{UAH} Ndugu Allan/John Kwitonda: Banyoro are really big headed!!!!! Kabala refines his art of war as British hunt blacks
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Kabalega's quick realisation that his forces were no match for the combined British, Sudanese and Baganda forces and his subsequent change in tactics, was not just revolutionary but also helped prolong his war of resistance.
The British-led attack on Bunyoro, offered Omukama Kabalega Cwa II the biggest-ever threat to his kingdom but it also provided the theatre of adversity in which he was able to demonstrate a remarkable survival instinct and military tactical awareness.
For starters, Kabalega immediately acknowledged that the invading force was superior in men and arms and that it would be futile to meet it head-on. He also knew that the invading force had been bolstered up by between 14,000 to 20,000 Baganda fighters whose raids on Bunyoro usually lasted only a month or two.
To deny the invading force a quick morale-boosting event, Kabalega then set fire to his palace at Mparo and adopted mobile guerrilla warfare, drawing the invading forces deeper and deeper into his kingdom away from food and other supplies while avoiding any form of contact with them.
The memoirs of Major Arthur Blyford Thruston, one of the British officers involved in the military expedition to Bunyoro, show that Kabalega missed an opportunity to attack and cause major damage to the invading force as it tried to cross the River Kafu.
Tactics
However, it appears that Kabalega chose to wait for his raiding parties still in Toro and Busoga to rejoin his main forces. He also expected the Baganda to return to Buganda within a few weeks and decided to wait them out. Evasive action was therefore a sign of the strength of planning, not weakness.
The first few weeks of the invasion were remarkable for the lack of major fighting, save for a few skirmishes here and there. So much so that by the end of February 1894, the British, who had marched across southern Bunyoro to Lake Albert, considered one of their main objectives to be complete.
Writing on February 27, 1894, Major Thruston noted: "I arrived at my new headquarters at Hoima, and the expedition had come to an end. From a fighting point of view, it had been trivial, but its results were not inconsiderable. The power of Kabarega had been broken, the Uganda frontier secured from invasion, a road had been opened out to Lake Albert, British influence had been extended down the Nile as far as Wadelai, and we had discovered that our claims were in no danger from our European competitors."
Raids & counter attacks
The congratulations were premature. After the Baganda force had arbitrarily, and without the knowledge of the British officers, scattered Kabalega's forces with a surprise attack in which they raided cattle and goats, the Omukama rallied his troops soon after and led a counter-attack in which the Baganda fighters turned and ran away in terror.
After continued desertions, the Baganda fighters were demobilised and allowed to return home as Kabalega had expected but the British remained, building forts across his land, which they manned with Nubian (Sudanese) fighters.
In August 1894 Kabalega's eldest son, Jasi and two of Kabalega's highest-ranking chiefs, Ireyta and Rwabudongo led an army of 750 Banyoro fighters armed with guns and an unknown number armed with spears in an attack on the largest British fort at Hoima.
Shane Doyle notes in his book, Crisis and Decline in Bunyoro that Kabalega's forces had already adapted their fighting formations from columns to ranks to take advantage of their guns, rather than use them as "loud spears" as the Baganda continued to do.
However, the 150 Nubian fighters at the fort were vastly more experienced and accurate with their fire, beating off the attacking force and killing 200 of Kabalega's forces.
Kabalega quickly learnt from this disaster and returned to the guerrilla warfare that had served him relatively well, attacking British supply convoys and ambushing them in vantage points especially forests and swamps.
"The evolution of the Nyoro military strategy in the 1890s was quite remarkable, and has no contemporary east African parallels," Doyle wrote. "The willingness to switch from an aggressive to a defensive mode of guerrilla warfare reflected the strength and innovativeness of Nyoro political culture under Kabalega."
Kabalega also understood the importance of terrain. After his camp and armoury at Mashudi were attacked and burnt, he retreated his troops to Kuzumbera on the eastern banks of the River Nile, using the river as a natural defence and also allowing him access to supplies through his rear-guard.
If necessity is the mother of invention then Kabalega was relying on his disadvantaged position and a survival instinct to out-manoeuvre the invading forces. His troops struggled to find ammunition and often had to rely on homemade bullets, stones and spears.
Kabalega's disadvantage
They did not have the luxury of training and, even when they arranged excellent ambushes, often missed the chance to cause major damage because of their lack of accuracy or experience with the firearms. Even then, Kabalega tried to cure this problem by changing the way his troops arranged their ambushes.
His enemies, on the other hand, had superior arms, including the Maxim guns and Hotchkiss cannons whose extended range meant that they could fire and kill Banyoro fighters from more than a mile away – a revolutionary range in warfare of the time. The British and Sudanese fighters could fire at Kabalega's troops, secure in the knowledge that their return fire could not get close to them.
Again Kabalega responded to this imbalance by having his troops dig trenches and build fortifications but the introduction of artillery by the British soon gave them the upper hand again.
Kabalega also pulled a classic psychological tactic, leaving prominent mounds of fetishes in the path of the invading forces. It is not clear whether he thought the British would fear the effects of witchcraft but Kabalega must have known that the Baganda fighters, who were more familiar with the subject, would at least think twice and associate any misfortune with this 'super spiritual power'.
Kabalega's greatest tactic however, was political, by attempting to keep his people loyal to him rather than collaborate with the foreigners as the Baganda had done to their detriment.
As the war went on, the Banyoro showed remarkable loyalty to their king but their refusal to cooperate frustrated the British forces so much that it led to widespread human rights abuses that would, in today's world constitute crimes against humanity.
For some British officers such as Major Thruston, the war in Bunyoro would become the 'chasse aux negres' or a blood sport involving the hunting and shooting of Africans, in particular the Banyoro.
They had come as protectors but the Brits were now looking at the Banyoro as prey.
Democracy is two Wolves and a Lamb voting on what to have for lunch. Liberty is a well-armed Lamb disputing the results.
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