….[this man did not even fight in the bush]
Mambo kama hiyo [stuff like that]. After that AC…. Huyo hana shida [he
has no problem] with the C-I-C, the appointing authority. That me I
did not go to school.
That is up to the C-I-C. The knowledge I have, maybe he appreciated
it. That is why he gave me that appointment. So it is something like
that. To me, it is not conflict, it is just undermining authority.

COMMITTEE: During your leadership, you had problems with Col. Muhesi,
Brig. Oketa, Brig. Tumukunde, Col. Burundi, among others, and your
reasons for that perception?

KAZINI: There were others. Now that you have mentioned some of them,
you should also mention others (Col. Angina, Col. Muzoora, Maj.
Mutengesa, Lt. Col. Dick Bugingo).

Let me start with Brig. Tumukunde. You know very well Tumukunde was
the Chief of Personnel and Administration (CPA). When Afande Saleh
came to Gulu as the overseer, Tumukunde said that it was me who had
asked the President to bring Afande Saleh, and yet the whole AC would
be the one to come there.

He went to the President and said that may be Afande Saleh's people
are not working in the GHQs. Then whenever I would say something,
Tumukunde would intervene. When he (Tumukunde) became Chief of
Military Intelligence (CMI), I happened to be the COS. The AC then,
Afande Jeje [Odongo], mandated me to go and preside over the
handover/takeover as COS.

I went there and sat with the C/Comdt [Camp Commandant], he refused to
come, that he does not recognise me as COS. Me what I did was to tell
the person taking over to continue with work.

From CMI he became the 4th Div CO [Commanding Officer]. He commanded
the Division well and then he made a lot of changes there, and the
balances, he landed on it, he handled it the way he wanted. We did not
care about that one.

But the worst strong point came when he planned an operation to go and
attack Kony in Sudan at Lubanga Tek, which later on failed. I was not
told anything, I was here as the COS. It was between him (Tumukunde),
the AC then, and the President.

They went and marshalled forces, organised, I did not know anything…
The President is the one who told us there is a mission going to
happen there, me I was just hearing like news.

So what Tumukunde did; he went, flagged off the forces, and he flew to
America. I was not monitoring anything. It was the President who knew
that the operational commander was not there. Then he called off the
forces because they did not have food, they had got tired. It is a
long journey…

It was Oketa to command the operation after he had given all the
confidence that he would succeed. They had reached almost 10km to the
target but Mzee [President Museveni] was given information, I think
from intelligence. Out of the force, I think they were 1,500, 500 were
already on stretchers. This is the information I got much later.

Then he said stop, and come back. Tumukunde, I understand, was in the
USA. For him he said: Aaah, this is Kazini now, who has undermined my
work, my operation.

He met me here in corridors and told me, and I said, 'I did not know
about your operation, Tumukunde'. I was taken by surprise to read the
message of H.E the President stopping the operation but I did not know
really about the operation.

I would have supported it, I did not want it to end. But for him he
took it that I had sabotaged it. Only to find out the operation
commanders he had sent; Rwandese and other people, they got stuck on
the way, food could not reach. It was a rainy season, between the
border and that place you can't take less than seven days… everything
was stuck on the way. Okay those things happen. So that is another
matter.

Things continued like that. One time, he was saying that when I was
made the COS, I came with the following people; he used to talk about
it openly. Lt. Col. Mugenyi Phenehas to be CPA, Obwoya Fearless to be
CLE, like that, like that. He said that first of all, I took Afande
Saleh to the North [to] manufacture a coup d'etat… That is Tumukunde,
Sir.

I said, Tumukunde, why are you making up all that? And when I was COS,
he [Tumukunde] never appeared in my office, to call him on phone, he
refused. I looked for a way to arrest him but I couldn't because as I
told you the COS is not empowered to do anything like that.
It continued, then lastly there was an eviction of people from houses in town.

This was H.E.'s directive. He said that people who are living in
houses of Indians, go and convince them to get out of people's houses;
when they refuse and there is an eviction letter, you should take them
out.

It happened that Tumukunde's sister had a house in Kololo. Me, I did
not know. When that thing happened, Tumukunde knew that I had
specifically tasked Military Police to evict his sister from the
house.

I told Tumukunde that I didn't know of it. If he had rang me, that
eviction I would have stopped until he sorted it out. So that is
undermining of authority, it is not a problem concerning cohesion in
the army.

When he was handing over CMI [Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence] to
Mayombo, I was there. The AC mandated me, you go, and see the
handover. You know what he said?

"I know you have followed me again, now I am going to Gulu, I do not
think Gulu will be my last office, because you are still behind me" –
at the handover ceremony! So that is Tumukunde.

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