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{UAH} IDDI AMIN NEVER TARGETED LANGIs/ACHOLIs, THEY TARGETED HIM {---Series two-Hundred and fifteen}

ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE CONFLICT AND THE PEACE PROCESS

ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY:

Most respondents named Joseph Kony as bearing the greatest responsibility for the conflict in the north,

frequently followed by the government, which was seen as contributing to the root causes of the conflict

through its perceived marginalisation of the Acholi and/or ineptitude in suppressing the insurgency. Although

a small number of individuals felt that high ranking individuals were responsible for actions committed

during conflict, most of those interviewed did not attribute responsibility for initiating or perpetuating the

conflict to LRA combatants (including top commanders), who were broadly perceived as having been conscripted

against their will. Many respondents believed that the initial rebellion was a justifiable response to

government repression, but that the methods employed by the LRA later on were unacceptable. Joseph Kony

was blamed for not giving up arms when it became apparent he would not win, and respondents seemed to

feel that he had placed his own interests above the well-being of his people, the Acholi. When asked what

should happen to the rebel leader, many respondents spoke of punitive measures, including execution or exile,

and stated emphatically that he would not be permitted back in the community.

These responses differed somewhat from those obtained in prior research among IDPs in the north, where

support for reintegration of all combatants, including top LRA commanders, was widespread.29 One possible

explanation for this difference is that the northern communities have been the subject of an intense sensitisation

campaign over the past several years focusing on issues of reconciliation, reintegration, and the use of

traditional restorative practices. Many of those interviewed in Kampala fled before the beginning of these debates,

which may also account for why they were less likely than in the north to spontaneously use terms such

as mato oput and, when prompted, showed an awareness of the broad principles of traditional justice but

could not describe the practices in detail. Emotional distancing may also have some impact on the responses

offered, as the community in Kampala may deliberately choose to avoid engaging in such debates in an effort

to focus on the challenges of everyday life.

 

Both ex-combatant and non-combatant respondents viewed former combatants as not responsible for actions

committed during the conflict, but nevertheless damaged by them. Most respondents, whether they

had been combatants themselves or not, believed that fighters (including commanders) on either side of the

conflict were not responsible for any atrocities committed (as long as those actions were not undertaken

for personal reasons), because they were "following orders", or feared death if they disobeyed such orders.

A small number of respondents attributed responsibility partly based on whether an individual entered the

conflict willingly or was abducted, and for this reason were slightly more likely to view UPDF commanders who

committed atrocities as accountable. Rather than endorsing a gradation of responsibility calibrated to reflect

increasing seniority in the ranks, according to respondents all the responsibility is vested in the top leadership,

with the rank and file (at least within the LRA) perceived as unwilling participants. The explanations offered for

this were often psychological in nature, and involved descriptions of methods by which fighters were inducted

into the LRA and which those interviewed felt resulted in brainwashing.

 

While many respondents did not think ex-combatants should be held criminally responsible for actions committed

under orders, they nonetheless believed that some form of accountability is required for them to be reintegrated

back into their communities. The rationales offered for this were both psychological and spiritual.

From a psychological perspective many respondents stressed that individual reconciliation would be required

for perpetrators to live alongside their victims and to facilitate psychosocial reintegration. If following traditional

forms, such reconciliation would require truth-telling (at the village level), apology, and perhaps some

form of compensation.

 

On the spiritual level, it was felt that many of the combatants are possessed by the spirits of those they killed,

and that such sprits can only be laid to rest through specific traditional ceremonies which combine aspects

of truth-telling and apology, but which are distinct from processes leading to reconciliation. A number of interviewees

explained that when an innocent person is killed, the spirit of that person enters their murderer

and continues to incite them to acts of further violence. This phenomenon is described as "amorawang" and

is believed to confuse the mind of its victim leading to black-outs and acts of senseless violence. Some of the

ex-combatants interviewed believe themselves to be possessed by amorawang, and declared themselves a

danger to others. Among the non-combatants, stories abounded of former abductees returning from the bush

and murdering their own families in a fit of madness.

 

Thus, while the ex-combatants were frequently perceived as not legally responsible for actions committed in

the bush, they were nevertheless tainted by such actions and viewed as requiring special assistance (including

prayer, counselling, or traditional ceremonies) in order to recover. Failure to perform such ceremonies is

feared to result in a continuing threat of violence from those possessed, and possible harm to future generations

in the form of haunting, "madness", and illness.

 

ATTITUDES TOWARDS TRUTH-TELLING:

Truth-telling by perpetrators within their immediate community was frequently understood to be a necessary

step in the recovery of individuals. Specifically, hearing a confession of what happened from the perpetrator

was sometimes mentioned as a key component of reconciliation between individual perpetrators and

their neighbour-victims (at the village level) and ex-combatants possessed by amorawang are believed to recover

through the performance of traditional ceremonies which involve the person confessing what they have

done to the elders of his or her clan, followed by the elders apologising to the spirit of the person innocently

killed. According to some reports, the spirit might also request reparations involving compensation, either

directly or to its surviving family members. This was not said to be a general rule, however, and depends on

the individual personality of the spirit in question.

 

The need for more formal and national truth-telling was strongly linked in respondents' minds with the

possible consequences of such truth-telling, and was viewed differently depending on whether it was seen

to involve victims or perpetrators. There seemed to be a fair amount of support for perpetrators coming

forward to explain their actions, though some respondents feared that doing so in too great a detail could

provoke a renewal of violence. Interestingly, those respondents who admitted to having committed atrocities

also generally expressed a willingness to tell their whole story in public (including on TV), and stated that

their neighbours knew of their past as combatants, even if not always in great detail. This willingness may

relate to the fact that perpetrators and the community alike believed no legal consequences could follow on

from truth-telling, as an amnesty is currently being granted to all who renounce rebellion.30 Most returnee

ex-combatants regard themselves as victims who acted under duress, and many stated their willingness to

come forward in a very public truth-telling process both because they wish to unburden themselves of painful

memories and because they believe that given the chance to tell their story they could convince the audience

that they are victims of circumstance.

 

Respondents were more ambiguous about the need for the victims (including in many cases themselves)

to come forward. Many expressed fears about stirring up old memories or putting themselves at risk from

perpetrators present in the community or from broader political forces. The fear was also conveyed that

such truth-telling could lead to further stereotyping of Acholis as barbaric. For some respondents this was

linked to the fact that when they had tried to share their personal stories with non-Acholi, they encountered

ridicule. When asked to explain further, some of those interviewed indicated that they would be willing to

come forward but only if they felt certain that doing so would lead to concrete action in the form of reparations

on the part of the government. This was accompanied, however, by profound scepticism on the part

of respondents regarding the outcome of any government-supported truth-telling process, and fears for the

personal safety, both physical and emotional, of those who come forward to speak.

 

RECONCILIATION:

 

Reconciliation was viewed by respondents as a multi-layered process, requiring different degrees of rigor

at different levels. These levels included communal (inter-village, inter-Acholi, inter-tribal), and national. In

general, those interviewed seemed to attach greatest significance to the narrower forms of reconciliation

(specifically inter-village and inter-Acholi), which, for pragmatic reasons, they identified as particularly difficult

but also more necessary, and as requiring a combination of truth-telling, apology, and in some cases

compensation. In order for former combatants to return to their villages, for instance, it is considered necessary

for them to reconcile with any neighbours or family members they may have harmed, and whom they

will have to encounter on a daily basis. Some respondents stated that the grant of Amnesty had reconciled

individual fighters with the government, but that they still needed to be reconciled with their own communities.

 

Inter-tribal or national reconciliation is seen as less urgent and more symbolic. It is also further complicated

by the shifting nature of the conflict and respondents' varied attributions of responsibility for its

perpetuation. Some of those interviewed, for instance, felt that it would be inappropriate for the Acholi to

reconcile with others since it was not the Acholi as a whole who went to war against other tribes. Rather,

other tribes suffered as a by-product of a conflict between Joseph Kony and the government. Proposals of

inter-tribal reconciliation are felt to be further complicated by the fact that the protocols for reconciliation

may differ somewhat between different ethnic groups and that in many cases the specific perpetrators or

victims cannot be readily identified. On a national level, respondents identified the need for reconciliation

between Kony and the government, and some also endorsed the idea of an apology by LRA leadership and

by the government to the victims of the war.

 

Reconciliation, and in particular mato oput (for those interviewees familiar with the term), was presented

by respondents as a final symbolic act which rightly belonged at the end of a long process involving different

forms of accountability, including apology and truth-telling. The need for perpetrators to step forward

and accept responsibility for their acts was cited repeatedly as a prerequisite of reconciliation, with many

respondents stating that forgiveness could not be granted if it was not asked for. It was said repeatedly that

mato oput on its own did not constitute reconciliation and would not result in lasting peace. Respondents

felt strongly that trying to reconcile the different parties on a national level before a final peace agreement

was signed would be futile. There was some indication that mato oput was viewed as inappropriate on a na-tional

level as it is perceived to rely on specific individuals taking responsibility for their actions – doubt was

expressed whether government bureaucracies, for example, could be held accountable in the same way.

 

Respondents also stressed the need for spiritual reconciliation. Some interviewees spoke about the need

for individuals to reconcile with themselves and with their creator, forgiving themselves and others for

wrongs committed. Others talked of the need to reconcile specifically with the spirit world, which was described

as a process of putting spirits to rest through traditional ceremonies that were distinct from those

intended to bring about reconciliation between humans (such as mato oput). It was indicated that while the

spirits of the dead who may be the subject of a mato oput ceremony would likely be pleased by it, they were

not necessarily bound by the outcome. In order to put troublesome spirits of the dead to rest it is necessary

to address them directly through elders and spiritual leaders. Many respondents, including those sceptical

about individual truth-telling, emphasized the importance of commemoration and memorialisation in this

context, stressing the necessity of remembering the dead through proper burial and prayer. The fear was

expressed that without proper burial and acknowledgement, the spirits would feel like they had been forgotten

by those still living and would continue to haunt their communities, causing mischief for generations

to come.

 

 

Stay in the forum for Series two hundred and sixteen on the way   ------>

EM

On the 49th Parallel          

                 Thé Mulindwas Communication Group
"With Yoweri Museveni, Ssabassajja and Dr. Kiiza Besigye, Uganda is in anarchy"
                    
Kuungana Mulindwa Mawasiliano Kikundi
"Pamoja na Yoweri Museveni, Ssabassajja na Dk. Kiiza Besigye, Uganda ni katika machafuko"

 

 

 

 

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